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ABSTRACT
Football has existed as a popular sport in Britain and the world for several centuries.
The game has evolved from a violent rural participant sport into a global entertainment
with thousands of amateur and professional teams vying for national and international
honours. Since 1960 a 'new' phenomenon 'football hooliganism' has become a 'moral
panic' amongst the media and the public. Crowd violence at football matches has
become a major social concern. Various explanations have been presented to explain
football hooliganism, but none of these explanations have been completely satisfactory.
Football crowd violence is not a new phenomenon, it has existed in a evolving
relationship with football since the sport's inception. The modern problem is a media
created moral panic over a long established human condition namely collective crowd
behaviour. Although many explanations have been offered to explain and solve
football hooliganism, none has attempted a detailed investigation of football crowd
violence through theories of collective behaviour.
Collective behaviour offers a viable alternative explanation for the causes of football
crowd violence. Using Neil Smelser's value-added theory and building block
approach, football crowds are analysed to determine the factors that contribute to
football hooliganism including: social stress in Scottish society including religious
intolerance and class influences, the football crowd structure, the media, the police, and
factors leading to violence. The results offer an explanation of the specific structure
required to create violence which in turn indicates how violence can be controlled.
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Football is unique in that the crowd is triangular in nature since it consists of two
opposing support groups and the police. Each Saturday these three groups are in
confrontation with each other on the terraces while two teams play football, but only in
rare instances does actual violence occur.
As a result of the analysis of football crowds through the value-added theory of
collective behaviour, conclusions are drawn which indicate that steps can be taken in
the wider society and by the police to reduce the possibility of football crowd violence.
The focusing of support group attention on the opposition support is vital to crowd
violence. The police are generally able to restrict crowd violence by disrupting this
focusing process. Although collective violence can never be totally controlled, the non¬
violent ritualised behaviour on the terraces can be maintained while at the same time
reducing the possibility of collective crowd action. This can be achieved by altering
police activities, reducing social stress in the community, and altering preconceived
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"Soccer hits the ultimate depths"
AT LEAST 42 KILLED AT EUROPEAN CUP FINAL
TV millions see carnage at match
A NIGHT OF DEATH and dishonour, and still the bodies pile up on the
terraces. Riot police and the paratroopers called up in a bid to control
fighting hooligans.
FORTY-TWO football fans were killed and 150 seriously injured last
night in the most appalling and tragic display of crowd violence ever
seen in Europe.
Supporters of Liverpool and Juventus were battling on the terraces of
the Heysel Stadium in Brussels an hour before the European Cup Final
was due to start.
As Italian fans tried to escape, a dividing wall collapsed. Many people
were crushed by the tumbling masonry and others were trampled to
death as the hysterical crowd surged over them.
But even as the people lay dying and the screams of the injured filled the
stadium, the hooligan hordes carried on fighting each other and the
Belgian police, who seemed powerless to halt the mayhem.
In the confusion it was several minutes before rescuers could reach the
injured, 50 of whom are in critical condition.
The dead were carried away on police riot shields, some draped with the
flags of the clubs which they had been waving proudly only minutes
before. Liverpool manager Joe Fagan donned a soccer shirt and walked
across the pitch to plead for calm from his side's 15,000 supporters.
But it took police riot squads and officers on horseback to separate the
fighting fans.
As the enormity of the tragedy was realized most of the 52,000 crowd
stood shocked and silent, many in tears.
But the hooligans, many of them wild through drink, continued to fight
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and bombard the police with sticks and other missiles.
The dead were in sections Y and Z. Y section included mostly British
supporters while the Z section was a mixture of British, Italian and
Belgian.
Liverpool fan Paul Fry, 28, from Stevenage, said: 'I was in section Z
and saw it all.
There were Liverpool fans in there by right. They charged the Juventus
fans. There was no segregation. If there had been I don't think this
would have happened.
Then Liverpool fans in Section X fired flares. Then they charged.
I was trying to get back where it was safer.
The police did not help, even though the fault was the Liverpool fans.
They continued to wield their batons on anybody. They helped spread
the panic'.
Outside the ground, the car park became a temporary mortuary as the
dead were laid out in rows.
A helicopter ran a shuttle service of the injured to hospital.
In an office behind the main stand, officials of UEFA and the two clubs
met to decide whether the game should go ahead.
The players were against it, but it was decided that the match would be
played in the hope of preventing even more
bloodshed.
And more than 80 minutes after the scheduled start the two teams did
come out. As they did so, dozens more riot police entered the stadium.
At the kick-off there were 1000 circling the pitch". 1
Soccer: The Creation Of The Social Problem
Football crowds have been associated with violence throughout the history of the
sport.2 The problem of football crowd violence is a universal one,3 but it is only
1. Daily Mail. 30 May 1985, pp. 1 and 2.
2. Neil Offen, God Save The Plavers: The Funny Sometimes Violent Wodd Of Sports Fans.
Chicago, 1974, pp. 131.
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since 1960 4 that the relationship between football crowds and violence has become a
matter of major public concern. It is from this point that this thesis begins an
investigation into crowd violence at football matches.
Football crowd violence has caused a great amount of property damage, personal
injury, death, police activity, court time, public condemnation, and government action
since its identification as a major social problem. This thesis will look at the historical
relationship between football and crowds with the intent of looking into the real
relationship between the game, participants and spectators; it will also present an
analysis of that change and how it relates to the modern day problem of football crowd
violence. Football violence may not be as serious or as common as property crime or
crimes of violence in the wider community, but the fear created by the larger social
problem of football crowd violence - of which the Brussels riot was an extreme
example - has placed football hooliganism in the public eye with a resulting demand for
its control. From a theoretical analysis of the football crowd, an attempt will be made
to explain how violence occurs utilizing evidence collected through direct observation
of incidents at matches over a period of six years.
Football crowd violence or football hooliganism as a matter of social concern has
existed at many points in British history, 5 and has now returned as a focus
again.6 The identification of any issue as a social problem takes place, not as an
objective decision by the author, but as Herbert Blumer states:
3. John Williams, Eric Dunning, and Patrick Murphy, Hooligans Abroad. London, 1984.
4. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness and Soccer Hooliganism" in Stanley Cohen ed. Images of
Deviance. Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 156.
5. See chapter two for a historical analysis of football crowds.
6. See chapter four, five and six for evidence on how the current problem has been identified and
dealt with.
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"The societal definition, and not the objective make-up of a given social
condition, determines whether the condition exists as a social problem.
The societal definition gives the social problem its nature, lays out how
it is to be approached, and shapes what is done about it". 7
In the case of general violence in society the social problem has existed for all of
recorded time. The trend in recent years has been for a general increase in crimes of
violence 8 with a general increase in media coverage of crime, 9 but
". . . the total number of crimes against the person is still small
compared with the number of offences of dishonesty".10
In the case of general hooliganism the increase in the number of offenses and public
awareness is well documented prior to 1960, when football hooliganism re-emerged as
a point of social concern. 11 For any issue to become a social problem it must meet a
series of specific criteria in a structured order to establish itself in the minds of the
whole society. "The emergence of a social problem" 12 is the identifying of any social
activity as a legitimate matter of concern both by observers and the general society. In
the case of football crowd violence observers have noted its existence for many
centuries 13 and the process has been further enhanced by media coverage 14 "The
legitimation of social problems" 15 takes what the observers and the public perceive to
be a problem and gives it 'official' recognition through moving the discussion into the
7. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior", Social Problems. 18:197,
pp. 300.
8. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Against The Person. Manchester, 1963, pp. 10.
9. F. H. McClintock, Op. Cit. pp. 1.
10. F. H. McClintock, Op. Cit.. pp. 7.
11. F. H. McClintock. Crimes Of Violence. London, 1963, pp. 10.
12. Herbert Blumer, Op, Cit. pp. 301-302.
13. See chapter three.
14. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit.. pp. 302.
15. Herbert Blumer, Op, Cit.. pp. 302.
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media, civic organizations and into parliament. Once this has occurred a "mobilization
for action" 16 takes place in which all interested groups present conflicting evidence
as to the cause and cures for the problem. From this basis, a "formation of an official
plan of action",17 takes place through governments and other official bodies to combat
the problem. The final step in the "implementation of the official plan ", 18 occures
when actual action is taken to correct the social problem. 19 At any point in the
process, a social issue can fail to be defined as a problem due to the lack of recognition,
lack of public interest, lack of media interest, no legislative debate, no plan of action,
and no action taken resulting in the issue remaining a major topic of discussion. The
major source of identification of a social problem is the awareness of the collective,
which in turn demands that action be taken by official bodies to remedy the
situation.20 Football crowd violence meets all of the criteria set out by Blumer and
others 21 to be identified as a social problem. This identification has taken place
throughout history 22 and more recently has been the subject of research by many
scholars. 23 The issue has been taken up by the media in both a reflective and
projective stance which has brought the issue to the attention of the wider public.
Through public concern and media publicity the issue has come to the attention of
legislators, the Football Association and the Scottish Football Association. 24 From
this basis, Parliament and other official bodies have drawn laws and regulations to try
and combat football crowd violence.25 The implementation of laws and regulations
16. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit. pp. 303.
17. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit.. pp. 303.
18. Herbert Blumer, Op, Cit.. pp.307.
19. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit.. pp. 304.
20. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit.
21. Malcolm Spector and John Kitsue, Constructing Social Problems. London, 1977, pp. 142.
22. See chapter two.
23. See chapter three.
24. See chapters four, five and six.
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has only served to alter the scope of the problem but has not, so far controlled or solved
it. 26
It is contended in this thesis that one important aspect of the analysis of football crowd
violence has for the most part been overlooked. This is the concept of football crowd
violence known as "collective behaviour". Collective behaviour is the study of people
in acting together in groups or crowds and the influence the crowd has on the
individual. Collective behaviour can be used to analyze any mass participation event;
including social movements, panics, crazes, fashion trends, public opinion, and
collective violence. 22
Historical Perspective: The Evolution Of The Game And Spectator
Crowds
Football violence has existed as long as the sport itself has existed. For this reason, the
historical setting of football is important to the analysis of contemporary football
hooliganism. Football was based on mass collective participation and is now based on
mass collective spectator participation. The change in the relationship between playing
and spectator participation in football has only altered the collective participation
patterns of the sport and as a result, collective violence associated with football in past
centuries has simply altered its form as football has evolved from an unorganized sport
to a modem international media event. Participants in football, whether playing in mass
or watching in mass, have always reflected the stresses and value conflicts of the wider
society, and as a result have been susceptible to bouts of collective violence.
25. See chapters four, five and six.
26. See chapter six.
27. Detailed analysis of collective behaviour theories appears in Chapter Three.
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The historical setting of football and its relationship to collective violence therefore
becomes important in investigating the modern pattern of violence. 28 The game has
been affected by a changing society in which football has adapted to new economic and
social conditions. Football has adapted from a gregarious mass participation sport to a
sport played by relatively few and watched by many, stadiums have been built, players
have gone from amateur to professional, league and Cup competitions have developed,
and players have become household names due to media coverage. All these influences
have vital parts to play in the evolution of the sport and the participation of the mass
society. Any time mass society gathers collective violence can take place, but it is an
extreme case when this happens. 29 The social economic and cultural changes in Great
Britain since the middle of the eighteenth century have only altered the form of mass
violence, not its actual occurrence. Collective violence has generally occurred in
groups of incidents linked to a specific issue of the day although isolated incidents do
occur. 30
Not only has football adapted to economic and the resulting social changes of the
industrial revolution, it has adapted within the class and cultural settings as well.
During the historical development of football it has become associated with the
class system and passed from the influence of the upper class, middle class and lower
class and is now in a balancing act between these three influences, reliant on each to
exist. The upper class own or finance the clubs, the middle class occupy expensive
private box seats and the working class supposedly occupy the terraces. 31 The class
differences are often reflected in the location of clubs and their grounds, which most
28. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit.
29. Karl Mannheim, Man And Society: In An Age Of Reconstruction. London, 1940, pp. 288.
30. Neil Smelser. Theory Of Collective Behavior. New York. 1962.
31. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit.
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often are in working class areas. Football clubs also reflect the cultural influences of
the communities they represent. Some clubs play a smooth fast flowing passing game
while other clubs play a harder game based on physical exertion and tough tackling
depending on the demands of the supporters.32
Within a theoretical framework, the historical development of football may have
significant influence on the analysis of existing work dealing with football crowds. 33
Most of the theoretical perspectives of the modern social problems do not take into
account the historical relevance of football crowd violence, and this very fact may bring
these theoretical perspectives into question, since most of these perspectives assume
that football crowd violence is a relatively new phenomenon. As a result, it is
important to establish the historical relationship between football and football crowd
violence as any theoretical perspective must be able to account for violence at all points
in history, not just in the modern context.
Theoretical Framework For The Study of Football Violence
The study of football crowd violence has been undertaken from many theoretical
perspectives,34 none of which fully account for the total explanation of 'football
hooliganism'. It is therefore argued that in order to develop a more satisfactory and
useful explanation of football crowd violence, it is necessary to study that phenomenon
in the context of the broader framework of collective behaviour. Collective behaviour
offers a broad, yet highly structured framework in which to study the occurrence of
32. Bill Murray, The Old Firm. Sectarianism Sport And Society In Scotland. Edinburgh, 1984.
33. Eric Dunning, "The Development of Modern Football" in Eric Dunning ed. The Sociology Of
Sport: A Selection of Readings. London, 1971.
34. See chapter three.
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collective violence at football matches without disregarding any of the analysis
previously undertaken of football crowd violence. Collective behaviour offers the
opportunity for the analysis of football crowd violence in a historical, social, cultural
and physical environmental setting which other theoretical perspectives may not be able
to accommodate. Collective behaviour also offers the ability to accommodate a wide
variety of social and cultural stresses into the analysis which other perspectives single
out as a basis for the theoretical analysis of the football crowd problem. This allows
for a greater variety of social issues to be analyzed as they appear on the football
terraces of Scotland.
Collective behaviour offers advantages over other traditional analysis of football crowd
violence, such as subcultural, conflict, anthropological, labelling and amalgamations of
the perspectives.35 These perspectives make important contributions concerning
social conditions that result in stress on the terraces; social stress which can result in
violence. None of these perspectives explain why there is violence at one match and
not at another. Collective behaviour theory offers a conceptual framework that can
accommodate the relationships between violence and social stress. In addition, it
progresses beyond the question of underlying reasons for the violence to the analysis of
how the violence actually starts and why it starts at one match and not at another. This
major advantage of collective behaviour analysis provides for both the investigation of
social stresses that exist on the terraces, and how those stresses manifest themselves in
violence.
The field of collective behaviour expressly deals with crowd violence, and football
crowds by definition fall within the confines of collective crowd action. Previous
35. These perspectives are discussed in Chapter Three.
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research has made general reference to the process of crowd activity and the
36 37
relationship to football crowds, ' but no specific analysis of football crowds has
been carried out to date. As a result, the objective of this study is to systematically
investigate football crowds in the context of collective behavior. Since the identification
of football crowd violence as a major social concern in the 1960s, many theories have
been presented trying to explain why football crowds in particular seemed to become
involved in violent activity. 38 The vast majority of these theories have looked at the
social origins of football and at changes in the socio-economic and physical make-up of
football and related them to crowd violence. These, along with a limited amount of
actual crowd-related investigations, make up the basis of current knowledge about
football crowds and why they seem to be involved in a continuous stream of violent
incidents. These investigations have left a specific and significant gap in the analysis of
football crowds which has not been thoroughly researched, that of collective behaviour.
Although some authors have looked into crowd structure 39'40 no known study to
date has systematically analyzed football crowds using a theory of collective
behaviour. To accomplish this type of analysis it is necessary to do two things; one,
select a theoretical framework of collective behaviour suitable to undertake the analysis
of football crowds 41 and, two, choose a method of investigating the crowd activities
which provides evidence which supports or denies the theoretical concepts. 42 To this
end, the major concepts within the field of collective behaviour are analyzed to provide
36. Michael Smith, "Sport and Collective Behavior" in Donald Ball and John Loy, Sport And The
Social Order: Contributions to the Sociology of Sport. London, 1975.
37. Fred Coulter, Brian Dunfield, Malcolm Foley, John Mulloy and Sue Walker, Crowd Behaviour
At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland. Edinburgh, 1984.
38. See chapter three.
39. Michael Smith, Op. Cit.
40. Fred Coulter et. al. Op. Cit.
41. See chapter three.
42. See chapter three and eight.
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a theoretical framework for research into football crowd activities. From this reference
point, a method of investigating the crowd also is necessary to provide evidence to
support or deny the theoretical ideas. The most common form of research to date in
this area has taken up the point of view of the outside observer. 43 However,
participant observation is used here as the method for gathering evidence about football
crowds. Participant observation has been successfully used by several authors 44
who have investigated football crowds under different theoretical perspectives. 45,46
Taking into account these studies, an "inside method" of observation has been selected
for the study of football crowd violence in Scotland. Once a theoretical perspective
of collective behaviour has been selected and football crowds investigated using the
framework, conclusions can be drawn concerning the theoretical perspectives of
43. Eric Dunning, Soccer: The Social Origins of the Sport and its Development as a Spectator
Sport. London, 1979.
Eric Dunning, "The development of Modern Football" in Eric Dunning ed., TheSociologv of
Sport: A Selection of Readings. London, 1971.
Desmond Morris, The Soccer Tribe. London, 1981.
H. F. Moorhouse, On. Cit.
Bill Murray, The Old Firm Sectarianism. Sport and Society in Scotland. Edinburgh, 1984.
Ian Taylor, "On the Sport Violence Question, Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in J. Hargreaves,
ed., Sport Culture and Ideology. London 1970.
Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology of Football Hooliganism", in Eric
Dunning ed., The Sociology of Snort. London, 1980.
Eric Dunning ed., The Sociology of Sport. London, 1980.
Ian Taylor, "Hooligans: Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society. Vol. 14.
Ian Taylor, 1971, Op. Cit.
44. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit.
John Williams, et. al., Op. Cit.
Peter Marsh, Aggro. The Illusion of Violence. London, 1978.
Peter Marsh, E. Rosser and R. Harre, The Rules of Disorder. London, 1978.
Perte Marsh, "Life and Careers on the Soccer Terraces", in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Football
Hooliganism: The Wider Context. London, 1978.
Steve Butlers, "The Logic-of-Inquiry of Participant Observation", in Stuart Hall and Tony
Jefferson ed..Resistance Through Rituals. Youth Subcultures In Post War Britain. London,1978.
45. Participant observation has also been successfully used to investigate crowd violence outside the
realm of football crowd violence. Ibid.
46. See the following section for a complete methodological explanation of this study.
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collective behaviour, and ways to reduce the amount of violence at football matches.
Scope And Methodology Of The Empirical Research Into Soccer
Violence
This thesis will stay within the concise narrow subject matter directly relating to
collective football crowd violence in Scotland. Although there are many contexts of
violence in society as a whole, 47 this study is only concerned with the violence that
occurs in and around football matches, and with the why and how of football crowd
violence. These narrow parameters eliminate several avenues of investigation, but to do
otherwise would alter the aim of the research, this being to examine empirical evidence
in support of explanations of violence in football grounds which in turn can have an
impact on policy and lead to a reduction to violence in this context.
The research design for this study has to take into account the amount of observation
that can be carried out by one person over a six year period. Although football crowd
violence exists in many countries around the world, this study is restricted to Scotland,
and the violence that takes place on Scottish football terraces. Even though football
violence is an international problem, crowd violence in Scotland is representative of the
problem as it exists around the world and thus capable of being singled out for analysis
as a representative sample. Even though Scotland is a representative sample of football
and football crowd violence, it is a an independent culture which reflects problems that
maybe unique to it, just as Brazil or England have cultural and social problems which
make local analysis applicable in a world wide problem. Football crowd violence in
47. F. H. McClintock, "Crimes Against The Person", in Transactions of the Manchester Statistical
Society 1962-3. Manchester, 1963.
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Scotland has implications that may separate it from England or other countries, these
include history, culture and social make-up which are unique to all countries. As a
result situations in countries should be studied separately, even though the general
conclusions may be applicable to football crowds in all countries.48
Although the main emphasis of this study is on Scottish football crowds,
observations of English football crowds are used for purposes of comparison and
research is carried out in England to test the differences between supporters in the
respective countries. The historical, cultural and social differences that exist between
England and Scotland make grouping the two countries together highly undesirable, but
the opportunity for comparison still exists. In a comparative perspective some of the
problenis associated with English crowd violence will be analyzed.
Restricting the research to Scotland allows for individual observations of supporters
both at home and away matches over a prolonged period of time. This type of
observation allows for the analysis of existing patterns of crowd behaviour on a club by
club basis whereas infrequent observations ofmany clubs would eliminate this type of
analysis. The history ofmodem football crowd violence in Scotland indicates that the
major clubs with large support groups tend to have the most incidents of
hooliganism.49 Restricting the research area to football clubs in Scotland allows for
the seeking out of potential violent situations for observation and analysis.
The survey includes all the Scottish Football League clubs, but is focused specifically
on the ten clubs of the Premier Division. 50 Games in the first and second divisions
48. See H. F. Morehouse, Op. Cit.
49. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. 1984.
50. During the term of this study the Premier Division had ten teams. For the 1986-1987 and
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were attended for comparative information. The original research design included
planned systematic visits to every Scottish football club ground and to see every team
play at home and away. This design was discarded after the first year since this survey
method limited the opportunity to observe numerous matches with large crowds and
local derby matches which are more likely to have episodes of hooliganism. 51 The
research design was altered to focus on the ten teams playing in the Scottish Premier
League in order to concentrate on clubs with large support, local derby matches, and to
allow for more in depth analysis of the supporters observed. Trying to observe every
clubs' supporters at home and at away matches would have restricted the observations
to a general analysis whereas observing fewer clubs allows for a more detailed analysis
of the events that may cause violence in football grounds. By focusing on the ten clubs
in the Premier League, their supporters were systematically observed, both at Home and
as visitors, playing in the Scottish League, Scottish Cup, League Cup and European
competitions. All teams were observed systematically both at home and away but
certain criteria were developed based on the first year of observations as a basis for
selection of matches in the last five years of the study. When none of the following
criteria were applicable then match selection was based on the premise of systematically
seeing each team both at home and away during each season. The selection criteria
are: 1.) Probability of crowd violence. This was based on rumours, prior knowledge
of past incidents between supporters and local issues which were likely to be reflected
on the terraces. 2.) Local derbys, whose past history of violence is often a predicator
of further violence. 3.) Crowd size. After initial observation it was found that large
crowds with roughly equal support group sizes were more likely to have a greater
following season the Premier Division has been expanded to twelve teams.
51. Preliminary research indicated that local derby matches and matches with large crowds often
produced a greater likelihood of violent incidents and this is supported by the publications listed
in footnotes 43 and 44.
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likelihood of producing crowd violence. 4.) Religious divisions. Crowds which were
divided between Catholic and Protestant supporters have a greater probability of
collective action. 5.) Importance of the match. Matches with great symbolic or
practical importance often raise the emotional level of the supporters and add to the
possibility of violence, and 6.) Inter city rivalry. Matches between teams from cities
vying for social, economic and cultural position often produced animosity between the
support groups. Based on these criteria all Rangers versus Celtic matches from 1979 to
1983 were observed along with all Hearts versus Hibs matches in the 1983 - 1984
season. Since scheduling conflicts placed local derby matches on the same day, only
one Dundee versus Dundee United match was observed, although many Dundee United
versus Aberdeen matches were observed over the course of the study.
Over the course of the six year study period an average of fifty matches were attended
each season. Two hundred and sixty club matches were attended in Scotland,
approximately sixty matches in England, seven matches in the 1982 World Cup in
Spain, three matches in Europe following Scottish club sides, two European club
matches between Scottish and English clubs in England, four Scotland versus England
matches, twenty two Scotland matches against teams other than England, and several
friendly matches between English and Scottish club sides were observed. The total
number of hours of observation inside football grounds amounts to approximately
seven hundred, with an additional three hundred and fifty hours of observation done
before and after the matches on the streets of the cities visited. In addition to the
observations made in and around football grounds approximately three hundred hours
were spent on various forms of public transportation with football supporters which
included doing many open ended interviews. Many hours were also spent in various
15
pubs, on terraces and walking from grounds conducting open ended interviews.
The entire research project was self financed which limited the physical territory that
was covered due to the cost of transportation and admission to the matches. Being a
single observer also restricted the number ofmatches attended due to the schedule being
set up to have most matches played on Saturdays with a few on Wednesdays and other
mid week matches being attended. Despite these restrictions, the Scottish Premier
League through observance of the clubs, based on the afore mentioned criteria over the
six year study period has provided ample data for the analysis of football crowd
violence. The research for this study and analysis is based on participant observation,
not as a supporter of any club, but as an impartial spectator on the terraces. After a one
year orientation, 52 the observation cites were chosen based on standing on the
terraces in each support group both home and away and observing from the stand at all
Premier Division grounds. Observation points were chosen from within the crowd so
that each identifiable segment of the support groups were studied, but the main focus of
the observations are centred on the group of supporters most identified with football
crowd violence. The most frequently used positions for observation were: 1.) the
Jungle at Celtic Park, 2.) the Enclosure and Copland Road Stand at Ibrox Stadium,
3.) the Corner at Tynecastle, 4.) the centre of the main terrace at Easter Road, and 5.)
the Shed at Tannadice. The observations were not restricted to these positions, but
these represent the majority of the positions from which observations were made. In
addition to terraces observations, all support groups were observed from outside by
using the seated sections of the ground and by traveling with supporters to away
matches. From these positions observations were made of home supporters, visiting
52. Not having attended a soccer match before arriving in Scotland one seasons matches were
attended to become familiar with the clubs, grounds and supporters.
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supporters, play on the pitch, and the police for their relationship to collective crowd
action. Even though several matches attended had violent incidents 53 no violence
was participated in, except in self defense. As part of participant observation open
ended interviews 54 were conducted with supporters. These interviews were
conducted after a pilot study of a formal questionnaire was carried out and
abandoned55 which provided the basis for many of the questions asked of supporters.
The interviews were carried out before the matches, at half time, after matches, in pubs
after matches, and on public transportation to and from the matches. No interviews
were carried out during the match as the supporters were uncooperative due their
interest in watching the play on the pitch. Most of the interviews were not tape
recorded due to problems and restrictions placed on tape recorders, cameras and other
physical equipment by the clubs and police. The interview answers were recorded in
hand written notes and written up immediately after returning home. The interviews
consisted of approximately six hundred hours of formal discussion and thousands of
hours of informal discussion with all kinds of football supporters. All interviews were
conducted in total confidentiality in order to allow those interviewed to relate
experiences and attitudes which might have been illegal or unpopular.
Although aware of the conceptual framework used in this study, the research data
collected will be used to examine the validity of the Value Added approach to collective
behaviour by Neil Smelser. The study is not an empirical test of the Value Added
53. See chapter seven for descriptions of of several incidents personally observed at matches.
54. Robert Merton. The Focused Interview. New York. 1962.
55. During the early development stage of the methodology for this thesis, a formal questionnaire
was prepared and pilot interviews conducted on the terraces. The formal questionnaire was
eventually discarded under advice from Dr. A. N. Oppenheim who recommended that other forms
of investigation be used to collect information as the questionnaire had sampling problems
within football crowds and the amount of information asked was too large to be easily collected
on the terraces. See appendix B.
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approach to collective behaviour, but uses the framework for the development and
modification of the concept with the view to creating a more adequate explanation of
crowd behaviour at football matches.
Participant observation in this case is the best way to become involved, to a limited
extent, and view the crowd from the inside and get the supporters immediate
interpretation of what has taken place. Being an American with a definite American
accent, and never wearing a scarf or other identifying mark of any club, allowed me to
go where I wanted and talk to anyone who was interested. Many supporters were very
interested to know why an American was on there terrace with a notebook recording
information about them and offered many insights to the game and the people who
watch it. Even with the advantages of being an American on Scottish terraces,
participant observation has some definite drawbacks which cannot be overlooked.
"The actual process of crowd behaviour, ... is extremely difficult to
study for several reasons: First, the time and place of collective
outbursts are unpredictable making it difficult for interested observers to
be on the scene. When, on occasion, trained observers are present, the
risk of personal injury tends to persuade many to make their
observations from a distance. Events, moreover, usually occur quickly
and over a wide geographic area, and many events may occur at once.
Second, participants in the crowd are unlikely to stop what they are
doing to cooperate with the investigator. Third, the account of the
crowd members who are interviewed, during or following the disorder,
are especially vulnerable to conscious or unconscious distortions since
members often have 'very vested interests in the interpretation of the
phenomenon' (The dramatic nature of crowd outbreaks, of course,
excites strong emotions which add to any distortion). Fourth,
experimental control is almost impossible to achieve. Fifth, it is hard to
sample from populations of collective episodes." 56
With knowledge of these limitations, every effort was made to compensate for them.
Even though collective action is hard to anticipate the selection process previously
56. Michael Smith, Op. Cit.. pp. 285.
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outlined increased the possibility of observation of violent incidents and several nasty
incidents of crowd violence were observed, 57 most noteworthy being the Hampden
Park Cup Final riot of 1980 between Rangers and Celtic in Glasgow. At one point in
this riot, observations were made while standing in the street outside Hampden Park
between the support groups watching rocks, bottles and other objects flying overhead.
Other observations 58 have been made in the middle of battles on Gorgie Road and
while dodging flying glass on the Bothwell Street bridge in Edinburgh.
While the research and the writing of this study has been taking place John White was
writing a thesis on a parallel subject. Under agreement within the Centre for
Criminology and the Social and Philosophical Study of Law at Edinburgh University
there been a minimum of overlap in the approach to the subject of football hooliganism.
Our respective studies were designed to deal with different aspects of the phenomenon
of spectator violence. 59
Definition Of Terms Used In This Study
A number of terms used in the discussion of violence and football violence are often
highly vague in meaning or are used with multiple definitions. In this study, an attempt
has been made to be as objective and precise as possible in the description of events of
57. See Appendix A for descriptions of the major incidents of violence observed at matches.
58. Standing in the roughest part of the crowd allowed the opportunity to interact with many
supporters and pick up several souvenirs as a result of battles between opposing supporters.
Several coins were picked up or caught as they came flying into the terraces form the opposition
supporters. One Celtic supporter was so angry at a Dundee United supporter at Tannadice that
he threw his well adorned hard hat into the United support which missed the target and now
makes a wonderful souvenir. A Rangers supporter so depressed by a Rangers loss to Celtic at
Ibrox threw his scarf at the Celtic support, it fell short and is now another souvenir.
59. John White, A Socio-Legal Approach To Football Hooliganism. Edinburgh Ph.D. Thesis,
1985.
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football crowd violence. In particular, the following terms have been used in the way
indicated.
Clamjamfry:
"(1) A company of people, generally used contemptuously,
hence a mob rabble, the riff-raff of the community; 'frequently used to
denote pruse-proud vulgal'... (2) Hurly-burly row commotion... (3)
Worthless odds and ends, rubbish... (4) to crowd, clutter." 60
From this definition the term clamjamfry will be used to describe football supporters
who attend matches regularly, wear team colours in the form of scarves and jerseys,
and stand in predesignated sections of the terrace. These supporters are the most vocal
and animated in their support for the team which makes them stand out form other
segments of the crowd due to their tight packing on the terraces and continuous singing
and chanting. This group of supporters tend to be young, ranging in age from 12 to 21
years of age and are the most likely to be involved in violence in the ground.
Ordinary Supporters: form the basis of all football crowds. These supporters
attend selected matches in support of their team, wear scarves and other identifying
garments in moderation, stand at varying distance from the clamjamfry, and participate
in limited singing and chanting. The average supporter varies in age from the very
young to the very old. The average supporter does not identify with the clamjamfry or
the activities that they engage in so stand at varying distances from the clamjamfry and
do not participate in violence.
Violent Supporter: is a person who stands with and participates in the clamjamfry
activities but enters the ground with the intent to participate in any violent activity, and
thus may instigate or be the first to follow the leader should violence occur. Violent
60. William Grant ed.. The Scottish National Dictionary. Edinburgh, 1941, pp. 113-114.
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individuals can be naturally violent in a biological 61 or anthropological sense. 62 63
Naturally aggessive individuals who seek to create violence or simply take advantage of
the situation can have a major impact on football crowd violence. The violent supporter
is impossible to distinguish from supporters in the clamjamfry until some form of overt
violence takes place, then the violent supporter will emerge to engage in the violence.
Casual Supporter or Casuals: are a self labeled group of individuals originating
in Aberdeen who dress in expensive clothes, hence the name, and go to football
matches looking for violence. The group is well organized and attends selected
matches with the intent of starting violence on the terraces. The causuals are not
football supporters, they do not wear team colours or support any particular club, they
only attend matches to find and create violence.
Football Hooligan: is a term used as a label by the press and broadcast media to
identify supporters who become involved in spectator violence. This label has taken on
a wide ranging definition and is often applied to anyone wearing a football scarf and
falling under the afore mentioned definitions. As a result, the term football hooligan
will only be used in this thesis as it is used by the media otherwise more specific afore
mentioned definitions will be used.
61. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression. New York, 1966.
62. Robert Ardrey, African Genesis. New York, 1963.
63. Ashley Montegu, Man And Aggression. Oxford, 1968.
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CHAPTER II
FOOTBALL: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
Football has always been a mass participation sport, either as a mass player sport or as
a mass spectator sport. The violence associated with football since the 1960s is not
new to it but a continuing evolution of violence that can be and often is associated with
any mass participation event. The following history seeks to set out patterns of
violence that have always existed in football and how those patterns have evolved with
football as it has developed in relation to socio-economic developments in Britain.
Football crowd violence is not a new social issue but an issue that has not been
identified until recently. The historical relationship and the evolution between football
and violence is vitally important to any future explanation of the problem since the
modem issue of hooliganism can not be investigated in isolation.
Collective violence is not isolated to any time period or strictly associated with any
individual social issue. Any time people gather with a common desire or goal the
possibility of a group or crowd becoming violent exists. Crowd violence has often
been associated with political issues, food shortages, social deprivation, racial
intolerance, prison conditions and football. 1 No collective unrest or riot happens in
isolation, conditions exist which create a common feeling amongst the participants
which allow for action to be taken to alter the condition of contention. Often the
1. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 1972.
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conditions that create collective action recur, although in altered forms and over long
periods of time. Thus an isolated incident may in fact be a reappearance of actions in
response to ongoing conditions of social, political, physical, racial or religious stress.
To study any collective action in isolation may and often will over look long standing
traditions and conditions of stress in the community which may be the real reason for
violence. These conditions of social stress may recur at various periods and then
disappear only to appear at a later date in an altered form.
Football is no different from any other institution; it brings a history and tradition which
contributes to the modem setting.' Long standing social traditions may not be part of
the official history of the sport but be part of the social traditions, passed on by word of
mouth over hundreds of years of mass participation by players and spectators. These
traditions are important to the modern game and the incidents of violence which plague
it. Collective violence is not new to football; it has been a part of the sport since its
inception and the violence has evolved along with the sport through hundreds of years
of development. To isolate modern football hooliganism would overlook vital
information related to the development of the contemporary problem and thus make any
subsequent findings incomplete. Football crowd violence has evolved along side the
sport and is has a important relationship to it; one that must be acknowledged in order
to study the modem phenomena. As a result the history of football and the violence
associated with it are vitally important to the analysis of modem football hooliganism
and its subsequent reduction.
Earlv Development. 1100 To 1750
Football in medieval Scotland and England was a violent mass participation sport based
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on folk traditions which varied from place to place. The origins of the sport are
shrouded in mystery but have been claimed to be a development from kicking Danes
heads on the battlefields after invasions and to have been brought in by the Romans
during their occupation. Whatever the origin, folk-football was well established in the
twelfth century as a leisure time activity for the masses. The sport had few if any rules
and was evolving as a violent participant sport based on masculinity and physical ability
which in turn created status amongst the players and observers.
"After dinner, all the youth of the city go into the fields of the suburbs
and address themselves to the famous game of foot-ball. The scholars
of each school have their peculiar ball; and the particular trades have
most of the them theirs. The elders of the city, the fathers of the parties,
and the rich and wealthy, come to the field on horseback, in order to
behold the exercises of youth, and in appearances are themselves as
youthful as the youthest; their natural heat seeming to be revived by the
fight of so much agility and in a participation of the diversions of their
festive sons." 2
As this was written in 1174 the game of football was not only played by the scholars
and workers but watched by the older wealthier non-participants. The demarcation of
participant and supporter was clearly beginning to develop along age and wealth
differences even at this early stage, although the main emphasis for the youth and
middle aged was that of participant.
The game itself was extremely violent in nature with up to one thousand participants on
each side pursuing a ball through city streets in riotous style with little regard for life,
limb or property. Many were injured in the games and property damage was extensive
in many communities due to the style of play. The rough and tumble style of play by
large unorganized teams meant that many of the injuries and property damage were the
2. William Fitz-Stephens, Description Of The Citv Of London. London 1174, Translation and
reprint London; B. White 1772, pp. 45-46.
24
result of the sport and not intentional individual actions.
.. as played in the streets and open spaces, the game was violent and
dangerous, devoid of grace and skill.3 Football was then a wild
hurly-burly, played without proper teams, deplored by the serious, both
for its rowdiness and for its dangers.4 Poorer folk had only
commons and open spaces at their disposal, but on these they managed
to enjoy an astonishingly large number of pastimes ... to wild and
noisy football matches that ranged over over entire country parishes or
hurtled devastatingly through narrow streets of towns.5 During a
game of ball, as he kicked the ball, a lay friend of his, . . . ran against
him and wounded himself on a cannon so severely that he died within
six days, (1321).6 ... in the wise foote balle, wherin is nothinge
but beastly furie and extreme violence, wherof procedeth hurte, and
consequently rancour and malice do remaine with them that he
wounded; is is to put in perpetual silence." 7
The violent folk sport of football was organized on a community level with various
factions of the city representing a side or collectively playing for one of the sides in the
match. The large semi unorganized sides meant that the game relied on mass collective
participation with limited teamwork to accomplish the goal of the game. This semi
unstructured participant sport relied on a limited form of collective action to win the
match. The collective nature of folk-football meant that the sport had a natural tendency
to become excessively violent and destructive toward both players and property. 8
The collective action style of play resulted in the descriptions of the aforementioned
authors and their calls for abolition of the sport due to its destructive nature. The
descriptions of folk-football's riotous style of play and modern football hooliganism
with its destructiveness have a similar theme in that the violence associated with the
3. Peter C. Mcintosh, Sport In Society. London, 1963, pp.39.
4. Christina Hole, English Sports And Pastimes. London, 1949, 4.
5. Christina Hole, Op. Cit.. pp. 39.
6. G. G. Coulton, Social Life In Britain From The Conquest To The Reformation. Cambridge,
1918, pp. 400.
7. Sir Thomas Elyot, The Boke Named The Governour. London, 1546, pp.82.
8. See chapters 4, 5 & 6 for a full analysis of collective behavior and its implications for folk
football.
game through collective participation has always caused varying kinds of destruction
either to the participants or to property and bystanders. 9 The riotous style of play in
folk-football with its 'destructive social qualities' meant that official action was taken by
successive kings and other authorities to try to ban the sport. Not only was the sport
destructive to persons and property but it was recognized that many of the men who
participated in sports did so at the neglect of military training. Much of the military
training of the day took place on religious holidays and Sundays, the limited free time
enjoyed by the workers. The competition for the leisure time of the masses meant that
football was in direct competition with military training, and far more popular. As a
result from Edward II in 1314 (on his way to battle with Robert the Bruce at
Bannockburn) to James the Third in 1615 the Kings of England and Scotland banned
the playing of football.10'11,12,13
Football continued to be played by the masses despite the threat of imprisonment from
the edicts of their respective Kings. The game on Shrove Tuesday became a tradition
before Lent and was often the biggest match played during the year. The game between
Derby and Ashbourne on Shrove Tuesday became such a tradition that it lent its name
to matches between local teams, "Local Derby". The following description indicates
the problems associated with football and crowds concerning property damage, alcohol
and rough play in pre-industrial times.
". . . On most places the ball was started from the market place, which
from its central position, was naturally selected for the commencement
9. Also see, R. A. Knox and L. Leslie, The Miracles Of Henry VI. Cambridge, 1929, pp. 17.
10. see Terrance Delancy, The Footballers' Fireside Book. London, 1971, pp. 35, 36.
11. see Eric Dunning, "The Development Of Modern Football" in Eric Dunning ed., The Sociology
Of Sport: A Selection Of Readings. London, 1971, pp. 118.
12. see Percy M. Young, A History Of British Football. London, 1896, pp.58.
13. see Acts Of The Scottish Parliament. Volume II. ADMCCXXIV - ADMCDLXVII, James I,
AD 1424, pp. 518.
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of the game; the sides were usually town against village or parish
against parish, each township reinforced by its partisans from outlying
villages. On Shrove Tuesday the town in which the the contest took
place was usually placed as if in a state of siege - the windows were
barricaded, the doors securely fastened, to prevent the ingress of
unscrupulous spectators, and the inhabitants were compelled to join
their respective parties on the pain of rough treatment, or even heavy
fine. The goals were sometimes the church, the chief alehouse, the
wheel of the watermill, or the gate of the nursery-ground. It was a
universal holiday, the whole town was alive with expectations; men,
women, and children perched on the housetops and thronged the
windows to witness the contest. The fight was usually a long and
protracted one, the combatants over the anon, overcome with thirst,
creeping out of the struggle to refresh themselves with glasses of ale
from the adjoining public houses. The ball sometimes mounted high
into the air, and was carried over the walls of the gardens, or was lifted
into the river, where it was immediately followed by the excited
combatants, when a fierce struggle commenced, one player doubtless
swimming away with the ball in his arms,pursued by a pack of hungry
adversaries. . . After the goaling of the ball, the hero of the day was
lifted on the shoulders of his brethren, and carried, with the ball in his
hands, through the districts of the various parties, soliciting and
receiving alms". 14
The tradition of football on Shrove Tuesday and other religious holidays was well
established by the twelfth century and widely practiced by the middle of the fourteenth
century. 15 Even with the prohibition of football in Scotland and England, football
was a deeply embedded local tradition. Governmental edicts had very little effect in
controlling the game due to the lack of effective policing against crowd action. The
previous quotation reflects the problems caused to the local community where the match
was played. Spectators were separated from the participants both to avoid being caught
up in the play but also to avoid injury from the players. The town shops and houses
were shielded against damage from players who used the opportunity of crowd action
to engage in illegal activities. Alcohol was already a vital ingredient in the activities and
misbehavior of the participants. All these activities are similar to the modem conditions
14. C. W. Alcock. Football. Our Winter Game. London, 1874, pp. 16-18.
15. also see Sir John Sinclair, The Statistical Account Of Scotland. Vol. XVIII, Edinburgh,
MDCCXCVI, pp. 88-89, for an account of Shrove Tuesday football in Scodand.
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that surround football hooliganism.
Football was not the only cause of social unrest in pre-industrial society. Food prices,
religious passions, military conscription, and hunger caused social unrest and riots.
The participants in these riots were often the same persons who participated in football
matches and the matches were used as a vehicle for unruly behavior. The participants,
often over worked, generally economically exploited, and of radical inclination. The
prohibition of football not only reflected the relationship between social stress and
social disorder but indicates how social stress can be manifest in secondary activities
which may not be directly related to the issue in question. 16 Football crowd action,
was then and is now, a reflection of wider social stresses, which are expressed in a
situation that is convenient to various segments of the community.
Along with government suppression of football, the church was active in attempting to
control the sport. Football was played on religious holidays and Sundays which meant
that it competed with the church for attendance. The Catholic and later the Protestant
church had a major influence on the court systems in England and Scotland; they, for
example brought prosecutions against football players, especially those playing when
they should have been in church. Not only did the churches object to the playing of
sport on religious days but they also saw football as a violent, often deadly, 17 sport
with no redeeming qualities. In fact, the church saw most sport' as an ". . . exercise
which withdraweth us from godliness, either upon the sabbath or any other day els, is
wicked and to be forbidden". 18 The church continued to suppress football actively
16. Gary T. Marx, "Issueless Riots", in James R. Short and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective
Violence. New York, 1972.
17. F. G. Emmison, Elizabethan Life: Disorder. Chelmsford, 1970, pp. 226.
18. Philip Stubbles. Anatomy Of The Abuses In England. London, 1583, pp. 183-184.
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until the late nineteenth century when it realized that football was deeply imbedded in
the culture and was of benefit to the church in sponsoring teams as an effort to draw
men back to the church. As with the government, the church had little effect in
suppressing football as a mass folk sport because the game was popular, wide spread,
and the church had little in the way of sanctioning ability in suppressing football.
Folk-football continued to be played throughout Scotland and England through the
fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The game changed little
due to the traditions of the sport that were established and passed on from generation to
generation. Many areas tried to suppress the sport but some cities like Glasgow openly
encouraged the game by providing new leather covered footballs to local boroughs.
The game was based on folk traditions, and thus differed from area to area ranging
from a kicking game, a form of rugby, and sometimes incorporated forms of hurling.
Most were combinations of the three. 19 Football, despite its agrarian class influences
had transcended class distinctions and was openly played at Oxford and Cambridge
Universities during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The game was still a riotous
affair causing injury and property damage. In an effort to control the violent nature of
the game the first formal rules were introduced at the colleges in an effort to protect the
community, the colleges, and the students. As the sport continued to cause general
mayhem and damage it was banned at Oxford in 1555 and at Cambridge in 1584.
Despite the ban football continued to be played in open defiance of authority.20-21'22
Football continued to be a popular sport throughout the seventeenth and the first half of
19. F. P. Magoun Jr., "Scottish Popular Football 1424-1815", American Historical Review.
October 1931, Number 1:1-13.
20. Peter C. Mcintosh, On. Cit.. pp. 76.
21. Richard Mulcaster, Positions. London, 1581, pp.104.
22. see Joseph Strutt, The Sport And Pastimes Of The People Of England. London, 1801, pp.
100, for a description of football after the influence of rules on the sport.
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the eighteenth centuries. The increasing number of well organised police, better
communication, and a more powerful central government meant that the government
had greater ability to control riotous football matches and thus more arrests and
prosecutions were brought against participants. 23 During this period football was
used by various groups for political purposes, usually to challenge local authority's
ability to make changes in long standing customs. Football matches with their
notorious violent behavior and ability to inflict property damage were often started with
the specific intent to destroy property or intimidate local officials into changing their
course of action. The increased power of the police meant that many of these popular
political football matches failed in their objective. 24
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two major changes in the structure of
British society began to have profound effects on football. First, a class of untitled
land owners appeared who employed many former share croppers and peasants to
work their land. As employees many of these people, with the encouragement of the
land owners, held folk-football matches against other farms in the area. These matches
continued to be violent in nature and played on Sundays and religious holidays.
The second and most profound change in British society was the industrial revolution.
The industrial revolution saw vast segments of what had been the rural population
move to new fast-growing urban centres in search of work. As a result folk-football
began to decline as a mass popular sport with the shift of people from rural to urban
areas where leisure time was highly controlled and the police were more effective in
controlling crowd behavior.
23. James Walvin, The Peoples Game. London, 1975, pp. 26.
24. James Walvin, Op.Cit.. pp. 25.
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.. the days had gone when authorities stood by helplessly while their
subjects took the law into their own hands with impunity; in the capital
bands of footballers ceased to be able to create mayhem at will". 25
Football survived in the rural areas but generally died in the towns and cities as the
industrial revolution changed lifestyles and deprived people of the leisure time and open
spaces necessary to conduct matches; also the police were better able to control unruly
behavior. The industrial revolution had done in a relatively short period of time what
Kings, Parliaments, Churches and local authorities had been unable to do for over five
hundred years - suppress football. The traditions that had built up over the centuries
were, if not forgotten, not used as the new urban industrial environment did not accept
or want folk traditions to be continued, especially if they interfered with the labor
force's ability to produce. 26
Football In The Public Schools. 1750 To 1840
With the onset of the industrial revolution and the changing lifestyles in Britain, football
died as a mass folk phenomenon in the urban setting. This brought on the second stage
of football development, football in the public schools. 27 The public school system
had a profound effect on football and its subsequent development. Seven public
schools are generally recognized as the only true public schools of this time period.
They were: Eton, Shrewsbury, Winchester, Westminster, Harrow, Charterhouse, and
Rugby. These seven schools moulded the basis for the modem game of football and
rugby.
25. James Walvin, Op.Cit.. pp. 26.
26. William J. Baker, "Making Of A Working Class Football Culture In Victorian England",
Journal Of Social History. Winter 1979, pp. 242.
27. Public schools in the British educational system are private fee paying institutions in contrast to
the American concept of public schools being free and open to anyone.
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Originally, public schools were opened to provide educational opportunities for poor
underprivileged youths of the lower classes. The young students brought folk-football
into the public schools. The game was played in much the same style as it had been
played in rural Britain, based on folk traditions but restricted by the physical facilities of
each individual school. Since the public schools were spread out around England the
traditions of football style varied and the games that developed in each school were
distinctly different form one another and evolved to suit the physical facilities of each
school.
As the cost of educating young people rose, public schools began to accept fee paying
students to pay for the costs of operation. Over a period of years public schools 28
became predominantly fee-paying institutions catering for the upper classes. As upper
class youth began to enter the public schools they found the existing students playing
football, a game not unfamiliar to the upper classes who may have participated in or
watched folk-football in the rural setting.29'30,31
The internal structure of the public schools played a large part in forcing everyone in the
school to play football. The 'prefect - fagging' system gave power over nonclassroom
activities to the older, stronger boys who forced young ones to do all kinds of jobs,
including the playing of football. When upper class youth entered the public school he
28. Tony Mason, Association Football, Brighton, 1980, pp. 23-24. defines the upper class as being
generally involved in the following professional occupations: school masters, manufacturers,
managers and whole and retail businesses.
29. James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp. 50-68.
30. also see William Fitz-Stephens, Op. Cit.. pp. 45.
31. also see Charles L. Kingsford, A Survey Of London, (reprinted from the text of 1603 by John
Stow) Oxford, 1971, pp. 2.
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was confronted with older prefects who forced him to participate in football matches.
Football in the public schools was still a very violent sport. 32, 33 A match included
every boy and thus followed the folk traditions of large-scale collective participation
which resulted in the same problems of injury and damage to property. At Rugby, the
violence took the form of wearing thick soled shoes for the purpose of hacking and
kicking the shins of opposition players'. 34
"When running like this the enemy tripped, shinned, charged with the
shoulder, got you down and sat upon you - in fact, might do anything
short ofmurder to get the ball from you." 35
Although the style and forms of violence adapted to the surroundings, football was still
violent. The public school setting emphasised individual toughness and winning in
order to establish a reputation.
In order to reduce the damage to property if not the physical injuries, the schools
placed various limitations on the game, based on school sports areas, to reduce the
problems of damage to the buildings. This, combined with differing folk traditions,
meant that distinctive styles of play developed in each school. Small playing areas at
Charterhouse, Eton and Westminster meant the game developed with dribbling and
short passing skills being essential. At Harrow and Shrewsbury the grounds were
large so a long passing game developed. All schools allowed handling of the ball
before 1852 when Westminster banned the practice. At Rugby around 1800 a player
caught the ball and ran with it in his hands. The style caught on and the distinctive
32. see Edward P. Eardley-Wilmot and Edward C. Streatfield, Charterhouse. Old And New.
London, 1895, pp. 75-76, for a description of public school football.
33. see Thomas Hughes, Tom Brown's School Davs. London, 1858, pp. 97-98, for a description
of football at Rugby school.
34. Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.. pp. 138.
35. F. Markham, Recollections Of A Town Bov At Westminster. London, 1903, pp. 95.
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game of Rugby developed as a result. 36' 37
The schools did not play against one another due to lack of communication and
transportation. Therefore the rules of the game were still in a state of constant change
since they were still based on folk traditions and not written down. Each school had its
own rules and style of play based on traditions, the prefect - fagging system, and
physical playing facilities. During the 1830s and 1840s public pressure grew to reform
the harsh conditions in public schools, especially the prefect - fagging system. Thomas
Arnold at Rugby was instrumental in reforming the system by making the prefects
responsible to him and forcing them to write down rules for the school and for football.
This reduced the arbitrary authority of the prefects and for the first time created a
written set of rules for football players of all levels to follow. Thomas Arnold was so
successful at Rugby in reforming the prefect - fagging system and the educational
standards that the other public schools followed his example. 38
The public schools kept football alive during a period of rapid social change in Britain.
Folk-football had declined to a point where it was only played in remote and isolated
agricultural areas but the traditions were carried on in the public schools in an evolving
form for almost a century. Although the styles of play differed in each school the sport
was still violent and based on a limited form of collective participation. New rules
resulting from the necessity of physical playing fields and the control of the power
structure in the schools only altered the form of collective participation and made it
more formal, but no less violent.
36. James Walvin, Op, Cit.
37. Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.
38. James Walvin, Op, Cit.. pp. 36.
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New Rules For Football. 1840 To 1860
Economic changes brought on by the industrial revolution had many effects on British
society, one of which was an expanding merchant or middle class. 39 The emerging
middle classes with their economic power began to send their sons to public schools.
The middle class youth entered the public schools to find football being played by
upper class youth in the period of reform when headmasters were exercising more
control over non-classroom activities. The middle class youth influenced the emerging
rules for football in the public schools by reducing the amount of violence in the game.
Rugby was the first school to publish formal rules for football in 1847. The rules
prohibited the following rough play and violence.
"1. No player being off his side shall hack, charge, turn in, touch
down in goal or interrupt a catch.
2. A player standing up to another may hold one arm only but may
hack or knock the ball out of his hand if he attempt to kick it or go
beyond the line of touch.
3. No hacking with the heel or above the knee is fair.
4. No player may wear projecting nails or iron plates on thesoles or
heels of his shoes or boots."
These rules only eliminated some of the violent play associated with the game at
Rugby. Hacking, intentional kicking of the shins, and various other physical assaults
were still allowed. Even though the rules prohibited certain violent acts the tradition of
hard physical play was carried on.
Advances in British society and economic structure brought pressure for changes in the
public schools. The technical and social advances in Britain, which were reflected in
39. Tony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 43, defines the middle classes as being generally involved in the
following job categories: banking, commercial and financial services, and shop keepers.
40. Cited in Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.. pp. 144.
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the public schools, also affected football. Communications systems were developed
and improved which allowed for faster and cheaper communications for the public, and
public schools. The railways also expanded and developed during this period and
41 42
provided cheap transportation to all parts of the country. ' The public schools all
considered themselves to offer the best in education and openly competed for students.
One way for the schools to gain recognition was to play sports, especially football and
cricket, against one another. Communication systems allowed schools to arrange
matches and agree on rules, which were still different in the various institutions. The
expanding travel facilities meant that teams could travel easily from school to school.
During this period of rule formation, football began to move away from its traditions of
mass participation, to emphasize individual skill with a disciplined team, "... a type of
game structured in such a way that it is relatively spontaneous yet highly
controlled."43 The control of public school authorities over the evolving rules meant
that the game still included the pleasures of the fight without the great risks and dangers
to players and property. 44 The new rules reduced injuries, and placed new emphasis
on skill, teamwork, inventiveness and individual expression. Despite the changing
format of football, the game was still very violent when compared to modem standards.
Football in the public schools had become a:
". . . socially constructive means of satisfying the need for excitement
by providing in the form of an orderly, relatively harmless, spontaneous
yet controlled type of 'mock-fight'." 45
41. James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp. 39.
42. John Hutchinson, The Football Industry. Glasgow, 1981, pp. 17, 29, & 49.
43. Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.. pp. 144.
44. Norbert Elias, "Dynamics Of Sports Groups With Special Reference To Football", in Eric
Dunning, Op Cit.. pp. 144.
45. Norbcrt Elias, in Eric Dunning, Op Cit.. pp. 145.
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Many graduates of public schools went on to university. Students at Oxford and
Cambridge had continued to play football in one form or another despite its banning
many years earlier. With the influx of public school graduates, all bringing various
forms of football rules, including those established at Eton in 1849 prohibiting the use
of hands, arguments developed about the style of play and rules to be followed in
universities. 46 Students at Cambridge University were the first to codify a
standardised set of rules of the game. Dominated by football style playing public
school graduates the rules reflected their preference for a 'no hands' style of play. The
Cambridge Rules as they became known, not only set out the size of the pitch, and
style of play they eliminated more of the violence in the game. Rule XIV: "All charging
is fair, but holding, pushing with the hands, tripping up, and shinning are
forbidden."47 The publication of the Cambridge Rules in 1853 with the resulting
effect of graduates taking the rules with them after graduation meant the rules became
widely known and used.
The influence of the public schools and universities also resulted in an improved image
for the sport. Since the sport was mostly played by the middle and upper classes it
became acceptable for 'young gentlemen' to participate in and become accomplished at
the game. The old folk style of football had almost disappeared as a result of the
industrial revolution and a new refined sport was emerging from the public schools and
universities. Football, as sport emphasizing individuals skills and teamwork, without
mass violence, became acceptable to all social classes. Graduates from the public
schools took the sport with them as they entered the work force, many of them going
into the expanding charitable field and the new emerging field of social work. 48 At the
46. Geoffery Green and A. H. Fabain (ed.), Association Football. (4 vols.) London, 1960, pp. 140.
47. J. C. Thring, The Winter Game: Rules Of Football. Uppingham, 1863, pp. 16-18.
48. James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp. 45 and 49.
37
same time as the public school graduates began to take football back to the wider
society sport and recreation were recognized as an important ingredient of the industrial
society. 49 Football in its new form was inexpensive, allowed for many participants
and thus was encouraged in many areas to combat some of the social ills of the day. 50
The middle and upper class influence on football, included the concept of 'the game for
the game's sake', This helped make the game socially acceptable during the Victorian
era. Football helped promote physical fitness, courage, skill, moral benefit, proper
temperament, hard work, and fitness, 51 all of which were desirable in Victorian
society. As a result many teams of former public school and university students were
established.
On 26 October 1863, a group of men from public school backgrounds got together in
London to form the Football Association. The Football Association was formed to
organize the sport and the various teams around the country under one set of rules, as
many variations were still being used. The rules adopted included the prohibition on
handling the ball and hacking. These two rules led to the eventual split in the sport and
the formation of the Rugby Football Union in 1871.52
Football not only survived as a sport in the public schools but transcended the class
structure to become acceptable to all classes. The rule formation period of football
development changed the style of play from the collective mass participant sport to a
49. see the Clarendon Commission Report. 1864.
50. James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp. 45 and 49.
51. Anthony Mason, Op, Cit.. pp.233.
52. see James Walvin, Op, Cit.. and Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.. for a further discussion of the
establishment of the Football Association and the formation of Rugby as a separate sport.
Many of the previously cited texts also document the formation of the Football Association.
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game of teamwork and individual skill. The new rules controlled the game, but did not
eliminate the spontaneous nature of the sport which meant that violence was still
common between players and involved spectators.
Football Grows Tn The Working Class. 1850 To 1890 53
The growth of modem football in England and Scotland ended the playing of the last
vestiges of folk-football which had survived in rural areas and relegated it to
celebrations of traditional sport on special occasions. The expansion of modern
football in the latter half of the nineteenth century was greatly aided by legislation which
increased the amount of leisure time workers enjoyed. By the 1850s most industrial
employees were under legislation limiting the total hours worked and they were given
Saturday afternoons off. 54 • 55'56' 57 This represented a major increase in leisure
time and allowed many more people to engage in or watch football. In 1871 The Bank
Holiday Act again increased leisure time and re-established many traditional religious
holidays and established several three-day weekends which were used to play football.
Many new teams formed all over the two countries and played each other on a friendly
basis under varying rules until the formation of the Football Association in 1863 which
set out a standard set of rules. In addition to increasing leisure time workers also
enjoyed increased real spendable income. In the period between 1860 to 1914 the
average worker's spendable income increased by one to two percent a year. 58 More
53. Tony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 43, identifies the working class as being in the skilled trades and
as unskilled manual workers.
54. Anthony Mason. Op. Cit.. pp. 23.
55. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit.. pp. 13-14.
56. William J. Baker, Op. Cit., pp. 242.
57. W.G.Carson, "White Collar Crime And The Enforcement Of Factory Legislation" in W. G.
Carson and Paul Wiles, ed., The Sociology Of Crime And Delinquency In Britain. Vol 1,
Oxford, 1971.
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spending money, along with more leisure time and increasing number of teams, meant
that football prospered during the period.
The affluence of the Victorian era led to many reforms of the new industrial - urban
society which had profound if unintended effects on football. The Education Act of
1870 provided extensive funding for state run schools and extended educational
facilities to the working classes. Many public school graduates took teaching positions
in the new schools and introduced football into the physical education programmes.
Many schools formed teams and played within the school or played teams from other
schools in the city or region. 59 New educational opportunities reduced the previously
high illiteracy rate especially among the working class. A reduction in the illiteracy rate
resulted in an increased interest in newspapers which enjoyed an increasing circulation
during the period. Newspapers were just beginning to take an interest in covering
sports and found a ready readership for football coverage amongst the newly educated
youth in the state schools.
The church,60 the emerging trade unions 61 and the long standing sport of cricket,62
58. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit.. pp. 15.
59. Many modern professional teams began as school teams and are today in League football, they
include: Blackburn Rovers, Leicester City, Chester, Exeter, and Queens Park Rangers. Teachers
in some of the schools formed teams that still exist including: Sunderland and Northampton.
60. Several modem football clubs originated through church sponsorship, these include: Queens
Park, by the Y.M.C.A. Aston Villa, Birmingham City, Bolton Wanderers, Blackpool,
Bournemouth,Watford, Everton, Liverpool, Fulham, Swindon, Wolverhampton Wanderers,
Hibernian, Celtic, and Rangers.
61. Eleven trade union sponsored teams are still in the football league and include: Stoke City
(railwaymen), Crewe Alexandra, Manchester United (railwaymen), Coventry City (cycle
workers), Milwall, Arsenal (Royal Arsenal), West Ham United (iron workers), Crystal Palace
(palace workmen), Sheffield United (cutters), Reading (biscuit workers) and Rotherham (steel
workers).
62. Cricket club sponsored teams that survive in league football include: Derby County, Preston
North End, Sheffield Wednesday, and Tottenham Hotspur.
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each in an effort to maintain or expand their influence over members or attract new
members, turned to football in order to accomplish their aims. Sponsored football
clubs attracted players from their existing membership and recruited players from other
clubs and professions. Several trade union clubs began actively to recruit workers for
higher wages who in turn would play football for the factory - trade union sponsored
team. Many workers were attracted from Scotland to England for the increased wages
offered by English trade union sponsored teams. Great emphasis was placed on
winning which led to increased recruiting of player employees. Successful teams
brought prestige to the work place and thus the trade union teams provided the early
basis for the modern transfer fee system of today.
The public school influence on football did not stop with the rule formation period. As
former public school students took football back to the developing working class
centres, a pattern that had been developed in the public schools became increasingly
common, that of football being played in limited space, by fewer players, in a regulated
form, and watched by spectators. Football had changed from a mass participation
sport, to one for the relative few and watched by mass audiences. Crowded urban
development had not provided ample open space for mass participation football, but
space did exist for the new controlled modern game. Thus the emphasis shifted from
participation through play, to participation through spectating. Increased police
resources, an emphasis on winning, and the increasing circulation of newspapers also
helped eliminate mass participation football. The inability of the very young and the
older men to play at the highest level of the developing game also contributed to this
development. The newspapers were able to communicate information about the
success of teams to a mass readership and this increased general spectator interest in the
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game. These changes led to football being an occasion on which the majority of people
watched the best players play the game. With this shift, football clubs began to
develop facilities to accommodate the audiences. The early facilities were usually only
earthen banks for the spectators to stand on, these eventually giving way to wood and
concrete terraces. The developing spectator interest and resulting need for facilities
coupled with travel expenses led working class clubs to begin charging admissions in
the 1870s. 63
By the 1880s the expanding rail service had become accessible to the football clubs and
their supporters. Teams began to travel extensively by train to play matches followed
by their supporters. For example, Queens Park was able to travel to Manchester for a
Saturday match by leaving on a Friday night and returning late Saturday night. 64
Aston Villa took 2,000 supporters to Glasgow for a match against Queens Park in
1887. 65
Newspapers continued to expand their coverage of football during this period.
Increased coverage helped generate increased awareness of football as newspaper
circulation increased. Newspaper coverage, transportation, increased economic ability
for the general public, organised teams, the codified format of play, better spectator
facilities, and a high standard of play meant that football had become a socially
acceptable game for the population in general.
On 20 July 1871 representatives of the Football Association met in London and
established the Football Association Challenge Cup, a knock-out competition for all
63. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 148-150.
64. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 146.
65. Anthony Mason, Op, Cit.. pp. 147.
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clubs who were members. This was the first nationally organized football competition
under one set of rules. New rules adopted at this time further formalised football,
removed violence from the style of play and eventually forced the rugby enthusiasts to
form their own association in 1871. 66 Examples of the new rules adopted by the
Football Association include:
"9. No player shall run with the ball.
10. Neither tripping nor hacking shall be allowed, and no player shall
use his hand to hold or push his adversary.
11. No player shall be allowed to wear projecting nails, iron plates or
quttapercha on the soles of his boots." 67' 68
The first F. A. Cup was won in 1872 by Wanderers of London.
As a result of the influence of the first Scottish club, Queens Park, the Scottish
Football Association was established on 13 March 1873. Queens Park dominated
Scottish football both as the administrative authority and on the playing field and as a
result provided the entire Scottish team in response to the challenge of Mr. C. W.
Alcock for a match between representative teams from each country. The first
international football match in the world was played at the West of Scotland Cricket
Ground (Partick) in Glasgow on 30 November 1872 and ended in a goalless draw.
One commentator observed:
"When the first match at Partick was over, the Scots gave three cheers
for the English eleven, who at once raised their voices to return the good
feelings, in the old fashioned way." 69
66. John Rafferty, One Hundred Years Of Scottish Football. London, 1973, pp. 3.
67. C. W. Alcock, Football The Association Game. London, 1906, pp. 12.
68. Other rule changes at this time also influenced play on the pitch. Previous to the F. A. Cup
competition three defensive men had to be between the goal and the player receiving the ball.
The rule was changed to only require two defenders to be between the goal and the player
receiving the ball. The rules were also changed to allow goals only where the ball passed the
under the cross bar and between the goal posts.
C. W. Alcock, 1874, On.Cit.. pp. 96-97.
69. Sir Frederick Wall, Fifty Years Of Football. London, 1935, pp. 78.
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Attendance was steadily increasing over this period 70 with most working class clubs
charging the set minimum of 6d 71 for admittance to matches. All players were
amateur before 1885 but most clubs offered illegal payments for the best players. As a
result of wide-spread illegal payments, The Football Association finally approved
professionalism with a set maximum wage. The advent of professionalism split
football between the middle class clubs and working class clubs, the former preferring
to maintain traditional values of sport for sport's sake. The consequence of
professionalisation was that the conflict between the middle class administration and the
emerging working class power base became one in which the division became
permanent with separate competitions being established for amateur clubs.
Professionalisation placed working class clubs in firm financial control of football with
professional clubs dominating competitions with paid players, many from Scotland
moving to England for the money. Professional clubs were able to pay ever increasing
transfer fees and also build facilities to accommodate increasing spectator interest.
The financial needs of professional clubs led William McGregor, the Scottish owner of
Aston Villa, to organize the Football League in 1888. The league was established to
promote a firm fixture list as opposed to the tradition of arranging friendly matches
around the F.A. Cup competition. A set fixture list meant a more steady income for the
working class professional dominated league clubs. This in turn financed transfer fees,
higher salaries and stadium construction. This extended the split between professional
and amateur factions. Different attitudes toward the style of play led many amateurs to
70. See Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 139.
See Peter Dunk, ed., Rothmans Football Yearbook 1986-1987. London 1986.
See Geoffery Green, History Of The Football Association. London, 1953, pp. 592.
71. Anthony Mason. Op. Cit.. pp. 150.
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refuse to play against professionals and thus amateur teams generally played in separate
league and cup competitions. The difference between professional and amateur clubs
was not only evident in the administrative and playing sides but also manifest itself in
conflict between club supporters. Middle class supporters of Queen Park, an amateur
club to this day, often had hostile encounters with the working class supporters of
Glasgow Rangers and Celtic. 72' 73
The struggle for power between the traditional middle class dominated Football
Association and the emerging professional teams led to a long conflict which in many
ways is still going on. Conflict between middle and working class values, both on and
off the field, created a situation where football evolved based on financial needs and not
as a result of alterations in the wider social situation. Once football had emerged form
the public schools with its new rules, it changed only slightly as an amateur sport to
adapt to the new industrial society. Advantage was taken of developments in
transportation, communication, leisure time, economic conditions to develop and adapt
as a mass spectator sport. Once football had become a mass spectator sport, space
restrictions and economic considerations had become major issues. When enough
people wanted to watch a match, clubs were compelled to accommodate them, first on
earth slopes and later on terraces, as a means of keeping people off the pitch and giving
them a good view of the match. Once spectator demands were placed on clubs and
facilities built, then clubs began to charge entry fees to offset costs and the economic
basis of football was established. Spectators demanded good players which led firstly
to illegal payments and secondly to professionalisation, which in turn ended what little
harmony had existed between working class and middle class teams. The traditional
72. Bill Murray, The Old Firm. Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 168.
73. William J. Baker, Op, Cit.. pp. 246-7.
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middle class attitude of the 'game for the game's sake' was alien to working class
traditions of working hard for the pay packet. The working class attitude of winning
and winning at all costs, left the working class playing style in total control of
football.74' 75 No middle class club won any major competition after 1882. Even
though the working class professional style of play dominated play on the field, the
middle class still held the balance of power in team ownership and influence in the
Football Association, the governing body in enforcing rules and providing penalties for
infractions. Middle class values, expressed through the Football Association, have
continually tried to reduce the violence in football while promoting skill on the field,
values which are often in conflict with working class values but are enforced by middle
class people in charge of the governing body. The conflict between the two continues
to be a problem to this day.
The Modern Game Develops. 1890 To 1944
Football by the end of the nineteenth century was becoming a major employer as more
and more teams became professional. With a predominantly working class work force,
a players' union was established in 1898 but did not become well enough organised or
have a large enough membership to take action until 1908. After a threatened strike the
Football Association retaliated by threatening to use amateur players as replacements for
the professionals. After negotiations, the Football Association recognised the players'
union and the new Professional Football Players Association recognised the Football
Association as the sole authority over the game.
74. see Anthony Mason, Op, Cit.. pp. 230, for a discussion of class values and conflict in the
playing of football.
75. also see John Hutchinson, Op, Cit.. pp. 45, for a further discussion of class differences in
football and how the problem was blamed on the Scots.
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Class divisions were evident, not only on the pitch but on the terraces as well.
Economic necessity forced more and more teams to turn professional to remain
competitive on the pitch and at the turnstyles. During this period both middle class and
working class supporters often mixed on the terraces. Just as the style of play was
different between the classes so was the style of support from the two groups. The
middle class tradition of 'sport for the sport's sake' meant that both home and
opposition teams received equal appreciation of their skills. The working class
supporters on the other hand, saw the match as an expression of their identity and
values and responded as partisan support. This was noted on the terraces prior to the
turn of the century.76
"First of all they (working class supporters) were so clearly partisan.
They wanted their own side to win. They were supporters. They did
not see the other side. They did not even applaud its skill and courage
nor give it any credit at all. It was merely a sacrificial lamb on which the
home team could practice ritual slaughter." 77 "The working class
spectator identified with a team and through that team with a place. He
liked to win and did not have much patience with honourable defeat."78
In the 1890s supporters' groups were organised and providing social events and travel
arrangements to away matches. 79 Supporters' clubs or 'brake' clubs - as they were
known in Glasgow - were organized to support a particular team, and thus the members
reflected the same general class values as the players. This in turn manifested itself in a
strong identity with the team and partisan support.
Football in Scotland developed on a slightly different basis than it did in England due to
the dominance of one amateur club, Queens Park. Scotland maintained its amateur
76. Anthony Mason. On. Cit.. pp.231.
77. Anthony Mason, Op, Cit.. pp. 230.
78. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 238.
79. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit.. pp. 50-55.
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players' status until 1893 and the development of the Scottish Football League. The
Scottish Football Association did not place a cap on players' salaries as the English
Football Association had done. As a result, Scottish football worked on a supply and
demand pay system, but salaries were generally lower in Scotland than England.
Scotland, due to the influence of Queens Park, and economic conditions, has to this
day maintained a system where amateur, part-time and professional teams play in equal
status with one another. With the banning of English clubs from European competition
after the Heysel Stadium riot in 1985, the larger Scottish clubs have been able to
reverse the trend of Scottish players moving to England for increased salaries and have
themselves attracted many English players to Scotland with the lure of competitive
salaries and European football.
Crowd violence in Scotland had existed prior to the turn of the century, especially in
Glasgow.80 After the Scottish Cup replay in April 1909 ended in a draw between
Rangers and Celtic before a crowd of 60,000 at Hampden Park, the crowd expected
extra time to be played but the rules called for another replay. Sections of the spectators
began to fight with one another, and one of the largest incidents of 'football
hooliganism' in this century took place.
"There were some who jumped the barricade and crowded round the
players' tunnel screaming 'play on'. A policeman probably provoked,
was seen to be rough with a demonstrator and the crowd went berserk.
The goal posts were torn up and paraded. There were ninety-seven
policemen present, but the officer in charge held them to protect the
stand, surrendering the field to the rioters. Wooden barricades were
torn up and a bonfire made of them. Mounted police were brought into
action but the crowd retreated to the terracing and stoned them. There
were baton charges which were repelled with stones.
The fire brigade were called out when the pay boxes were set on fire but
their hoses were cut and there was a weird sight when police and
firemen lined up to protect hoses and stoned rioters to keep them away.
80. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.
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Soon there were 300 police reinforcements called from all over the city.
Twelve doctors and a squad of nurses tended the injured including
forty-five policemen. As they did so the destruction spread to property
outside the park and damage scarred the route into town. Peace at last
settled on a shamed Hampden Park. On Monday morning one solitary
rioter appeared in Govan Court and was fined £5.00." 81
Although the description of the first Hampden Park riot does not provide a specific
analysis of collective behavior, the evidence does indicate a similar pattern of events to
those witnessed in the football hooliganism of today. The pattern of crowd activity
building to sustained action against the police, with semi-organised attacks against the
issue that incited the crowd and the agents of social control is the same pattern that is
followed in all collective violence.82
Class differences in the administration, support, playing style and management of
football continued to cause strife throughout the sport. Middle class clubs eventually
set up competitions for amateur clubs and left the league structure almost totally
dominated by professional clubs. Despite the conflict on the field between professional
and amateur clubs, the terraces for the most part were occupied by a mixture of
working and middle class supporters. Although the evidence is inconclusive football
crowds before the first World War seem to have been predominantly working class
with varying degrees of middle class support depending on the social make up of the
area. Women also attended most matches and often made up a substantial percentage of
the crowd, especially when given reduced admission charges. 82
The outbreak of hostilities in World War I resulted in a massive public resentment when
81. John Raffertv. Op. Cit.. pp.113.
82. See chapters 4,5, and 6 for a detailed analysis of collective behavior in football crowds.
83. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.. pp. 151-158.
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the Football Association and the League did not suspend play. Rugby and other major
sports all suspended play with the onset of the war. Led by newspaper criticism,
football - although contributing heavily to the war effort - was heavily criticised for
continuing to play. Many football clubs resigned from the Football Association and
changed over to playing rugby. This was especially true for clubs from public school
and middle class backgrounds. As a result of the public - especially middle class
resentment - most middle class spectators left football grounds and changed their
allegiance to rugby, thus creating a definite class distinction between the sports. By the
end of the war, only one amateur football team remained in the professional leagues,
Queens Park.
Despite the loss of most middle class support football enjoyed an attendance increase
after the war. Football benefited from an expanding leisure industry and was fueled by
increased incomes and a prosperous economic situation. Old football stadiums were
expanded and new ones built to accommodate the increasing number of spectators and
teams that joined the professional leagues. 84 With the building of Hampden Park,
Ibrox Stadium and Celtic Park, Glasgow had the finest football facilities in Europe, at
the time. 85
The inter-war years continued to see the best football talent in Scotland, Wales and
Ireland go to England for the higher salaries on offer. Scottish players dominated many
English teams and every league champion between 1920 and 1939 had at least one Scot
in the side. As a result of the relatively large number of good Scottish players during
this period, Scotland dominated the annual international fixture against England. Due
to political considerations both by the government and by the Football Association,
84. See G. Green, Op. Cit.. pp. 592.
85. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.. pp. 46-47.
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England played few international matches except where it could be seen as a form of
political superiority over the opposition. Scotland continued to play all countries of the
world on a regular basis, except those aligned with Nazi Germany.
The international match between Scotland and England continued to prosper after the
first meeting in 1872. With the opening ofWembley Stadium in London in 1923, the
semi-annual migration of Scots to London began, and by 1928 eleven fully loaded
special trains ran from Glasgow to London for the match. In 1934 the number had
increased to 52 trains transporting some 23,000 Scots south for the match with 'the
auld enemy'.86 Even at this early date the train loads of Scots were described as, ". ..
their tartan cargos more bemused by the mile, soaking in drink that defeated the
discomfort and fed their arrogance." 87 The 'Wembley Cult' continues, with
upwards of 200,000 Scots travelling to London when the match is played on a
Saturday.
With the outbreak of World War II, all football competitions were suspended. All
football facilities were made available to the War Office. Despite the suspension of
play, the government encouraged the Football Associations, both north and south of the
border, to institute matches using available facilities and players for the entertainment of
the population. Many local leagues were set up using footballers stationed near by to
make up the teams. Despite severe crowd limitations three quarters of a million pounds
was donated to the St. Johns' fund and the Red Cross from gate receipts. 88
86. John Raffcrty, Op. Cit.. pp. 61 and 13.
87. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.. pp. 47.
88. James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp.142.
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Football In Changing Times. 1945 To The 1980s
After the end of hostilities in World War II football league and cup competitions
resumed both north and south of the border. In the decade after the war football
enjoyed increasing attendance,89 increased revenues, 90 which resulted in increasing
transfer fees and higher salaries. 91 Although the professional teams enjoyed most of
the publicity amateur clubs continued to prosper and increase in numbers after the
92war.^
By the middle 1950s general economic conditions had improved and society as a whole
had more real disposable income. At the same time alternative leisure and entertainment
industries were emerging to compete with football for revenue. People were no longer
willing to go and stand on cold terraces in the rain to watch football when alternatives
were available. The expanding television industry took advantage of the popularity of
football and began showing recorded highlights of selected matches on a regular basis.
As a result of changing social and economic conditions, football was forced to adapt to
declining attendance by substituting entertainment and spectacle for supporter
participation and rivalry, and by substituting expensive seats for terraces. 93 As a
result playing styles changed and so did the make up of grounds as terrace capacities
were reduced to be replaced by seating in an effort to maintain income levels from a
steadily falling attendance.
89. see Tony Williams, ed., Rothmans Football Year Book 1983-84, London, 1983, pp. 464.
90. see Maurice Golesworthy, Op. Cit.. pp.11.
91. see James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp.145.
92. see James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp. 148.
93. Ian Taylor, "Hooligans: Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society. August 1969,
pp. 205.
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Falling attendance meant alternative sources of income were needed for clubs to
maintain funds for salaries and transfer fees. Scottish clubs were first to enter
European competition playing in all competitions consistently after the war. English
clubs did not participate in European competitions for political reasons until 1957 when
Manchester United played in the European Cup. European competitions provided
additional revenue to clubs and thus an increased emphasis on qualifying for Europe
through domestic competitions.
By the late 1950s The Professional Footballers' Association (players' union) was
gaining strength. Through negotiations it was able to force the abandonment of the
maximum wage limit in 1961 94 and the binding contract was declared illegal by the
courts in 1963. 95 As a result, players were free to move from club to club when their
contracts expired and were also able to negotiate salaries. Although big clubs had
always been able to attract the best playing talent, the existence of the salary cap plus
the existence of restrictions on transfers, meant that small clubs could compete with
large clubs by holding players under their contract. However, after the elimination of
these restrictions the big clubs were now able to dominate the smaller ones through
sheer economic strength. Salaries and transfer fees have steadily increased with smaller
clubs becoming reliant on transfer fees for financial stability. As a result, a relatively
small number of clubs have dominated domestic competitions over the past thirty years.
"Today football remains as sensitive as ever to fluctuations in social
patterns: to population and urban change, changes within the mass
media, and the influences of educational change, and above all else, the
re-direction of consumer spending." 96
94. James Walvin, Op. Cit.. pp. 166.
95. Law Reports. 1964. pp. 413-454.
96. James Walvin, Op, Cit.. pp. 163.
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Crowd violence at football matches before the 1960s is not well documented because it
was not seen as a major problem; there were fewer incidents and it was not identified as
a focus of media coverage. Even though early crowd violence is not well documented
there is no reason to believe that it was not a problem. As Tony Mason noted early
football crowd trouble was divided into three categories.
"The first, and almost certainly the largest number was the result of
anger at the decisions of the referee or at the attitude of the opposing
team or of individual players v/ithin it. Friction between rival groups of
supporters, especially during local 'derby' matches seems to have
almost always been sparked off by activity of this sort on the field
although memories of past struggles cannot be ruled out as initiators of
hostilities. The second most important cause of crowd disorder at
football matches was the overcrowding of spectators in the ground. The
third major cause was crowd dissatisfaction at some decision of the
club or other authority about how to play the match or indeed whether to
play the match at all." 97
Documentation of football crowd violence prior to 1960 is difficult to establish in any
sort of systematic or chronological order. 98 Most incidents were not recorded, or if
recorded by the media, were part of match coverage and not the basis for articles about
crowd violence. The general evidence does suggest that football crowd violence was
widespread with recurring incidents of crowd action throughout England and Scotland.
99, 100 incidents were recorded in Glasgow when over 300 police and army
personnel were used to control the crowd at Parkhead in 1898. 101 A stampede by part
of a crowd of 70,000, locked out of Hampden Park in 1935 when the turnstiles were
closed to limit the crowd size, resulted in 320 injuries. 102
97. Anthony Mason, Op, Cit.. pp. 160.
98. The Scottish Football Association refused permission for access to their files to document
incidents of crowd violence in Scotland both in a historical and contemporary reference.
99. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.
100. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.
101. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit.. pp. 54.
102. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.. pp .65.
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"Football from the Middle Ages, had always had a reputation for
lawlessness. The public school teams had gone some way to taming
this but riots, spectator violence and crowd invasions were relatively
common, especially in the 1880s, as rivalry between the newly
developed local teams intensified. Many invasions occurred in crucial
matches, particularly in the cup or in derby matches. So well timed
were some of them that it is difficult to believe that they were
spontaneous, but engineered deliberately to have a good draw replayed
for the sake of the gate money or because the local team was losing. By
the 1890s, crowd invasions were less common, more the result of
overcrowding as the popularity of the game increased and clubs became
more experienced in crowd control. Railings, turnstiles, fences and
crush barriers became an accepted and necessary part of a football
ground." 103
Despite the ability of the police and football clubs to better control football crowds by
the turn of the century, crowd violence remained common at matches, especially in
Scotland. 104 Crowd violence was also present in Europe and England throughout the
period before 1960. 105 As a result of recurrent patterns of collective behaviour
football violence was identified by the media and specifically by the press in the early
1960s as a major social problem of the day and who launched extensive coverage
campaigns with the subsequent demands for action to control "football hooliganism".
Media Influences
The mass media, through newspapers radio and television have had profound effects
on football. Newspapers helped football develop as a spectator sport starting in the
1850s, a tradition that continued until the 1960s. The first truly sports newspapers,
'Bell's Life' and The 'Sporting Chronicle', first appeared in 1820 with many
subsequent titles appearing in the second half of the nineteenth century. 106 Influenced
103. John Hutchinson, Op, Cit.. pp. 66-67.
104. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 163-190 for details of violence involving Glasgow Rangers and
Glasgow Celtic.
105. John Williams, Eric Dunning and Patrick Murphy, Hooligans Abroad. The Behaviour And
Control Of English Fans In Continental Europe. London, 1984.
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by the expansion of a state school educated public, sports coverage by daily
newspapers became the second most important selling point with enough demand from
football supporters to justify special pre-and post-match editions in addition to regular
coverage. In addition to supplying match coverage, newspapers served football clubs
by providing official information about the clubs to the readers. Many papers filled
columns with interviews and other information that supporters would not otherwise
have access to. With developing communication technology newspapers were able to
report on away fixtures and matches played by other teams which in turn created more
demand from the football supporting public. For the first hundred years of organized
football, newspapers and football clubs enjoyed a relationship which benefited both
through increased attendance and readership numbers.
After the end of the second WorldWar, competition from radio and television forced
many national newspapers to go out of business or to merge for economic reasons. In
an effort to gain increased readership reporting and presentation styles were altered. As
competition increased between national newspapers, the tabloid press emerged as a
form of popular entertainment intertwined with sensational news coverage.
Radio and television have had a long and difficult relationship with football.
Recognizing the potential spectator interest the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
attempted to cover selected matches as early as 1927, and television followed by
broadcasting its first game in 1937. Opposition to live transmission of football, due to
its presumed effect on attendance, meant that regular radio coverage did not occur until
1951 and television programmes showing highlights did not follow until 1964. 107
106. Anthony Mason, Op, Cit.. pp. 187-188.
107. Maurice Golesworthy, Op, Cit.. pp. 186.
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The advent of live radio and television at matches meant that descriptions and pictures
of not only football but other incidents in the ground, such as crowd violence, could be
brought to the attention of the listening or viewing public. Such incidents which may
not have interested newspaper reporters previously, could be described by announcers
and caught on film for a far larger listening and viewing audience. As a result, an
incident that might not have been seen or known about by anyone not at the match was
broadcast through out the country. If an incident was broadcast on radio or television
then newspaper coverage would also take place.
The publicity created by the media brought increased public and spectator awareness of
football resulting in generally high attendance figures after the war. The media,
through their ability to allow the spectator to gain first hand information about matches
without attending matches, has had a direct effect on the changing social make up of the
football terraces. With expanding disposable income levels, a general reduction in
Saturday working and expanding media coverage older supporters were often drawn
away from the terraces to other forms of the leisure industry. Football could be
watched in highlight programmes or in live Sunday transmissions from the comfort of
an arm chair. When the problem of crowd violence became an issue at football grounds
more older supporters opted for alternative entertainment thus leaving the terraces to
younger supporters. 108
Just as the media was instrumental in helping influence older supporters to leave the
terraces it brought younger supporters to football. Football provided the opportunity
for youths to get on television. Most important matches attracted the cameras and
young supporters had the opportunity to try to 'get on telly'. Without adult
108. see Anthony Mason, Op, Cit..
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supervision, young supporters had an afternoon of independence from parents, and
other supervision, which allowed them to become involved in acts of violence which
could attract the television cameras and make the individual 'famous' in his local area.
Although violence and football have been inseparable, it was not until the media began
to identify this violence as a problem that most people became sensitive to it. The
media coverage given to violence on the terraces, which had for example been going on
consistently in Glasgow for eighty years,109 identified a 'new' social menace where
blame could be laid on the opposition team as an excuse for a poor performance on the
pitch, or to prove the opposition's total lack of football and social skills.
"If we consider the game at its widest, to include club clerks, mascots,
fans and not only players and managers, newspaper reporters are
integral and very important to it. The nature of their association with
clubs is strongly reflected in the way they write about the sport. People
are seldom objective about sport, least of all football; the appeal to
aesthetic awareness, to emotion, to a man's sense of injustice, to his
capacity for self-identification, results in complex responses, and the
reporter is not excluded from these ..."110
Not only is the reporter susceptible to the influence of football and to identification with
a team, but the newspaper itself can reflect both the bias of a reporter and its own in the
presentation of the news and sport. This bias and the 'creative reporting' of certain
newspapers, can have a profound effect on the public, especially when associated with
editorial opinion. When creative reporting and editorial opinion appear as news the the
effect on the public can be dramatic.
Studies of the media, especially newspapers, have shown a relationship between the
109 Bill Murry, Op. Cit.
110. Arthur Hopcraft, The Football Man. People And Passions In Soccer. Harmondsworth, 1968,
pp. 201
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press and the readership which is greatly influenced by the process of newsworthy
choice, presentation and effect. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young have argued:
"There are, broadly speaking, four types of research which can be done
on the mass media: the first deals with questions of ownership and
control; the second with actual process of selection and manufacturing
of news; the third, with the images and content eventually presented,
and the fourth, with the effects of this presentation". 111
It is the final three points which are important to analyse if we are to understand the
relationship between football and football crowds. Although ownership of newspapers
does play an important role in what each newspaper covers, how it is presented, and
editorial comment, attention is better focused on how the news is interpreted. Analysis
will point out that football violence reporting is similar to the reporting of a crime wave;
the newspapers are somewhat alike in what they cover but differ in presentation and
coverage styles. Ownership has the most dramatic effect on presentation and reporting
styles, tabloid versus the highbrow press, but for this analysis the effect can be clearly
demonstrated with the latter three points of Cohen and Youngs' guide for research on
the mass media. In a narrow sense, this analysis will investigate the effects of the
media on football crowd violence, without going into the broader issues of who owns
the media.
Football crowd violence, like crime in general, has created a "moral panic". 112 The
development of the national press in the eighteenth century meant that local and
individual problems became national problems through increased national
111. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture OfNews: Deviance Social Problems
And The Mass Media (2nd. ed.), London, 1981, pp. 491.
112. Stuart Hall, et. al., Policing The Crisis: Mugging The State And Law And Order.
London,1978.
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awareness.11-* As Malcolm Ramsey notes:
"If there was no national reporting of crime news, there would not be
any endemic panic over crime. Panic about crime has characterized the
press as long as it has been in existence - which is precisely the time
span of urban, industrial capitalist society. The more everyday
reporting of crime by the press is the stuff of endemic panic. It is not
the peaks or the troughs of crime reporting which are of importance, but
the over arching continuity in the crisis - engendering presentation of
crime news in the press".114
As with crime in general, the football hooligan has been identified by the media as a
"folk devil".115 Reporting has focused on 'football hooliganism' since its identification
in the early 1960s and continues unabated today. As Stuart Hall has argued:
"Media coverage of football hooliganism is worth singling out for
special attention, for at least four reasons.
(1) Since football hooliganism first began to attract public attention and
concern in the mid-1960s it has received very extensive press coverage.
The nature and pattern of the coverage is a phenomenon worth analysis
in its own right.
(2) Despite appearances, only a very small proportion of the population
has any direct experience of 'football hooliganism'. Most people have
never seen, been close to or involved in a 'football riot', either at, or on
the way to or from a football ground. The media provide the principal
source of information about this problem for the vast majority of the
public. It is therefore worth asking what the nature of the information is
- how it is constructed, what it highlights, what it leaves out". 116
He goes on to argue two other points. He maintains; (3) the public definition of
football hooliganism is based on "impressions, definitions and explanations" provided
by the press; and that (4) the press is in a unique position, in comparison to radio and
television, through its private commercial ownership with limited control, to articulate
public opinion. The press can mobilize public concern and opinion about many social
113. Malcolm Ramsey, The Development Of Prison In Modern British Society As A Response To
Endemic Panic About Crime 1750-1950. Ph.D. University of Edinburgh 1980, pp.131.
114. Malcolm Ramsey, Op. Cit.. pp.123.
115. Stanley Cohen. Folk Devils And Moral Panics. Oxford, 1972.
116. Stuart Hall "The Treatment Of 'Football Hooliganism' In The Press", in Rodger Ingram, et.
al.. Football Hooliganism. The Wider Context. London, 1978, pp. 15.
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occurrences, like football hooliganism, and orchestrate public opinion to call for
corrective steps to be taken in an effort to control the situation. The effect of the press
campaign can flow over into radio and television as the problem develops into a
situation of national interest and concern. 117
The newspaper business as it exists today is based on the capitalist economic system
which requires newspapers to be sold in large enough quantities to attract advertisers,
who provide most of a newspaper's revenue, which in turn provides for facilities,
publication staff, and reporters. Within that system, two distinctive styles of
journalism have evolved in the British isles. The market theories represent the quality
media based on objective portraits of reality, of which the Times and Guardian are
examples. The second style is manipulative and based on the interest of the owners:
". .. whose interests in turn are quite opposed to the public at large and
to any true presentation of events in the world." 118
Newspapers including the Sun. Daily Mail. Daily Record. Express and The News Of
The World, have developed the manipulative style of reporting which has led to
sensationalism and distortion with the main aim not to inform the public but to sell
newspapers. Shock value and giant headlines sell newspapers for the modern tabloid
press and football violence has made the move from the sports page because of its
shock value and ability to attract readers. The resulting wider public awareness of
crowd violence through sensationalism and distortion has created the basis for a moral
panic about football hooliganism. 119
117. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 16.
118. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young. The Manufacture Of News. Deviance Social Problems And
The Mass Media. London, 1973, pp. 17.
119. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp.18.
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It is not known who first used the term football hooligan in the press, but it was in use
by the turn of the century in Glasgow. 120 The changing social make-up on the terraces
and crowd violence was creating press notice in match reports in Scotland since the turn
of the century. The Glasgow Herald often mentioned violence at matches in the match
reports, but seldom covered incidents outside this context. 121 It is the modern
identification and labelling 122 of football violence by the popular press, through banner
headlines and front page coverage of football crowd violence, that has created
contemporary public concern. 'Football hooligan' as a label is applied to terrace
dwellers who engage in various forms of activities in and around football grounds by
the press and other forms of the media. Once the label has been applied to violence
associated with supporters, it has been used to describe all supporters, violent and non¬
violent, and of all types for normal terrace activity. With the development of the
popular press, further identification, sensationalising of an existing social issue and the
publicising of football hooliganism newspapers actually promoted increased violence
through publicising a relatively few incidents. 122
The selection of news by the press is based on a concept of "the newsman's sense of
news values". 124 "Newsworthiness is still regarded as an independent quality of
autonomous events",125 which allows the press to select and report on events which it
feels that the public want to read about. Although the press may claim to report events
as a result of the reader's right or desire to know about events the actual selection of
one piece of news over another is based on its extraordinary aspects in comparison to
120. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 169-170.
121. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 180-183.
122. see Stanley Cohen, Op, Cit.. pp. 16-19.
123. This is what Stanley Cohen, Op, Cit.. calls the deviancy amplification spiral.
124. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 53.
125. Paul Rock, "News As Eternal Recurrence", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.) Op. Cit..
pp. 65.
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normal everyday life. 126 Along with traditional subjects always covered (Parliament,
fashion, business etc.) extraordinary events help gain public attention and sell
newspapers through public interest in the unusual.
"Two things follow from this: first is that journalists will tend to play up
the extraordinary, dramatic, tragic, etc., elements in a story in order to
enhance its newsworthiness; the second is that events which score high
on a number of these news values (unexpected, dramatic, negative,
human tragedies, elite persons, etc.) will have created news potential
over ones that do not." .127
Football violence before the 1960s was not directly identified by the press as a major
point of concern since the violence had in many cases been going on in the terraces for
many years. The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald had been reporting incidents in
and around football grounds involving supporters for many years with little or no
public outcry. With the advent of the popular tabloid press in the 1960s with its news
reporting and selection process that concentrated on controversy and sensational
reporting styles to attract readers football violence was seen as an extraordinary event of
newsworthy quality. Previous reporting of crowd violence had often been confined to
the match report but now appeared as an individual story which often overshadowed
the match report.
The problem violence in the wider society 128 and football crowd violence as a
phenomenon cannot be singled out and blamed on media coverage. The problem itself
has a long history but was on the increase in the early 1960s. The major reason for the
increase in terrace violence lay in the slowly changing social make-up of football
crowds. For those newspapers like the Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman who
regularly reported the odd violent incident on the terraces the slight increase in the
126. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 53.
127. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 53-54.
128. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Of Violence. London, 1963, pp. 10.
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number of incidents was reported but not exaggerated. 129 The problem had always
been there, deplorable as it might be, but it was not a major newsworthy story capable
of altering traditional journalistic reporting patterns. For the most part, incidents of
crowd violence were reported in match reports as a sideline to the real importance of the
day: the match.
The introduction of the first modern tabloid newspaper, The Sun, in 1965 and the
subsequent change of other titles to the tabloid form established a platform for the
identification of football crowd violence as an issue of social concern. 130 The tabloid
press was not tied to older reporting traditions, and in an effort to attract readers sought
new stories and different angles on old ones. The break with traditional styles of
football reporting resulted in the separation of crowd violence from the match in the
popular press.
Stories had appeared in leading newspapers about football crowd violence prior to the
advent of the tabloid press. Newspapers read each others' stories and report in
response to them, so as not to miss an important issue. Football crowd violence became
a newsworthy story for the new tabloid press as a response to traditional newspapers'
reporting of incidents at matches. The tabloid press identified crowd violence as
newsworthy in its own right and the issue was reported as an independent article on a
consistent basis for the first time. 131 Once football violence had been separated from
the coverage of the match by the tabloid press the same process that brought the tabloid
129. see Bill Murry, Op. Cit.. for a historical review of newspaper coverage of football crowd
violence in Scotland.
130. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior", Social Problems. 18:197.
131. see Mark Fishman, "Crime Waves As Ideology", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.) Op.
Cit.. pp. 102.
64
press to report on football crowd violence was reversed and the traditional press began
to identify and report on crowd violence as an independent issue. This had the effect of
separating historical traditions of football violence from the perception developed by the
media.
As a result of independent reporting of football crowd violence in both the tabloid and
traditional press the first "moral panic" 132 about football hooliganism occurred in
1967. Every major newspaper in the country carried stories about terrace violence, but
the tabloid press tended to have:
"... a noticeable tendency to dramatize the seriousness and the
extensiveness of these problems and to publicize 'get tough' statements.
In the case of football hooliganism this was achieved through various
techniques such as grouping together a large number of separate (often
trivial) offences in a wide variety of places into one report with a joint
heading, '40 arrested in football riots', and also by publicizing
statements from magistrates and football managers saying how serious
the problem was and how something needed to be done about it. This
was not to suggest that there would be no football hooliganism problem
without the press. It is suggesting, however, that the press does use the
considerable power at its disposal to keep alive, direct, and to some
extent exaggerate the problem as it is portrayed to the public." 133
The newly identified if not newly labelled problem of football hooliganism gave the
tabloid press a prime opportunity to define a problem to the readership, orchestrate their
own and the public outcry, and demand along with the readership that something be
done to solve the problem. As a result activities that had gone on in some cases for
almost a century became an issue of great public concern through the orchestration of
the tabloid press.
132. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers.
London, 1972.
133. Bob Roshier "The Selection Of Crime News By The Press", in Stanley Cohen and Jock
Young, eds. Op. Cit.. pp. 47-48.
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The changing social make-up of the terrace supporters resulted in the emergence of the
clamjamfry 134 amongst most football support groups. The behaviour patterns of the
emerging clamjamfry was different to the traditional patterns of support and thus could
be and often was labeled as hooliganism by the tabloid press. It was not until the
departure of the older supporters when the terraces were left to younger supporters,
now unsupervised by older supporters, that their behaviour could be singled out. The
emergence of the clamjamfry provided a necessary ingredient in the increase of football
violence. Coupled with the clamjamfry and inter-support group contact which included
singing and threatening activities the newspapers identified and labelled much of the
new terrace activities as hooliganism. As a result many non-violent activities on the
terraces were labeled as hooliganism simply because the activities were different to
traditional terrace behaviour.
The newspapers were able to create an image of football matches being predominantly
violent in nature when in fact violence was not common. Due to a national distribution
the tabloid press was able to report on one violent incident, however minor, at one
match and overshadow normal behaviour patterns at every other match. For many
tabloid newspapers the violence at matches became more important than the match on
the pitch. Football hooliganism became the central issue, one that attracted readers and
was built on a seemingly endless amount of violence.
"These self-generated paradigms may, in time, become virtually
autonomous. They may become progressively detached from their base
and then unfold in accord with an internal logic of their own. In this
fashion, the press can create 'pseudo-disasters' which may have no
discernible relation with the events as they are known by outsiders.
Pseudo-disasters, crime waves, and panics create a reality which is
organized by the structure of the newspaper office alone. Most
probably these autonomous news cycles are more conveniently
constructed than any other to meet the space and timetable demands of
134. See Chapter One for a definition of Clamjamfry.
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newspaper organization. The are likely to be discrete, brief, well-
structured, and pregnant with intelligible consistent development." 135
The result of the growing media campaign in 1967 against football hooliganism not
only defined hooliganism to the public as a whole, it used terms which polarised the
readership reaction into clear cut symbols of right and wrong. By taking sides in the
issue the press was able to increase public awareness and indignation through the
process of story selection and headline usage. Terms like riot, thugs, brawl, louts,
mayhem, slash, cut, vicious etc., in both the headlines and in the columns themselves
helped create an image of wrong-doing by those involved, without ever asking why or
how.
"Communication, and especially the mass communication of stereotypes
depends on the symbolic power of words and images; . . .
unambiguously unfavourable symbols". 136
Often terms used to describe hooligans' activities were the same as those used to
describe play on the pitch. Toughness was a desirable personal quality on the pitch,
but when transferred to the activities on the terraces the descriptive terms took on a
negative value and thus all terms associated with toughness and violence associated
with football took on a negative concept to the newspaper reader. This was especially
true if a headline story in a newspaper described a violent incident at one match before
reporting on other non-violent matches, thus giving an impression of violence at all
matches from the process of:
". . . choosing which sort of headline, language, imagery, photograph,
typography to use in translating what happened on Saturday afternoon
into a story in Sunday's paper". 137 "Through symbolisation, plus
other types of exaggeration and distortion images are made much
135. Paul Rock, in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.), Op. Cit.. pp. 69.
136. Stanley Cohen, "Mods And Rockers", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.) Op. Cit..
pp. 272.
137. Sturat Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp.19.
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sharper than reality". 138
Over a period of time the dramatisation, exaggeration and distortion of the actual
realities of football crowd violence can leave the most ardent supporter questioning the
reality of press reporting. In a tape recorded interview one Celtic supporter, when
asked about the newspaper portrayal of supporters said,
"They don't know, they nay been in the Jungle, they don't know what
goes on here". 139
Other Celtic supporters supported the first statement. When asked "when you read
about Celtic supporters in the newspapers, do they portray an accurate account of what
happens"?
"No, they've nay been here, they don't know what's going on. They
watch from up there (pointing at the press box), tell 'em to come down
here". 140
Views like these support the contention that the newspapers are on the outside looking
in, and not on the terraces learning, understanding and reporting on the realities of the
terrace situation. The distortion is clear-cut between the the reality of terrace activities,
including violent and non-violent behaviour, and what is reported in the popular press.
The distortion of headlines, lead stories, placement and the stories' own account can
serve to produce a total distortion of the reality of terrace activities. Many of the
activities of the clamjamfry are loud and animated but normally non-violent, yet often
Sunday newspapers have a lead story about the one violent incident between a few
boys at a third division match while over one hundred thousand other supporters were
well behaved. The bad behaviour of a few has often resulted in most well behaved
138. Stanley Cohen in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, eds., Op. Cit.. pp. 275.
139. Personal interview, Celtic supporters, Celtic Park, 15 May 1982.
140. Personal interview, Celtic supporters, Celtic Park, 15 May 1982.
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supporters being labelled as hooligans just because the wear a scarf and go to matches.
Although the press have a right and even an obligation to report crowd violence the
style in which the tabloid press has presented the issue has produced a false impression
of football as a violent undesirable place to be, when in reality the opposite is true. 141
Conclusions
Crowd violence and control of the violence have always been problems associated with
football. The inability of the police to control crowds of unorganized folk-footballers
led to a riotous style of play that often damaged property and injured players and
spectators. Only the industrial revolution and the change in society from rural agrarian
to urban industrial and the expanding power of the state with its increasing police
power was able to control folk-football. The emergent football structure after the public
school influences continued to use the traditions of crowd action in football but through
an altered form, adapted to the new rules of the game which required mass spectator
participation instead of mass player participation. Despite the popular media perception
that football crowd violence is a relatively new social disease football crowd violence
has existed throughout the history of the sport and has been prevalent to varying
degrees in the modern game since the founding of the Football Association in 1863.
Although not well documented football crowd violence in the form of pitch invasions,
fighting between rival support groups, fighting with the police, stadium invasions,
destruction of property including public transportation, projectile throwing and attacks
on players or the referee have gone on in cycles throughout the history of organised
football. It is only through one particular increase in the number of incidents that was
identified by the media as a major social problem that football hooliganism was brought
141. A further development of the relationship between media coverage and football crowd violence
appears in Chapter Five.
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to the attention of the public and thus became a major social problem. Once identified
by the media demands for action to control the problem were made thus focusing the
attention of the public and successive governments on the issue. Once this happened
efforts were made to control a problem that subsequent chapters will show may be a




TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
EXPLANATION OF DISRUPTIVE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR
Introduction
Football violence has attracted a considerable amount of attention, not only historically
as discussed in Chapter two, but in contemporary terms as well. As football crowd
violence seemed to increase from the early 1960s onwards the media, governments and
academics have devoted large amounts of time and energy to dealing with this social
problem. Although many ideas have been put forward as to the causes and solutions
for football crowd violence, Ian Taylor has identified five major perspectives.
". . . (i) subcultural theories of youthful fashion or style; (ii) theories of
changes in the structure of the game; (iii) social anthropological theories
of ritual violence; (iv) labelling theories and (v) more or less empiricist
amalgams of the above." 1
Taylor however, sees his own work as falling outwith his typology and according to
him belongs to the radical tradition. While Taylor dismisses all of these perspectives in
preference to his own theory, the contention here is that all of the identified categories
have a contribution to make in the analysis of football crowd behaviour but no
perspective is adequate by itself for the analysis of the problem. Through Neil
Smelser's value added approach to collective behaviour a more adequate analysis of
football crowd action can be made. 2 One of the great strengths of Smelser's theory
L Ian Taylor, "On The Sport Violence Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in Jennifer
Hargreaves ed., Snort Culture And Ideoloev. London, 1982, pp. 165.
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is its ability to accept and incorporate elements of differing explanations of football
crowd violence within his framework without affecting the structure of the approach.
This chapter will review the explanations of football crowd violence following the
oudine of Ian Taylor. This is done to indicate the scope of previous work, point out its
strengths and weaknesses, and to show why each has not provided an adequate
explanation of the problem. Although not an exhaustive and complete review of
possible approaches to the analysis of football crowd violence, all make a contribution
to the body of knowledge on football crowd violence, and lead to the adoption of the
value-added theory of collective behaviour. Smelser's theory, at a general level, can
incorporate the insights of the following contentions without disrupting the framework
he sets out for the analysis of collective behaviour. This chapter then uses the
'imminent critique' approach put forward by Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young
in The New Criminology. ^ By first analyzing the deficiencies in other approaches to
the study of football crowd violence and then reviewing the theoretical concepts within
collective behaviour an argument for the adoption of Smelser's theory can be made.
Contemporary Theoretical Perspectives
On Football Crowd Violence
Subcultural Perspectives
Subculture theories of violence and problems of personal identity are seen by John
Clarke's early work as the primary basis for crowd violence. Through tracing other
subcultural styles such as; teddy boys, mods and rockers, skinheads, and punks, 4
2. This argument will be expanded after reviewing the major contributions to the understanding of
football crowd violence.
3- Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, The New Criminology. London, 1973.
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Clark found that youth cultures are a reflection of the dislocation of working class
youth from traditional working class society through changes in "education housing
and the distribution of income". 5 As a result of "professionalisation and
spectacularisation" the game of football has become a multi-class sport in which "the
working class young have become physically and socially separated in the football
crowd". 6 As a consequence, the younger supporter is effectively isolated from older
supporters who in turn do not exercise the educational or informal social control
mechanism previously present in the crowd. Clarke argues that young supporters have
established old working class values on the terraces which involve toughness and
masculinity which in turn leads to violence. The terraces provide a place for the youth
subcultures to meet and participate in a traditional working class activity, collective
participation, to test out and prove old traditional values, and create excitement on the
terraces through identifying with their team. As a result of social and economic
changes in the wider society, working class youth have been isolated on the terraces
which has created a subculture that tries to maintain old working class values which
manifests itself in violence. 7
Subcultural theories make many valid points relating to the football terraces and Clarke
makes several contentions which are confirmed in this research. Subcultural
approaches do not however, offer a framework which allows for the analysis of
football crowds as a normal crowd or as a violent collective unit. The subcultural
concept may in the light of arrests in England of organized gangs amongst football
4. John Clarke, John Critcher and Richard Johnson, Working Class Youth Culture: Studies In
History And Theory. London, 1979.
5- John Clarke, "Football And Working Class Fans: Tradition And Change", in Rodger Ingram
et. al., 'Football Hooliganism' In The Wider Context. London, 1978, pp.51.
6. John Clarke, Op. Cit. pp. 51-52.
7. John Clark in Rodger Ingram et. al.. Op. Cit.
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crowds, be a viable explanation but when applied in Scotland the concept is found to
have little empirical evidence to support it. 8 The football crowd, as correctly
observed by Clark is divided by age and social status, but not to the extent of totally
isoladng working class youth from the wider society. The terraces are occupied by a
multi class audience. Fred Coulter's research on the social make up of the Scottish
terraces concludes,
"Although predominantly male,... the supporters were predominantly
in the younger age groups, (under 30) in the skilled occupational
groups, whether white- or blue-collar, but with a significant proportion
from the professional and intermediate white-collar occupations".9
Clarke's contention that hooliganism is an attempt by working class youth to reestablish
old traditional working class values on the terraces must be questioned, since the values
of toughness and masculinity have never left the terraces and can not be isolated as only
a working class trait. 10 The inclination toward violence is related more to age than to
class associations. 11 Violence is an on-going terrace tradition that has never ended
and thus has no need to be reestablished, the violence simply appears in cycles based
mostly on outside influences.
The fact that control of younger supporters by adults has diminished can not be
questioned. 12 The general trend for older supporters to occupy the seats does
influence the terrace behaviour by reducing informal control over younger fans. The
changes in the make up of football crowds dose not warrant an analysis based on
8- also see, H. F. Moorhouse, "Professional Football And Working Class Culture: English
Theories And Scottish Evidence", Sociological Review. 261: 1984, pp. 285-315.
9- Fred Coulter, et. al.. Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland. Edinburgh,
1984, pp. 144.
'0. John Clark in Rodger Ingram et. al., Op. Cit. pp. 54.
11- Larry J. Siegal, Criminology, St. Paul, 1986, pp. 86.
'2. John Clark in Rodger Ingram et. al., Op. Cit. pp. 51.
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working class youth creating a subculture on the terraces, since youth of all classes
have tended to stand in isolation from direct parental control throughout football history
and are not a subculture as Clark contends.
Changes In The Structure Of The Game
In early work, Ian Taylor based his analysis on the changing nature of class
relationships between football crowds, ownership, and management. It was changes in
these relationships that led to football crowd violence. For Taylor, football is part of
the general class struggle for equality and reestablishment of working class values and
control of football clubs. The game of football represented many of the traditional
working class values such as, " masculinity, active and collective participation, and
victory" in which the supporter was part of a "football subculture" where he was part of
a "participatory democracy". 13 With the professionalisation of football and the
advancement of the institutionalisation and internationalisation of the game, the clubs'
relationship with the "football subculture", or the clamjamfry as defined here, became
distant. This left the "rump", a group with a subculture identity with a total dedication
to the club on the terraces, believing they were the only true paying customers. The
"rump" 14 was the remaining working class support with traditional values who
began the struggle to regain their traditional position within football, that of
participatory democracy, to regain a sense of control over "the game that was theirs".
From this point, re-assertion of authority over football has been through violence.
Along with John Clark's later work, Taylor tried to show how changes in the structure
13. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness An Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen, ed., Images
Of Deviance. Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 141.
14. Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology Of Football Hooliganism", in Eric
Dunning, ed„ Readings In The Sociology Of Sport. London, 1971, pp. 352-378.
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of the same, by emphasising the entertainment and spectator side of the sport, were
alien to the traditional supporter who was not interested in seats, bars, restaurants and
modem social amenities. The gulf between the club and the traditional supporters led to
the rump trying to re-establish their old relationship with football, that of participatory
democracy. 15
In his 1982 work Taylor takes his analysis of football crowds more clearly into class
issues, contending that the "under-class" traditions and values are in conflict with those
of the middle and upper classes and that football violence is a reflection of a changing
"capital-labour" relationship in the wider society. Taylor contends that the British
government has become more authoritarian since the late 1960s with more emphasis on
"law and order" which has created a 'moral panic' in the mass media over the
'threshold of violence' amongst working class youth. As a result of the "struggle of
hegemony", a reduction in the economic expectations of the "under-classes" together
with increasing ruling class authoritarianism has created a "crisis in working class
experience which is manifested in many forms, one of which is football violence". ^
Ian Taylor's work makes assumptions about football crowds that are based on Marxist
traditions of class struggle combined with notions of subcultural theory. The problem
with his work is that it lacks the careful scrutiny of empirical evidence necessary to
substantiate these assumptions. For example, Taylor makes a careful analysis of many
social and structural changes both in football and in the wider society, but the historical
assumptions he makes about football traditions must be questioned and the results of
his analysis as well. As pointed out in Chapter Two, football has had a long history of
15. Ian Taylor, 1982, Op, Cit.
16. Ian Taylor, 1982, On. Cit.
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multi-class participation at all levels. The relationship between football and class
participation has been in a state of constant flux since the industrial revolution, but at no
time has any one class had a total domination of football. 17 Working and middle
class influences have co-existed on the terraces and in the stands since the emergence of
football from the public schools, although in many cases one social class may be more
prevalent on the terraces than another. Today the terraces are still a multi-class
institution with the main identifiable segregation being based on age. 18
Taylor assumes that crowd violence at matches is a new phenomenon, which it is not.
He also claims that football crowds had some kind of influence on management and
ownership decisions through a participatory democracy. Football crowds have always
had an influence on management and ownership decisions, in an indirect sense through
vocal support, for or against decisions and in a more direct sense by simply not
attending matches and hurting the club financially. To assume that supporters on the
terraces had or have any greater influence than this must be questioned. Professional
football is influenced by economic considerations over which spectators have only a
partial influence through their admission fees. Revenues have always been generated
from other sources unrelated to spectator attendance. The buying and selling of players
is also a management decision over which the spectator has never had any direct
influence. Player transfers are often based on the availability of funds and contract
agreements, not on supporter demands.
The most obvious spectator influence on the football club is through vocal support for
players, playing styles and performance or attacks on the same. Supporters may show
approval or disapproval for the activities which may in turn influence player selection,
17. The one exception to this statement is in ownership, where the wealthy own most of the clubs.
18. also see, Fred Coulter, et. ah. Op. Cit.. pp. 38-39.
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playing style, and player performance. To assume that spectator participation from the
terraces ever has or will expand beyond this point is questionable. The only direct
influence and direct contact supporters' have with most clubs is through official
supporters clubs who do communicate supporters' attitudes to club officials.
The changes in football through professionalisation, institutionalisation, and
internationalisation with football becoming a spectacle and part of the entertainment
industry are pertinent observations of the structural changes in football since the 1950s.
These changes often represent changes in the wider society which football responded
to, but did not create. The development of international club football in England and
Scotland was the result of economic needs that developed with declining attendance
and whose fmancial viability was facilitated by the advent of relatively cheap air travel
around Europe. Competition for spectators developed due to an expanding economy
which saw the end of Saturday working, a steady rise in spendable income, and
increasing competition from new leisure industries resulting in general reductions in
football attendance. In order to attract traditional spectators and new ones most clubs
began to offer spectators modern facilities including seats and modern social amenities,
facilities and amenities which most supporters actually want. 19
The "rump", as Taylor labelled the young segment of vocal supporters most identified
with violence is, like the Clamjamfry, a Saturday subculture. It is not, as Taylor
contends, the remnants of working class disillusioned youth, but a multi-class group of
participants who, as a result of their age, are more prone to collective violence than their
19. see, Fred Coulter, et. al.. Op. Cit.. pp. 69, for a statistical analysis of surveys carried out at
Scottish football grounds indicating that terrace supporters were infavour of clubs providing
better facilities.
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older counterparts. If the rump were actively engaged in trying to reestablish traditional
working class values and participatory democracy on the terraces their violence would
be aimed at the club and management and not at opposition supporters. Every true
supporter knows that violence and bad publicity hurts the club and seldom if ever
brings about any positive changes.
Taylor's later work is open to historical questions also, most of which concern his
analysis of governmental changes in relation to the rise of football crowd violence.
Football crowd violence did not emerge in the 1960s, it was simply on the increase,
and the popular press did - as Taylor claims - create a moral panic about football
hooliganism. The major insight offered in Taylor's 1982 work is in the economic
conditions which developed slowly in the late 1960s and accelerated into the 1980s and
which have created an unemployed class or "under-class". Historical research done in
the area of collective behaviour has shown that in times of falling economic
expectations the incidence of collective crowd violence increases. 20
Social Anthropological Theories OfRitual Violence
The third type of investigation into football crowds is based on social anthropological
theories of ritual behaviour. The most notable work in this tradition has been done by
Peter Marsh with a further study through photographs by Desmond Morris. Peter
Marsh viewed crowd behaviour as ritual violence in a tribal setting, where insults are
made to one's masculinity which in turn can lead directly to violence. 21 The rituals of
the modern terraces are directly related to the rituals of folk football, territoriality and
20. Gary Marx, "Issueless Riots" in James F. Short and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective
Violence. New York, 1972.
21. Peter Marsh, Elizabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder. London, 1978,
pp. 121-134.
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ritualistic behaviour patterns, like chanting. 22 Football terraces have become isolated
and shunned by the wider society, thus denying social dignity and a place of
responsibility in the wider social order to the adolescent participants. The young
supporters have established their own structure on the terraces. Reputations are built
with hierarchies arranged around physical toughness, often based on age, which results
in a social structure stricdy for adolescents which avoids the status and structures of the
wider society. 23 Symbolic battles are fought with the opposition through chanting
and singing with the occasional physical confrontation in which solid rules of conduct
are followed and very few people are injured, since few blows are exchanged between
the combatants. 24' 25
Peter Marsh studied supporters at the Manor Ground in Oxford and concluded that
most of the activities on the terraces are ritualised in nature, and based on masculinity
and territoriality. Marsh's general conclusions about ritual behaviour patterns are
substantiated in this analysis since personal observations of matches show that even the
smallest grounds with only a few hundred spectators become involved in singing and
chanting between support groups. Home supporters have always had an identity with
their club's ground and speak of it in possessive terms just as they speak about their
team. Territoriality on the terraces did not exist on the terraces until barriers were
erected in the 1960s to stop supporters changing ends at half time. Before barriers
supporters of the two teams often intermingled without major violent incidents. When
barriers were erected sections of the terraces became the sole possession of a group of
22. Peter Marsh, Aggro. The Illusion Of Violence. London, 1978, pp. 66-94.
23. Peter Marsh, "Careers For Boys, Nutters, Hooligans And Hard Cases", New Society.
36, 1976, (710) pp. 348-49.
24. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.
25. Peter Marsh, Op, Cit.
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supporters and thus an identity was established with that section of terrace, a place to be
protected and defended against invaders. As a result much of the territoriality
associated with the terraces is the result of barriers erected to separate supporters and
force them to stay in one place.
Marsh's concept of symbolic violence must be seriously examined. Ritual chanting and
singing may represent a form of symbolic violence in which the opposing support is
always sent away having been out- vocalized on the day. This may satisfy masculine
and territorial needs of the supporters and in this context is symbolic "aggro" since no
real physical violence takes place. The findings of this research support this concept
since the supporters take pride in their singing and chanting and often see this action as
a moral victory if the match is a draw. If the match is won the supporters take pride in
their achievement of having helped the team to victory. If the team loses the supporters
lose and no amount of vocal support can vindicate a loss.
In the context of actual physical violence in the form of pitch invasions, street battles,
or missile throwing the general intent of the combatants is to do damage to the
opposition support. The violence is not symbolic but real, with injuries inflicted on
many participants and innocent bystanders. The Hampden Park riot of 1980 and the
Heysel Stadium riot of 1985 are prime examples of crowd violence which resulted in
death and injury. Collective violence by its very nature is open to fits of extreme
violence in which the perpetrator has little or no regard for the victim's well-being. 26
In most instances of football crowd violence the unknown identity of the potential
victim, his identity by scarf or other garment of opposition team colours, anonymity of
26. see P. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason And Order Versus
Deindividuation Impulse And Chaos", in W. J. Arnold and M. M. Page, Nebraska Symposium
On Motivation Lincoln, 1970.
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the perpetrator, general dislike of the opposition and opportunity through crowd action
means that the amount of violence used is only governed by the physical power of the
perpetrator, weapons used, crowd support, and the influences of the police or stewards
to stop the act. Often fatal injuries are avoided in collective violence because the victim
is not able to defend himself or the conditions change and the perpetrator then looks for
another victim.
Desmond Morris based most of his conclusions about football violence on Peter
Marsh's work, while maintaining a more traditional anthropological approach. The
theme again is one of ritual behaviour, but as Morris notes, major attempts must be
made to understand the social conditions and changes that are the root of violent
outbursts. 27 The elements of terrace violence as Morris see them are anthropological
applications of:
"assembly taunting, terrace taunting, terrace jostling, terrace charges,
pitch invasions, player assaults, referee and linesman assaults, missile
attacks, supporter sieges, property destruction, street battles, seeing off
displays." 28
Labelling Theories
The fourth approach to the analysis of football hooliganism has been through labelling
theory or deviancy amplification theories. Based on the concepts of Howard Becker
and Edward Lemert, Stanley Cohen described football hooliganism as a youth culture
based on rule breaking, social reaction, association with defining agencies, labelling
and ostracism from the normal social relationships due to the expectation of deviant
27. Desmond Morris, The Soccer Tribe. London, 1981, pp.268.
28. Desmond Morris, Op, Cit.. pp. 262-266.
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behaviour. This left the individual as a labelled deviant who is then expected, by
defining agencies such as schools and the police, to continue the same type of
behaviour, thus amplifying the deviant behaviour patterns because the police and other
defining agencies, like the press, expect and react quickly to even the most trivial
actions. Cohen saw youth as always trying to establish an independent identity and
authority on the terraces which in turn creates moral indignation and the response of
control agents, thus beginning the labelling process. Within the framework of labelling
theory Cohen noted how the general terrace activity based on youth identity with its
escalating violent activity leads to and creates reactions from the police, and later the
press, who take actions to control violent activity. The subsequent arrests and court
appearances label the 'hooligan' who is then excluded from mainstream society due to
the wider indignation to hooliganism caused by media coverage and condemnation. As
a result the labelled deviant is placed in a position where the terraces are the place where
his activities are not only socially acceptable but are treated with admiration by others in
the terrace culture.
Deviancy amplification theories like Stanley Cohen's look at football hooliganism in the
context of labelling theory, which views supporters as a group of individuals who go to
football to break rules, as a result of the labels placed on them by the media and public
perception. This assumption is questionable since most people who go to matches do
so without breaking any rules. Those that do breake rules only break minor ones. The
rules that are broken are often not enforced outside the ground and never have existed
on the terraces. Despite the symbolic label placed on the football crowd, that of being
violent, the average match is non-violent.
29. see Ian Taylor, 1982, Op, Cit.. pp. 175.
30. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers.
London, 1972.
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Labelins theory looks at actors' perception of themselves after they have been labelled
by defining agencies; schools, police and the courts, and its relationship to future
actions. This may be helpful in explaining post violence perceptions of the participants
and the public but does nothing to explain the process which the supporters go through
in becoming violent. If individuals are not arrested or defined as violent the future
perception will continue to be non-violent. If the crowd is violent, despite a low arrest
rate for those involved, the media can label football crowds as violent and thus create a
situation where the symbolic label of all football crowds is that of being a violent "folk
devil". Labelling theory may point toward issues in controlling football crowd
violence31 but it is not a theoretical perspective which analyses how the activity takes
place for the label to be applied.
Although this concept relies heavily on the individual, football terrace activity is
collective in nature. It is the symbolic realities of labels which add emphasis to the
collective identity of football hooliganism. Crowds are expected to behave in a violent
manner. Seldom do individual acts of violence take place in the terraces. Like singing
and chanting, large scale violence relies on mass participation, not individual actions.
In addition to assumptions about individual activity, Cohen assumes that participants in
violence are arrested which then results in labels being placed on the individual which
excludes the individual from mainstream society. Most violence in and around football
grounds goes undetected, and relatively few arrests are made in relation to the
proportion of participants. 32' 3j When arrests are made many offenders are released
31. See Chapter Five for a furter discussion of public perceptions about football crowds.
32. see Scottish Education Department, Report Of The Working Group On Football Crowd
Behaviour. (McElhone Report) Edinburgh, 1977.
33. Personal observation of crowd actions at Hampden Park, Ibrox, and Tynecastle indicate that very
few individuals involved in collective violence were arrested. An estimate of the arrests
compared to participants in the Hampden Park riot works out to .025 percent.
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without charge after the match. 34 Few are actually forced through the courts and
convicted, and even if conviction does occur the penalties are often in the form of a fine
or other noncustodial sentence. 35 The lack of arrest and noncustodial sentences for
offenders does not carry major social labels outside the football arena. Football
supporters simply evaporate back into the wider society after leaving the football
ground and removing their identifying clothing. The labels that are applied to the
individuals on the terraces after arrest and conviction are often positive ones which
bring the individual status on the terraces.
The labels that are applied to football supporters are often, as Cohen indicates, a result
of the press reports of football crowd violence. This gives the reading public the
indication that all football supporters are violent and thus 'folk devils'. In this way the
kind of labelling and exclusion from society that is initiated by the arrest and
subsequent labelling process is created. The media is far more responsible for mass
labelling of supporters than individual arrests are for the public awareness and general
exclusion of 'football hooligans' from main stream of public acceptability. Despite the
label, supporters can by simply not wearing club colours or other identification, escape
the label and the expectation of further violent acts. Since the individual is often not
labeled, personal perception is that of non-violence and so is that of the collective
crowd. It is only the public that expects the football crowd to be violent.
Empiricist Amalgams
The final classification of football crowd research in Taylor's analysis is empiricist
amalgams of the previous four approaches. This category is not helpful to the analysis
34. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983.
35. see John White, A Social-Legal Approach To 'Football Hooliganism'. Edinburgh, 1985.
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of football crowds except for the data collected. Two studies have been carried out
usins this research style and incorporate most of the information covered in the
previously mentioned approaches. 36' 37 Since amalgamation approaches tend to
repeat existing contentions in a slightly different format or using different data no
attempt will be made to look into this theoretical approach. As Ian Taylor noted, the
major problem with amalgamations is that the simplified parts of each analysis are
removed from the theoretical background on which they rely. 38
The above approaches are all deficient in one common factor, they do not provide a
framework for the analysis of how the crowd moves from supporting two opposing
teams to participation in mass violence against one another and against the police. As a
result the aforementioned concepts can not be used for the analysis of football crowd
violence. Despite the lack of ability to analyze the structure of crowd violence the
concepts do offer considerable insight and their strong points can be used as a basis for
further analysis. Collective behaviour offers the opportunity to go beyond the analysis
already offered and analyze the specific elements necessary for everyday football
supporters to become involved in mass participation crowd violence. This is not to
imply that the aforementioned perspectives do not have a contribution to make to the
analysis of football crowd behaviour, but the contribution of each is flawed in various
ways due to their assumptions about crowd behaviour. The theory of collective
behaviour is a flexible framework for the analysis of crowd behaviour which allows for
the inclusion of many of the valid points previously mentioned. From this point a
structure for the analysis of football crowds through the field of collective behaviour
36. Social Science Research Council and The Sports Council, Public Disorder And Sporting
Events. London, 1987.
37. John Williams, Eric Dunning and Patric Murphy, Hooligans Abroad. London, 1984.
38. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit.. 1982, pp. 180.
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must be selected.
perspectives Within Collective Behaviour
The concept of collective behaviour is a relatively new one, only becoming widely
discussed in this century. Despite its relatively modem development as a framework
for analysis, crowd behaviour interested many European writers during the renaissance
of social thought in the nineteenth century. The influence of the crowd on the political
and social spectrum is reflected in the writings of Karl Marx, 39 Gabriel Tarde, 40
Emile Durkheim, 41 Max Weber 42, Scipio Sighele, 43 Sigmund Freud 44 and
George Simmel, 45' 46' 47 & 48 but it was not until the pioneering work of Gustave
LeBon in his book, The Crowd: A Study Of The Popular Mind, in 1896, that
collective behaviour was isolated as area for specific analysis. It is from these
beginnings that the modem contentions develop within the field of collective behaviour.
Since LeBon's 1896 text and the work of Freud in 1904, collective behaviour has been
heavily influenced by psychological traditions, many of which are at the forefront of
39. see David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Oxford, 1977.
40. see Gabriel Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, translated by E. C. Parsons, New York 1903.
41. see Stephen Lukes. Emile Durkheim His Life And Work: A Historical And Critical Studv.
Harmondsworth, 1973.
42. see W. G. Runciman, ed., Weber Selections In Translation. London, 1978.
43. see Robert Park, The Crowd And The Public, London, 1972, pp. 52-53.
44. see Siegmond Freud, Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego, translated by James
Strachey, London, 1892.
45. see Robert Park, The Crowd And The Public. London, 1972, pp. 52-53.
46. see Robert Park and emest Burgess, ed., Introduction To The Science Of Sociology. 2nd. ed.,
Chicago, 1930, pp. 353.
47. see George Simmel, "Social Interaction As The Definition Of The Group In Time And Space",
in Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, ed., Introduction To The Science Of Sociology. 2nd. ed.,
Chicago, 1930, pp. 348-56.
48. see David Frisby, George Simmel. London, 1984.
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modern collective behaviour research. Despite the influence of LeBon and Freud in
Europe, Robert Park, beginning in 1904, suggested, in a series of works, that
collective behaviour is a field of social investigation. The division created by Park has
meant that the field of collective behaviour has been divided into social and
psychological approaches with the majority of subsequent research being done from
one of the two perspectives.
The field of collective behaviour is a broad area of study. The diverse approaches
within the field, creates a situation where no general theory can be specifically applied
to any one crowd situation with out modification due to the specific social setting from
which the crowd emerges, and the setting in which the crowd action takes place.
Therefore, to look at football crowds, special modifications must be made to the
existing general theory so that a more specific theoretical concept can be evolved which
relates directly to the specific situation. These modifications may only be viable in the
social and cultural setting in which the violence takes place and are not transferable to
other similar crowd situations. Each and every crowd situation, or series of crowd
situations, must be studied independently in order to determine the relationships and
social stresses that result in crowd action. The analysis of football crowd activity in
Scotland is unique and the findings not directly applicable to football crowd situations
in other countries without first investigating the social context in which subsequent
crowd activity is set.
With this proviso, collective behaviour is a diverse study, that explain man's actions in
group or crowd situations. Despite this diversity, collective behaviour theory does
however rely on a specific structure for analysis. In order for any investigation to be
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complex, the structure of the investigation and presentation must be systematic and
allow for input that does not alter the overall framework of the theory. Alteration of
major components of the various perspectives would call into question the premise
upon which each approach is based. Since this study is not trying to develop a new
concept of collective behaviour, the theoretical perspective used must be structured in
such a way that the components are elastic enough to allow for constructive evidence
without negating the entire approach. For this reason Neil Smelser's Value Added
approach to collective behaviour has been chosen as a framework for this analysis. The
approach is very systematic, using a building block system to guide analysis. Although
highly structured and systematic in its approach the theory is able to accommodate
diverse empirical data, within the existing framework, without creating the necessity for
a complete restructuring, a facility that no other approach to collective behaviour offers.
Despite the general acceptance of Smelser's framework for analysis of collective
behaviour other traditions have made valuable contributions to the study of crowds.
As Smelser admits 49 his earlier work overlooked these contributions and it is the
intent in this thesis to overcome this confessed problem by incorporating these other
traditions where applicable.
Working from the traditions established by LeBon, Tarde and others Herbert Blumer
developed a theory of crowd behaviour, Social Contagion. Highly psychological in
nature the approach emphasized three major points; one, people from any background
could form a crowd, two, once a crowd formed they take on a "collective mind" 50
49. Neil Smelser, "Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in
James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence. Chicago, 1972.
50. Gustive LeBon, The Crowd: A Studv Of The Popular Mind. London, 1896, pp. 27. The
collective mind defined by LeBon was a mystic phenomenon, but the concept used by Blumer is
empirically observable and measurable concept.
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which altered normal behaviour, and three, participants
behaviour. To form the collective mind necessary for
three requirements:
tend to imitate 51 each other's
crowd action, Blumer set out
"First 'milling' occurs: pure circular reaction in which individuals move
amongst one another randomly and become increasingly sensitized and
inclined to respond to one another 'quickly, directly and unwittingly'.
Second, 'collective excitement' - essentially a speeding up of the
'milling' process - increasingly 'catches and rivets' the attention of
others. Under the influence of 'collective excitement' people become
emotionally aroused and susceptible to being carried away by impulses
and feelings. Finally, a stage of 'social contagion' is reached in which
there is 'relatively rapid unwitting and non-rational dissemination of a
mood, impulse, or form of conduct' and a lowering of 'social
resistance' resulting from 'some loss of self-consciousness' and . . .
ability to interpret the activity of others. 52
Circular reaction refers to a type of interstimulation wherein the response of one
individual reproduces the stimulation that has come from another individual, and in
being reflected back to this individual reinforces the stimulation. Thus, the
interstimulation forms a circular form which individuals reflect one another's states of
feelings and in doing so, intensify this feeling.
Blumer's theory of collective behaviour has distinct problems resulting primarily from
its structure and use of concepts borrowed from anthropology which are applied to
psychological analysis of human behaviour. The milling process Blumer describes
indicates that crowds are somewhat spontaneous and not recurring like football crowds.
Football crowds are made up of individuals from varying backgrounds who may or
may not attend every game and who stand in the same general location on the terraces.
51. see Gabriel Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, translated by E. C. Parsons, New York, 1903.
52. Michael Smith, "Sport And Collective Behaviour" in Donald Ball and John Loy, eds., Sport
And The Social Order, London, 1975, pp. 295.
53. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behaviour", in A. M. Lee, ed., New Outline Of The Principles
Of Sociology. New York, 1968, pp. 170.
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As a result much of the terrace activity is, as Marsh contends, "ritualized behaviour",
54 where preconceived behaviour patterns eliminate the circular reaction process.
Although ritualised behaviour patterns may preempt the circular reaction process,
Blumer's definition of social contagion cannot be totally dismissed since the crowd
does influence individual behaviour on the terraces through imitation.
A second development of the LeBon, Freud psychological tradition is Convergence
theory. Convergence theory differs from Contagion theory in that Convergence writers
assume that crowds are made up of people with similar backgrounds and
predispositions, 'like minds', thus assembling for a specific reason and purpose.
Developed over an extended period of time the Convergence approach is a simplistic
view of collective behaviour which has never developed a framework of analysis. It
relies on psychological assumptions, one of which is that, man is inherently evil and
the crowd situation provides the ideal setting for natural violent action, which
individuals are prohibited from doing in the wider society. 55 Convergence writers
analyze individuals and crowds along pathological lines relating to frustration
aggression theory 56' 57 and the "highly individualistic learning theory". 58
The approach has little structure and relies on assumptions about leadership within the
crowd which indicate that the leader is vital to collective action, rejection of the concept
of the crowd having a group psychology, while assuming that "individuals in the
crowd behaves just as he would alone, only more so". 59 Leaders are vital to crowd
54. Peter Marsh, et. al„ Op. Cit.
55. F. H. Alport, Social Psychology. Boston, 1924, pp. 295.
56. John Dollard, et. al., Fustration Aggression. London, 1944.
57. Leonard Berkowitz. Roots Of Aggression. New York, 1969.
58. Michael Smith, Op. Cit.. pp. 297.
59. F. H. Alport, Op. Cit.. pp. 295.
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action since members of the crowd compete with each other for leadership positions but
only few succeed, leaving others with "frustration relationships" where the crowd
reverts to identifying with leaders' suggestions and actions. As a result the individuals
in the crowd follow the leader in a stimuli, reaction process. Individuals react to the
leader only and not to other crowd members thus becoming "group individuals" and
participating in leader-incited action. 60
'Reversion' to an altered state of mind where the individual willingly accepts and
follows the leaders' actions or de-individualisation as it is termed by Dollard is a
process where the individual in the crowd incurs the following symptoms: a reduction
of feelings of personal distinctiveness, identifiablity, responsibility, inhibitions and
restraint. 61 When these reductions in normal human control factors emerge in the
crowd, feelings of selfishness, greed, hostility, lust, cruelty and destruction develop
and the crowd is more likely to engage in violent activity: man at his most basic and
barbaric self. 62' 63 The effect of de-individualisation due to high states of arousal
brought on by crowd excitement reduces the individual's ability to differentiate between
conflicting stimuli resulting in the loss of self control and personal awareness. 64 This
results in a lack of awareness to the plight of the victim and increases the probability
that the victim of individuals involved in crowd action will be severely injured or
killed.65
60. Siegmond Freud, Op. Cit.. pp. 49.
61. P. Zimbardo, Op. Cit.
62. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Criminal Behaviour: A Psychosocial Approach. Englewood
Cliffs, 1986, pp. 195.
63. John Dollard, et. al., Op. Cit...
64. P. Zimbardo, Op. Cit.
65. P. Zimbardo, Op. Cit.
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Within the wider traditions relating to collective behaviour, 'frustration aggression'
concepts, based on the work of Freud, have been applied to crowd psychology.
Frustration aggression writers, such as Albert Bandura and Leon Berkowitz, have
applied specific areas of this concept to crowd activity without indicating why some
parts of the Contagion and Convergence theory, on which it is based, are not used.
While not accepting all the parameters of either Contagion or Convergence approaches,
no attempt has been made to distinguish between individuals from a common
background or crowds based on random selection or to distinguish the difference
between the individualistic crowd member or common crowd mind. As a result,
frustration aggression within the crowd setting is an individual reaction to aggressive
stimuli which is simply multiple people reacting in a similar manner. Simply expressed,
frustration increases the probability that an individual will react in an aggressive,
physical, verbal, or with implicit aggression, especially to aggressive stimuli, but
aggression is one of many possible responses to frustration stimuli. 66
"The person is blocked from obtaining an expected goal. Frustration
results generating anger. Anger predisposes or readies the person to
behave aggressively. Whether the person actually engages in aggressive
actions will depend in part on his or her learning history and individual
ways of responding to frustration. It will also depend, however, upon
presence of aggressive-eliciting stimuli in the environment." 67
Much of the frustration generated and aggressive response is controlled through social
learning which influences the interpretation and response to aggressive stimuli.-68 The
family unit and symbolic models are the most powerful influences on an individual's
control system. 69 People who gain rewards from being physically aggressive in the
66. Leon Berkowitz, "Words And Symbols As Stimuli To Aggressive Responses", in J. F.
Knutson, ed., The Control Of Aggression. Chicago, 1973.
67. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, On. Cit.. pp.157.
68. Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, 1973.
69. Albert Bandura, "Psychological Mechanisms Of Aggresssion', in R. G. Geen and E. I.
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wider society will also react aggressively in response to frustrations. 70 Many
aaaressive responses are learned from observation of others who are seen to be gaining
rewards from aggression which provides a role model for future aggression by the
observer. 71 Aggressive responses are further reinforced by the successful use of
aggression to gain desired rewards. 72 Aggression may not be adopted as a reaction to
stimulation due to the lack of motivation, punishment, the observed aggressor being
punished for his actions or poor memory of the observer. Reactive aggression needs to
be maintained through occasional use thus reinforcing the knowledge that aggressive
behaviour will gain the desired goals, especially if aggressive behaviour will gain
desired goals quicker than conventional non-violent behaviour. 7^' 74
Kirk and Gladys Lang used a separate terminology for collective behaviour, "Collective
Dynamics". Their concept is based on a psychological format, developed from the
work of LeBon, Dollard and other aforementioned authors, and developed it into a
theoretical approach capable of empirical testing. The concept of Collective Dynamics
is based on the following elements:
"Collective Dynamics . . . refers to those patterns of social action that
are spontaneous and unstructured in as much as they are not organized,
and are not reducible to social structure". 75 "Social structure, then
consists of a set of statutes defined by relatively stable relationships that
people in various positions have with each other". 76
Donnertein, eds., Aggression: Theoretical And Empirical Reviews. (Vol. 1) New York, 1983
30. Albert Bandura, 1973, Op. Cit.
71. also see Gabrial Tarde. Op. Cit.
72
R. L. Akers, Deviant Behaviour: A Social Learning Approach. 3rd. ed., Belmont, 1985.
73. Albert Bandura, 1973, Op, Cit.
74. R. L. Akers, Op. Cit.
75. Kirk Lang and Gladys Lang, Collective Dynamics. New York, 1961, pp. 4.
76. Kirk Lang and Gladys Lang, Op, Cit.. pp. 6.
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The Langs' concept places collective behaviour in a position where all crowd actions
must be psychological in nature and therefore cannot be the result of social conditions,
oraanised, or structured and therefore cannot be considered anything more than simple
social action. As pointed out in chapters four, five and six, football crowds are
structured, organised and cannot be simply explained as part of the normal social
structure until they become violent.
Psychological approaches have valuable insights to offer in the analysis of crowd
violence but lack a precise structure for empirical research to determine the specific
cause of crowd violence. Psychological approaches do not take into account social
phenomena, such as stress in the community, which influence crowd action but rely
totally on the interactions of crowd participants to determine the possibility and
structure of collective violence. Since social stress is a major influence in terrace
violence this aspect of hooliganism can not be overlooked. Psychological approaches
do not offer a structure for the analysis of crowd violence and the assumptions made
require a general belief that individuals are susceptible to de-individualisation, like-
mindedness or circular reaction. None of these concepts provide any framework for
determining why a crowd becomes violent or why a similar crowd does not become
violent. The insights of psychological approaches into how the crowd becomes violent
are important to any analysis of collective behaviour, a point not thoroughly analyzed
by Neil Smelser.
Even though sociological writers had been interested in collective behaviour since
Robert Park first approached the subject, it was not until Ralph Turner and Lewis
Killian wrote Collective Behaviour that a true sociological analysis of collective
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behaviour was undertaken. Expanding on concepts first put forward by Herbert
Biumer and using an interactionist approach Turner and Killian's "emergent norm"
concept stands in opposition to the basic concepts of the psychological approaches and
is based on the following outline.
". . . the crowd is characterized not by unanimity but by differential
expression, with different individuals in the crowd feeling differently,
participating because of diverse motives, and even acting differently.
The illusion of unanimity arises because the behaviour of part of the
crowd is perceived both by observers and by crowd members as being
the sentiment of the whole crowd. 77
It is from this basis that Turner and Killian evolve a system that is based on the
assumption that there is a:
"continuity between ordinary social behaviour and collective behaviour
in which they recognize 'there are times when ordinary norms do not
apply and that a special norm must be imposed on some situations to
justify action or overcome the impact of contradictory norms', the
emergent norm. 78
The emergent norm is the development of new behaviour patterns by the crowd, which
are seen as legitimate, as a way of solving 'cultural conflict' or 'normative
integration'.79 Turner and Killian separate the crowd from the public 80 by setting
out a series of elements which every crowd must posses to be considered anything
more than a group of individuals. Once the six basic elements are achieved then a
group of individuals become a crowd and move on into the second phase of crowd
activity.
77. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 22.
'8. Joseph Perry and Meridith Push. Collective Befhaviour: Response To Social Stress. St. Paul,
1978, pp. 34.
79. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp.80.
80. also see Robert Park, Op, Cit.
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"These elements, then, are common to all crowds: (1) uncertainty; (2) a
sense of urgency; (3) communication of mood and urgency; (4)
constraint; (5) selective individual suggestibility; and (6)
permissiveness". 81
After these six requirements have been met, the crowd then becomes an individualistic
crowd eventually progressing to a solidaristic crowd, expressive crowd and finally to
an acting crowd. Any of these crowd situations can turn into a panic where individuals
act in the same manner as the rest of the crowd, but with personal motivation as the
driving force, resulting in mass crowd-like actions by individuals, often resulting in
death due to the individuals inability to perceive and reason normally.
Communication plays a very important part in the collective behaviour process.
Rumours within the crowd situation, associated with differential responses which
influence the suggestibility of the individual, add to the uncertain situation, this
increasing the possibility of a common objective arising and uniting the crowd. 82 The
communication of rumours in an uncertain situation where people are moving around
together is called milling, and leads directly to a process called sensitisation which
brings the individual into the common situation with those around him. This creates the
common objective for the crowd and limits the self-awareness in favour of the
collective direction of the crowd. 82
The individualistic crowd is, in simple terms, a crowd doing together what could be
accomplished by individuals acting alone. The crowd has the same goals and
objectives as individual actors but acts together in order to obtain the desired result.
81. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp.80.
82. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 30-37.
83. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 38-39.
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The individualistic crowd is still competitive in nature and the only delineation between
crowd and individual actions is the appearance of working toward a common goal.
The second crowd type is the solidaristic crowd. The major difference between the
solidaristic and individualistic crowd is that the solidaristic crowd members must act
together, with co-operation, to obtain the common objective. The solidaristic crowd
develops a division of labour that enables crowd members to perform various required
tasks to accomplish crowd ambitions. The crowd members have a unity based on
common objective, a righteousness of purpose, leadership, and differential
participation. 84 The solidaristic crowd is not violent, but acts together to achieve a
common goal.
The expressive crowd incorporates many of the aspects of the individualistic and
solidaristic crowds but moves on to; "change the mood, the imagery and the behaviour
of the members themselves". 8^ The main objective of the expressive crowd is to
bring all its members into step with its goals and objectives, and to get everyone
participating in the actions being taken. This crowd type is generally inward looking
and is not trying to change its external environment. It is generally non-violent, but can
take action against individuals who threaten or oppose the general sentiment of the
crowd.
The final, and most important, stage in Turner and Killian's emergent norm process is
the 'acting crowd'. The acting crowd has a specific objective which requires a
collective force to accomplish. The acting crowd takes action;
84. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op, Cit.. pp. 88-90.
85. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op, Cit.. pp. 102.
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.. when the circumstances and the emergent definition of the situation
suggest that manipulation of the external environment may be both
effective and legitimate." 86
The acting crowd incorporates all the elements of the aforementioned crowd types and
progresses to a point of taking action as an emerging form of legitimate activity to alter
the existing situation. 87 The acting crowd justifies violence as a legitimate, and
sometimes the only way of altering an unjust situation. The type of action, of which
violence is only one form, emerges from the collective sentiment of the crowd in each
new crowd situation.
The emergent norm theory has been criticised by several authors. 88' 8^ ' ^0 Much
of the criticism has arisen as a result of the interactionist perspective, the crowd
influence on the individual, and the use of a framework which is difficult to empirically
test. Although the emergent norm theory has a lot to offer to the study of collective
behaviour, it does suffer from reliance on Blumer's work in accepting concepts of
milling which does not adequately account for human tendencies to become involved in
collective actions. The major problem in relating Turner and Killian's approach to
football crowds is not structural, although the structure is not as strong as other
concepts of collective behaviour, but is in relating the basic premises of the theory to
sports crowds. Turner and Killian contend that each new crowd develops its own new
norms of legitimate behaviour. The sports crowd is a crowd situation which occurs on
86. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 98.
87. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 80-115.
88. Joseph Perry and Meriedith Pugh, Op, Cit.. pp. 35-36.
89. Michael Smith, Op, Cit.. pp. 298.
90. Kathleen Tiemey, "Emergent Norm Theory As Theory': An Analysis And Critique Of Turner's
Formulation", in Merideth Pugh, ed. Colective Behaviour: A Scource Book. New York, 1980,
pp. 48-53.
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a resular basis with predetermined forms of behaviour which are not new and thus the
emergent norm concept would not stand up to rigorous analysis in relation to football
crowds.
Neil Smelser's value-added concept is based on the work of Talcott Parsons,
interlacing economic concepts with those of social action.
"The four basic components of social action, then, are: (1) the
generalized ends, of values which provide the broadest guide to
pruposive social behaviour; (2) the regulatory rules governing the
pursuit of these goals, rules which are to be found in norms; (3) the
mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the
normative framework. ... (4) die available situational facilities which
the actor utilizes as means; these include knowledge of the environment,
predictability of consequences of action, and tools and skills." 91
Values within the social action system are the desirable forms of human endeavour
towards a legitimate goal. From the generalised beginning of values the individual has
within the social framework, norms develop which regulate behaviour to legitimately
maintain the positive values of the state and society through the control of individual
actions. When the values and norms of the individuals within a society become
organised into families, churches, business, governments and corporations etc., the
values and norms take on an increased meaning which allows for more positive action
in the pursuit of the established goals. Once organisation is established between
individuals to obtain and maintain values, norms and goals, they become easier to
obtain within the the established framework where they can use the facilities available to
gain their goals. 92
91. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour. New York, 1962, pp. 24-5.
92. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 24-280.
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From this basis of individual action and organised action Smelser goes on to build his
concept of collective behaviour.
.. any instance of collective behaviour must contain the following: (a)
uninstitutionalised; (b) collective action: (c) taken to modify a condition
of strain; (d) on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a
component of action." 93
Thus collective behaviour is crowd activity designed to modify normal social action at a
level of engagement, whether it be a revolution against the government or action against
an unjust situation. Whatever the collective behaviour, it must contradict all of the four
basic components of social action in an attempt to redefine or re-establish an existing
situation to the benefit of those involved. As a result of the four parameters within
social action collective behaviour has four types of activity aimed at altering those
parameters.
". . . (a) the value-oriented movement is collective action mobilized in
the name of a generalized belief envisioning a re-construction of values;
(b) the norm-oriented movement is action mobilized in the name of a
generalized belief envisioning a re-construction of norms; (c) the
hostile outburst is action mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief
assigning responsibility for an undesirable state of affairs to some agent;
and (d) and the craze and the panic are forms of behaviour based on a
generalized redefinition of situational facilities." 94
All four types of collective behaviour are built on some form of generalised belief. The
generalised belief is different in each category of collective action, requiring separate
analysis for the four types of collective action. Value and norm oriented movements
do not generally result in collective violence because their aim is change within the
existing social framework. Generalised beliefs which lead to hostile outbursts will be
93. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.. pp. 73.
94. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 124.
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analysed because the violence at football matches is not aimed at long-term social
change but instead at quick short-term redress against those held responsible for a
unsatisfactory situation.
Despite the general acceptance of the hostile outburst as a structure for the analysis of
football crowd behaviour the value and norm oriented movements cannot be totally
discounted because certain aspects of football organisations can and often do attempt to
effect social change through the existing framework. Football clubs and supporters'
clubs have often lobbied Parliament in an effort to have the law changed. Supporters
clubs have made demands on clubs for changes in the facilities and on players and
managers but these situations rarely result in violence. When violence does arise wider
social implications may be present but the violence is generally aimed at a more
immediate short-term goal.
The panic is one situation that can have a cross-over effect in to terrace violence.
Panics that caused many deaths and injuries at Bolton in 1946 and Ibrox in 1972 were
not caused by collective violence but by overcrowding of supporters in a restricted area,
resulting in a crush where people were crushed or suffocated. The Heysel Stadium riot
between Liverpool and Juventus supporters resulting in 39 deaths was a combination of
the result of a collective outburst by Liverpool supporters and a resulting panic by
Juventus supporters. Those who died panicked when chased by Liverpool supporters
and tried to move through an area with a low retaining wall. The resulting crush of
bodies caused the wall to collapse resulting in the 39 deaths.
The hostile outburst is built on a series of components which build upon one another in
order, then short circuit to create violent action. The first two steps towards collective
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action take place in the wider community setting and are reflected by the crowd. The
first step leading to collective action is structural conduciveness, which examines:
"(a) the structure of responsibility in situations of strain; (b) the
presence of channels for expressing grievances; (c) the possibility of
communication among the aggrieved." 95
Built on strain in the community, structural conduciveness looks at divisions within the
community in general terms before re-examining them in more detail in successive steps
in the theory.
Strain in the community is the second stage towards collective action. Building on the
conduciveness already established, strain involves each of the four basic determinants
of social action: facilities, organisation, norms and values. It is social strain which
creates real or threatened deprivation which causes most of the hostile outbursts from
crowds. Perceived deprivation takes place in many forms, but the most obvious are the
most relevant, since they are open to observation by all those concerned. Perceived
deprivation creates anxiety and a desire to alter existing social organisation, in this case
through collectivity.
The build-up of conduciveness, strain and anxiety furthered by rumours creates a
generalised belief that" something or someone is responsible for the deprivation, either
real or threatened. At this point Smelser uses a system called "short circuiting" to
accommodate the crowd moving from being non-active to violence. Generalised beliefs
and anxiety produce aggression, the desire to attack those responsible, and the
omnipotence to do so. Before the crowd can take action short circuiting must take place
95. Neil Smelser, On. Cit.. pp. 277.
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so that there is a clear identification of those responsible, a channelling of aggression to
those responsible, exaggerated ability to remove those responsible, and exaggerated
results of action taken. 96
Even after a crowd situation has progressed to a point where short circuiting has
occurred, Smelser requires a "precipitating factor" to occur before any hostile activity
can take place.
"The precipitating factor confirms the existence, sharpens the definition,
or exaggerates the effect of one of these conditions". 97
(conduciveness, strain and generalized beliefs)
The precipitating factor, just as it implies, is some overt act which starts the mass
participation of the crowd in anti-social or violent behaviour.
The final escalation stage of the value-added process is the actual hostile outburst or "
mobilization for action". This final stage, like all the previous stages, requires the
successful completions of the previous elements of escalation. Mobilisation for action
includes:
". . . (a) leadership; (b) organization of the hostile outburst; (c) the
shape of the hostility curve". 98
The final, and what Smelser considers to be an over-riding aspect of every element
within the value-added process is social control.
"Once an episode of collective behaviour has appeared, its duration and
severity are determined by the response of agencies of social
96. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit,. pp. 101-103.
97- Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 249.
98. Neil Smelser, On. Cit.. pp. 253.
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control."99
The activities of the police in response to the crowd action will affect the duration and
severity of crowd activity. Police presence often preempts crowd activity since most
people seek to avoid arrest and stay within tolerable behaviour limits.
(inclusions
The review of the major theoretical perspectives of football crowd behaviour indicates
that collective behaviour offers a major, relatively unexamined, avenue of analysis of
'football hooliganism'. The field of collective behaviour is a field of broad analysis of
man acting together, with the interaction between the crowd and the individual of
paramount importance. The diverse approaches within the discipline; including those
of anthropology, psychology, natural history and sociology, all add to the large number
of variables and few agreed upon specific facts relating to the study of crowd
behaviour. This has created a situation where no specific theory is adequate to analyse
a specific crowd situation, or series of crowd situations, without modifications due to
the specific social setting from where the crowd emerges. Since all the aforementioned
perspectives on collective behaviour were written to explain a certain series of crowd
actions at some point in history, they necessarily reflect the social, psychological and
physical conditions in which those collective actions took place. Therefore, to analyse
football crowds, alternative structures for analysis need to be developed in addition to
the traditional approaches to collective behaviour. The alternatives or modifications to
the traditional concepts of collective behaviour may only be viable for the setting in
which the collective action takes place and not automatically transferable to other crowd
99- Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 384.
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situations without first reverting to the original framework. Each and every crowd
situation, or series of crowd situations, must be studied within the social setting and
physical structure of the collective action. Otherwise important variables which
contribute to the cause, structure and goals of the crowd action may not be evident, and
thus any attempts at control may not be effective. For these reasons the analysis of
football crowds in Scotland is unique, since Scotland has its own social setting, social
stresses, physical structure, and goals associated with football crowd activity. As a
result the findings of this study may not be directly applicable to football crowd
situations in other countries or societies, like England, without first looking into the
social context in which the violence takes place. 100
Since it is the contention that no theoretical approach to collective behaviour is totally
adequate for the complete analysis of football crowds, a framework for study is still
required. Even though all the approaches to collective behaviour have a framework for
analysis, the Theory Of Collective Behaviour by Neil Smelser is by far the most
structured and precise. 101 The building block system developed by Smelser is elastic
enough to allow for modifications, which must be made for the analysis of football
crowds, without destroying the framework or concept itself. The other approaches to
collective behaviour all have major faults which make them unacceptable. The
emergent norm is reliant on a concept which is not proven by research, 102 which
results in the entire structure of the concept being brought into question. 103 Both the
contagion and convergence approaches suffer from a lack of a strong systematic
framework and a reliance on psychological concepts which are not substantiated by
100. also see H. F. Morehouse, Op. Cit.. pp. 285-315.
101. see Michael Smith, Op.Cit.. pp. 299-300.
102. See Chapter Four.
103. aslo see Kathleen Tierney, Op. Cit.. pp. 48-53.
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research. 104 Since the structure for analysis, in this case, is more important than the
underlying theoretical concept, Smelser's value-added approach will be used as an
outline for the analysis of football crowd violence.
The value-added concept has been used by other authors to study crowd behaviour 105
and by Michael Smith in one of the few attempts to probe football crowd behaviour
through collective behaviour theory. As Smith notes, Smelser's theory is "the most
elaborate, comprehensive and certainly the most sociological" 106 approach to collective
behaviour, but it does suffer from being very broad in concept, "the breadth of many of
the concepts makes disconfirmation difficult". 107 Even with notable criticisms of the
value-added concept, 108' 109 ' 110 it still has the best overall structure for the analysis
of football hooliganism. The problems of broad general categories for analysis are in
fact necessary for the analysis of football crowd violence. The underlying problems
associated with the violence are multi-faceted and the flexibility of the value-added
approach accommodates these broad-based social and psychological issues; when other
approaches may by specific design eliminate important avenues of investigation.
The structural framework of the value-added approach is elastic enough to
accommodate additions of psychological concepts of crowd behaviour which Smelser,
104. See chapter four.
105. Jerry Lewis, "A Study Of The Kent State Incident Using Smelser's Theory Of Collective
Behaviour", in Meredith Pugh, ed., Collective Behaviour: A Source Book. New York, 1980.
106. Michael Smith, Op.Cit.. pp. 299.
107. Michael Smith, Oo.Cit.. pp. 300.
108. see E. Currie and J. H. Sckolnick, "A Critical Note On The Conception Of Collective
Behaviour", in J. F. Short and M. E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence. Chicago, 1972.
109. see R. Manning, "A Critical Analysis Of Contemporary Collective Behaviour Theory",
Sociological Focus. 4:1971, pp. 99-106.
HO. see Gary Marx, "Issueless Riots", Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social
Sciences. 391:1970, pp. 21-30.
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after criticism, 111 admitted needed to be accounted for. llj Through its elasticity,
Smelser's framework can accommodate the 'imminent critique' 114 method of analysis,
then using information from other explanations in relation to the value-added theory.
In addition to being elastic enough to accommodate additions, the framework is elastic
enough to accommodate several contradictions. Smelser's work investigated violent
crowds and their relationship with the police, whereas football crowds are triangular in
nature, two support groups and the police. Other contradictions arise in the form of
leadership in the crowd, precipitating factors, the effect of the media, and the concept of
short-circuiting. In addition, the structure itself suffers from being repetitive in the
analysis of structural conduciveness and structural strain. Despite these noted
problems, Smelser's value-added concept is elastic enough to accept modification
without destroying the framework itself. These identifiable alternatives and
modifications to the value-added approach, as a result of research within Scottish
football crowds, make the analysis of the crowd situation unique to Scotland, and thus
these modifications must be further examined before being applied to other crowd
situations.
HI. See notes 96, 97, & 98.
112- Neil Smelser, "Some Additional Thoughts On Collective Behaviour", in Merideth Pugh, ed.,
Collective Behaviour: A Source Book. New York 1980.
113. Neil Smelser, "Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in
James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds.. Collective Violence. Chicago 1972.
114. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, On, Cit.
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CHAPTER IV
FOOTBALL CROWDS ANALYSED BY THE VALUE-ADDED
APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR: THE NON-VIOLENT
CONDITIONS
Introduction
As has been noted in the previous three chapters football has always been a crowd
activity. From the earliest form of unorganised folk sport to the modem game people,
and lots of them, have been the focal point of football. The modern game is based on
the spectator, who is supposed to attend matches in large numbers and thus maintain
the modem economic structure of professional football. Although the circumstances
have changed the overriding concept of people gathering together for the common
purpose of sport has not. Professional football depends on public interest and public
participation, just as folk football depended on large scale public participation.
The history of violence at football matches indicates that violence was not widespread
before 1960 except in Glasgow and to a lesser extent in other Scottish cities. This is
not to discount the historical contention that crowd violence has always been associated
with football, but between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s a period of
relative calm existed on the terraces where few notable violent events took place. When
football crowd violence was first noted in England in the 1960s it was labelled the
'Scottish disease'. As far as Scottish football, and especially football crowds in
Glasgow, were cpncerned Moorhouse noted:
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"Riots, unruly behaviour, violence, assault and vandalism appear to
have been a well-established, but necessarily dominant, pattern of
crowd behaviour at football matches at least from the 1870s. 1
The traditions of violence were centred in Glasgow with Rangers and Celtic supporters
the predominant offenders. 2 Supporters' clubs were known as 'brake clubs' 3 4
before the 1930s and in Glasgow had a long history of confrontation which is similar in
pattern to the problems that exist today. The process that brought the terraces of other
clubs to the level of violence that persisted in Glasgow required some basic changes in
the make-up of the terrace supporters to allow 'football hooliganism' to expand and
become the social issue that it is today.
The public, 5 when gathered into a specific area for a specific purpose such as
watching football or participating in it, can take on a new role which can be defined as a
crowd.
"The crowd is a collectivity involving essentially a considerable number
of individuals responding within a limited space to some common object
of attention." 6
In this case the playing or watching of football has been the common purpose of the
football crowd throughout history. Folk football depended on collective crowd
activity, just as the modem club depends on crowds for financial stability. Although
1. H. F. Morehouse, "Professional Football And Working Class Culture: English Theories And
Scottish Evidence", Sociological Review. 261: 1984, pp. 294.
2. also see John Hutchinson, The Football Industry, Glasgow,1981, pp. 57.
3. Kevin McCarra, Scottish Football: A Pictorial History From 1867 To The Present Dav.
Edinburgh, 1984.
4. Bill Murray, The Old Firm: Sectariansism. Snort And Scocietv In Scotland. Edinburgh, 1984,
pp. 67-74 & 169-75.
5. Robert Park, The Crowd And The Public. London, 1972, pp. 128.
6. Kimball Young, Handbook Of Social Psychology. London, 1950, pp. 286.
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the circumstances surrounding crowd structure related to football have changed
drastically for the crowd, from participant to spectator, the violence associated with
football has been continuous. The frequency and duration of football crowd violence
episodes have fluctuated throughout history and continue to do so in the modern
setting. The historical structure of football and crowd violence has evolved into the
contemporary setting, - not as some suggest developed as a new phenomena in the
1960s. "Collective violence is normal," 7 not only in the wider society, but
particularly at football matches because of the structure of the game and its facilities.
"Sports fans and violence have seemingly always been entwined with
one another. Fans are supposed to be spectators, passive viewers,
removed from the ferocity of the combat. But they are also urged to
root, to form allegiances, to identify, to scream and shout and pray for
the good guys. Somewhere along the line the demarcation point gets
blurred". 8
As a result of the historical relationship between football and crowd violence, the
question becomes one of, why has there been an increase in the number of incidents of
collective violence since 1960 rather than, why does it exist in the first place.
It is the objective of this chapter to look at the crowd situation as it exists on the terraces
today, and from the perspective of a participant observer describe and analyse what is
found in the terraces along the lines of the value added approach to collective behaviour
as outlined in chapter three. From this perspective evidence will emerge to indicate
why there has been an increase in collective violence at football matches since 1960.
Before any analysis can be made of violence at football matches a detailed account of
7. Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr eds., The History Of Violence In America: Historical And
Comparative Perspectives. London, 1969, pp. 5.
8. Neil Offen, God Save The Plavers: The Funnv Crazv Sometimes Violent World Of Sports
Fans. Chicago, 1974, pp. 131.
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the actual social and physical structure of football is needed as a basis for further
discussion. Since collective violence is the result of social stress in the community it is
also important to investigate the relationship those stresses have on the terrace. As
Gladys and Kurt Lang contend:
"The main task for such analysis is to find links between the specific
content of the impulses, fears, grievances, and demands that
characterize the participants in any crowd episode and the conditions
under which the crowd comes from and the goals it pursues. The
conceptualization of crowd episodes in terms of the collective process
emphasizes the relationship of such apparently irrational outbursts to
inadequacies and strains in the social structure. Crowd behaviour needs
to be studied within the larger context of social and organizational
breakdown and change." 9
Within the value added approach to collective behaviour, Smelser examines the crowd
progressing through non-violent stages toward the possibility of collective action.
Following Smelser's structure, this chapter lookes at the social elements which appear
within the football crowd; structural conduciveness, social strain, and the generalized
belief, which forms the basis for discussions in the following chapters. Since this
study uses Smelser's frame work as a basis for analysis but is not an empirical test of
the value-added approach to collective behaviour it is often necessary to make
modifications to the frame work to incorporate important conditions found in football
crowds which are not accounted for within the frame work. One such modification to
Smelser's frame work is the setting in which the violence takes place. It is important to
examine the setting in which football and football crowds exist since the physical
facilities influence crowd action.
9. Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, "Collective Behaviour", in D. L. Sills ed., International
Encyclopedia Of Social Sciences. Vol. 2, New York, 1968, pp. 564.
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The Setting
Football crowds gather at a predesignated ground on a set day at a set time; all clubs'
schedules are published well in advance. The spectators go to support one of the two
participating football clubs. Very few people go to games as impartial observers. The
supporters enter and remain in the grounds for varying amounts of time before and after
the match, depending on activities in the stadium. 10 They usually go to a
predesignated part of the ground to stand or sit to watch the game. 11 These simple
points set sports crowds and football crowds in particular apart from spontaneous
crowds, 12 ". . . which are not due to pre-established understanding or traditions".13
Football crowds go to a match with a predesignated common purpose, have a common
goal, to support their team through vocal enthusiasm, while occupying a specific space
on the terraces.14
One of the major points noted about the homogeneous crowd is the role of the
individual within the crowd situation. 15' 16' 17 The role of the individual can be
illustrated by returning to the classification system of football supporters defined in
chapter one. From personal observation and those of other authors, 18' 19 football
10. also see Peter Marsh Elisabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder. London, 1978,
for a similar description of the football crowd setting.
11. see The Safety At Sports Grounds Act 1975. London, 1975, which sets out the legal
requirements for crowd segregation and stadium safety standards.
12. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 1957, pp. 142.
13. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behaviour", in A. M. Lee ed., Principles Of Sociology. New
York, 1953, pp. 170.
14. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 58-59.
15. see Gabral Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation. New York, 1903.
16. see Robert Park, Op, Cit.. pp. 7-9.
17. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 22.
18. Peter Marsh, Aggro: The Illusion Of Violence. London, 1978.
19. Chris Wood, The Behaviour Of The Football Fan Group, unpublished paper, University of
Birmingham, 1968.
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crowds can be broken down into these categories: supporters in the stand, ordinary
football supporters on the terraces, the clamjamfry, and violent supporters. 20 Each
individual who enters a football ground enters into one of the four categories, however
unknowingly this may be to the individual at the time. The divisions within the
spectators are obvious to any observer at matches with a fairly large attendance. The
clamjamfry stand out in any large partisan crowd. They always go to a predesignated
section of the ground in which they occupy a well known area during each home game.
The ordinary Celtic support, always occupy the Northwest terracing at Parkhead, and
the clamjamfry always go to the covered North terrace affectionately known as "The
Jungle". Visiting supporters occupy the West terracing. These traditions are
maintained without enforced segregation by the police or 'all ticket matches' as the
supporters want to stand with their mates and support their team in unison. Even in
grounds where no artificial segregation exists, supporters will naturally segregate
themselves, although this situation may tend to lead to confrontations between the
support groups. The enclosure at Ibrox is an obvious example of an area without
barriers to segregate supporters. When Rangers play Celtic supporters from both teams
enter the enclosure and naturally segregate them selves, with the police providing a
human barrier between the two groups. Individuals quickly find their respective group
for safety and to join in the singing. Once the division is complete the clamjamfry in
both support groups becomes evident as they are dressed in team colors, they sing and
chant in support of their team, are animated in their actions, and hurl abuse at the
opposition team and their supporters. The clamjamfry's actions are amplified by the
tight packing of individuals into a relatively small area of terracing. 21
20. See pages 23-24 in chapter one for definations of these terms.
21. Also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.. for a description of the terrace crowd structure at the
Manor Ground in Oxford.
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The ordinary supporters are not as easy to identify as the clamjamfry. They both dress
in some type of club colours, but ordinary supporters usually wear only a scarf to show
team loyalty. The ordinary supporter stands at varying distances from the clamjamfry
depending on his identification with the clamjamfry, viewing position, and age. As
supporters get older they begin to identify less with the clamjamfry and distance
themselves from it. The clamjamfry as a result is made up of generally younger
supporters, usually between the ages of twelve and twenty.22' 23
The violent supporter is the hardest to identify. He is usually associated with the
clamjamfry and only emerges to instigate or participate in violence. The violent
supporter can be of two distinct types. The first is easily influenced by the crowd and
acts quickly to join collective violence, while the second is a naturally violent individual
or group of individuals who use football crowds as a staging ground for violence with
little risk of being arrested for violent acts. 24 From observation, the Scottish football
terraces are dominated by the first type of violent individual while the violence on
English terraces is caused primarily by the second type.
From this general description of the terrace structure it becomes important to look
outside the confines of a stadium and investigate the social setting of the supporters.
Supporters do not leave the stresses of daily life behind when entering the turn stiles, in
fact they bring them on to the terraces and use the collective setting as a-arena to express
frustrations and demand changes. The social background of the participants has a great
22. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 66, for age group research in England.
23. also see Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland.
Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 35, for specific age group statistics on Scottish football crowds.
24. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Committee Of Inquiry Into Crowd Safety And Control At Sports
Grounds. Final Report. London, pp. 60. Mr. Justice Popplewell found evidence of organized
groups using football as a front for violence.
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effect on the actual behaviour of the crowd.
There are certain aspects of working class life that lend emphasis to the position that
football occupies within the cultural and social context. This relationship has
undergone major changes since the end of World War Two 25' 26 and for this reason
it is important to look at the situation as it exists today so that analysis can be made in a
historical and contemporary context and provide a basis for the reduction of football
crowd violence.
As has already been noted in the previous two chapters, professional football has
developed as a working class sport, especially since the end of the Great War when
middle class supporters left the football terraces in favor of Rugby and amateur football
because professional football continued to be played during the first year of the conflict.
Scotland is a prime example of distinct class differences in sport.27'28'29 A
general survey of the location of football grounds in Scotland will show that most exist
in traditional working class areas. Only Hampden Park can be excluded from this
statement, and it is an amateur club.
"In England ... the world of the working class boy has been much
more totally dominated by the playing of one sport: the game of soccer.
All kinds of reasons may be responsible for this: the basic simplicity of
the soccer game ... the long history of group games in the folklore of
the English (don't forget the Scots) working classes; the game as a route
to success and 'fame' for the working class adolescent in England; (and
25. see Charles Critcher, "Football Since The War: A Study Of Popular Cultural Change", in
John Clark, Charles Critcher and Richard Johnson eds. Working Class Youth Culture. London,
1979.
26. Also refer to Chapter Two for concepts relating to changes in football during this time period.
27. Charles Critcher, Op. Cit.
28. H. F. Moorhouse, Op. Cit.
29. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness And Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen ed., Images Of
Deviance. Hardmondworth, 1971.
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Scotland) the lack of alternative sports in a society that is culturally and
ethnically less diverse than most; and the relevance of the values of
soccer (masculinity, victory, and group participation) to the historical
experience of the English (and Scottish) work classes." (brackets added
by the author) 30
The early groundings of football in the working class has generally been maintained in
Scotland. Rugby continues to be a predominantly middle class sport although there is
an increasing crossover in the support groups, especially in cities with increasing
middle class populations, like Aberdeen. The working class setting of football,
combined with working class values have helped build football and generally keep it as
a class function. 31
Almost any volume that traces Scottish social development in the twentieth century will
describe the conditions in which the working class lived and in some cases still live.
Even with the general improvement in housing, working conditions, recreation, and
general social conditions there are still certain aspects of the working class life style that
are important to football. 32 To begin with, one of the basic facts of the average
working class life is that it is routine, routine to the point of being monotonous or even
boring. 33 People tend to work all week at dull jobs and live at close quarters.
Leisure time was and still is limited, not only through time but through economic
restrictions and limited recreation facilities. Football provides excitement, recreation
and entertainment in the traditional working class life style. Although increased leisure
time, recreation facilities, and disposable income have reduced the influence of football
30. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit.. pp. 136.
31. This is a generalization based on observing both football and rugby crowds. There is an
increasing amount of crossover support between the sports both for players and spectators as
class boundries are being eroded.
32. Charles Critcher, in John Clark et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 4.
33. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, "The Quest For Excitement In Unexciting Socities", in
Gunther Luscher ed.. The Cross-Cultural Analysis Of Sport And Games. Champpaign, 1970.
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since the 1950s, it still provides entertainment, tension, winning and losing, a team to
identify with, all valued commodities in the working class community. 34
"Even more than ancient Shrove Tuesday games, professional football
provided a touch of colour and excitement for an otherwise drab
monotonous existence."35
Once a person has a job he is often tied to the job for the rest of his working life. He
often feels that he has little or no say in what goes on in the society around him.
Unemployment often exacerbates the situation. In order to vent frustration about the
general lack of excitement in society an outlet is sought that provides the opportunity to
have a say in the outcome of the situation. Sport often provides that outlet, either as a
participant or as a spectator.
". . . in the more advanced industrial societies of our time, compared
with societies at an earlier stages of development, occasions for strong
excitement openly expressed have become rarer". 36
Even if sport does not change the daily routine it does allow the person to escape for a
short period on Saturday afternoon and have a direct influence on winning and losing
by vocal support for his team. As the noted sport sociologist Harry Edwards has
commented:
". . . particular patterns and values are expressed through certain
intrinsic features of sport activities; in combination the two aspects
explain not only fan enthusiasm but sports' predominant male
following. Sports events are unrehearsed, they involve exceptional
performances in a situation characterized by a degree of uncertainty and
a lack of total control, and they epitomize competition for scarce values -
prestige, status, self-adequacy and other socially relevant rewards". 37
34. John Foster, Focus On Sport. London, 1974.
35. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, in Gunther Luscher , ed., Op. Cit.. pp. 30.
36. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, in Gunther Luscher , ed., On. Cit.. pp. 31.
37. Harry Edwards, Sociology Of Sport. Homewood, 1973, pp. 243.
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The football supporter can escape from all the problems and routine of the outside
world by entering the turn stiles and becoming a member of a crowd that root for their
and his team. The team is spoken about in possessive terms, except when the team
loses; "we won, they lost". By supporting their team with vocal ferocity the individual
feels that he can help his team to a level of performance required to win. Thus in this
way the person feels he has a direct influence on the outcome of the game. This can be
observed by levels of spectator involvement at various points in the match. If the team
is playing poorly the supporters may grumble amongst themselves, boo and whistle at
the players, or intensify their vocal support in order to have a positive effect on the play
of the team. If the team responds to the criticism and encouragement from the terraces
then the positive play is met with loud cheering in return. The opposition team often
comes in for abuse from the supporters as well. Opposition goal keepers are often
whistled at during goal kicks and if the kick is a poor one the supporters claim
responsibility and take credit for having helped their team. Norbert Elias and Eric
Dunning see football as have two distinct effects on the crowd.
"If this tension, if the 'tonus' of the game becomes too low, its value as
a leisure event declines. The game will be dull and boring. If the
tension becomes great, it can provide a lot of excitement for the
spectators, but it will also entail grave dangers for players and spectators
alike." 38
Directly related to excitement, football also provides the experience of winning and
losing in the working class environment. Once a person is well entrenched in a routine
life style there is little direct winning and losing in the social structure. Sport of all
kinds and football especially, because of its mass entertainment value, provides
winning and losing within an otherwise stale environment. Since the supporters feel
38. Norbcrt Elias and Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.. pp.49.
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that they have a direct effect on their team's winning, identification with the result
increases. If the team wins they have had a direct part to play in the victory and feel a
sense of achievement: "we won". If the team loses despite the best efforts of the
supporters then a feeling of personal loss and frustration may develop. 39 If the
feeling of personal loss is great enough it may result in 'frustration aggression' - violent
action against the winning supporters to vindicate the team and personal pride. This is
especially true if the game has been exciting with last minute goals scored to decide the
winning team.
"Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of
responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of violence."
40 41
The effect of uncertainty, tension, excitement and winning and losing not only affects
the supporters but affects the players as well. Players feel the same anxieties as the
supporters about a match in a general sense, although the players have job related
pressures that may not be evident on the terraces. Most players acknowledge the effect
the crowd can have on their performance even if the effect is more economic than
performance related. This is reflected in most teams' home and away records. Most
teams win at home but only the best teams win consistently on the road. Teams that
win consistently away from home often have large travelling support to cheer them
where ever they play.
The 1960s brought widespread social change to Britain as a whole and some of these
39. also see Lloyd Slone, "The Function And Impact Of Sports Fans", in Jeffery Goldstein,
Sports Games And Plav. Social Psychological Viewpoints. Hillsdale, 1979, pp. 236.
40. Neal Miller et. al., "The Fustration Aggression Hypothesis", in Leon Berkowitz ed., Roots Of
Aggression. New York, 1969, pp.30.
41. Fustration Aggression theory and its effect on football crowds will be analised in Chapter Six.
120
changes have had a direct effect on football and football crowds. Government
spending on improving inner city environments including housing redevelopment, new
recreation facilities, and new social amenities helped improve the quality of life. Many
old tenements were torn down and modern high-rise tower blocks were built to replace
them. For most people, spendable income continually rose through the decade of the
sixties and well into the seventies. 42 This, combined with union won reductions in
working hours and a general end to Saturday morning work began to change the leisure
industry in Britain in which football played a vital role. Expanded leisure hours and
more spendable income meant the football became less important and less of a Saturday
institution as other leisure activities expanded and attracted people away from the
terraces. Football attendances steadily declined from the 1960s as alternative activities
drew men away from the terraces. This left the terraces for the most part to younger
supporters, who, without their fathers' supervision, tended to get into trouble. 43
Despite the odd major crowd disorder and occasional minor violent incident, behaviour
on the terraces before the 1960s was fairly straight forward. Men went to see a football
match after work on Saturday morning and stop in the pub. Sons met their fathers and
went to the match. Men and boys supporting both clubs stood together talking and
supporting their team and appreciating the skill of the opposition because they
supported football as much as their own team. Boys stood with their fathers until an
age when they were allowed to join their friends in the front of the terraces. Boys who
went on their own to matches were aware of the father's keeping an eye on their
behaviour and thus direct or indirect control was exercised on young supporters. In
what the Economist call the "embourgeoisment" of traditional football supporters, the
42. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit.. pp. 15-16.
43. see Charles Critcher, Op, Cit.
121
ending of Saturday working, expanding leisure activities, and poor football facilities
have helped drive away these traditional supporters. 44
Today, men generally work a five-day week, may own their own home, own a car, and
find alternative leisure activities for Saturday afternoon.
"... the gradual departure of the working class family man for the TV
in his own lounge, has left the terraces with no sobering influences."45
As the aforementioned changes took place and the younger supporters took over the
terraces, the older supporters left with their values and norms of behaviour. When
young supporters found themselves the dominant force on the terraces they had new
values and norms of behaviour. New problems began to develop in the 1960s as the
young SUpp0rters found that their emerging values and norms were in conflict with the
traditional norms and values. 46 The emerging values and norms of young supporters
created a direct conflict on the terraces. The changing crowd pattern brought with it
what Turner and Killian called the "emergent norm"; a new style of behaviour vastly
different from what had preceded it. 47 The structure of football grounds with the
changing crowd make-up provided the opportunity for a new and changing form of
crowd activity to take place. Although the now departing older supporter had the
necessary elements to create collective action their norms and values preempted
numerous incidents of violence. The younger supporters who took up the terrace
positions vacated by the older supporters did not have the same values and norms of the
older generation and in fact disliked the old values and were eager to put their own
forward.
43. Economist. 9 May 1981, pp. 18.
45. Economist. 9 Mav 1981. pp. 16.
46. Paul Harrison, "Soccer's Tribal Wars", in New Society. 5 September 1974, pp. 602.
47. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian. Op, Cit.
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The new values and norms of behaviour that the younger supporter began to establish
on the terraces, resulting in what the media labelled as football hooliganism, could be
argued in collective behaviour terms as an emergent norm. In the emergent norm
approach to collective behaviour a new norm of behaviour is established by each
individual crowd and thus each football crowd would have to establish its own
behavioural norm. This could explain why football crowds often engage in animated
behaviour including singing and chanting without actually becoming violent, as this is
the norm of football crowd behaviour. This long-standing tradition of behaviour is
generally threatening, loud and poised just below the point of collective action. It is
contended that football crowds do not establish new patterns of behaviour at each
match, but simply repeat long-standing traditional activities that may or may not lead to
collective action; what Peter Marsh rightly call ritualised behaviour. 48
Many new young supporters enter the turn stiles for the first time every year. Once
they have entered the terraces, especially if they are not under parental supervision, the
youth often goes to or near to the clamjamfry where he goes through a semi-structured
career. 49 The youngsters look up to the older supporters, older but still under twenty
in most cases, whom they try to imitate in their style of dress and actions. As the
supporter goes through his career in the clamjamfry certain things are expected of him,
one of these elements is masculinity in the form of violent behaviour when it is needed
to defend against or attack the opposition team or support group. The young supporter,
in order to gain acceptance in the clamjamfry, imitates 50 the actions that are seen to
bring the best peer group acceptance. Once the youth has learned the accepted
48. Peter Marsh, 1978, Op. Cit.
49. Peter Marsh, "Life And Careers On The Soccer Terraces", in Rodger Ingram et. al., Football
Hooliganism The Wider Context. London. 1978.
50. Gabriel Tarde, Op. Cit.
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behaviour patterns of the clamjamfry, which expresses the social values of working
class youth, he can express these values throughout his clamjamfry life. He is in turn
expected to participate in all actions in which the clamjamfry engage, from singing and
chanting to collective violence. The imitative behaviour of new young supporters
bolsters crowd action by reinforcing the continued perception of the clamjamfry who in
turn produce the needed elements for collective violence. 51
Many young people in today's society are looking for something to identify
with.52,53'54 In some cases youth turn to youth cultures: skinheads, punks, mods,
rockers, football gangs, or some other group. 55, 56 In many cases all of these youth
cultures carry over into the football terraces, especially the skinheads and the National
Front. 32
The inner cities of Scotland's larger communities, like those of their English
counterparts, have many innate problems which often culminate in youth crime.
Working class deprivation, unemployment, family problems, and lack of recreational
facilities all add to problems of youth and their use of free time. With all the problems
created for youth in modern inner-city society personal identity becomes a major issue.
58 Many young supporters associated with football crowd violence identify with the
51. Neil Miller and John Dollard, Social Learning And Imitation. New Haven, 1941.
52. Lloyd Slone, Op. Cit.. pp. 235.
53. Segmund Freud. Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego. London, 1922, pp.1.
54. Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti. The Subculture Of Violence. London, 1967.
55. see Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics. London, 1972.
56. see Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds., Resistance Through Rituals. Youth Subcultures In
Post-War Britain. London, 1975.
57. The National Front sold their newspaper Bulldog outside Tynecastle and Ibrox stadiums
consistently during the course of the study and their influence on the terraces is evident through
fascist salutes during chants, especially those related to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.
58. Sigmund Freud, Op. Cit.. pp. 60-70.
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club, its colours and its very being as a focal point in the social activities of the week,
just as any other youth culture member might.
"We already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of a
group is in the nature and identification of this kind, based upon an
important emotional common quality; and we may suspect that this
common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader." 59
Identification with youth cultures or when members of the crowd form emotional
attachments to a common cause and its leaders is crucial for the mobilisation for action
in collective behaviour. 60 Football does not represent an identity point for all youth,
many identify with youth cultures; punks, skinheads, mods, rockers, and lesser
known movements like street gangs and then participate in football crowds as a second
interest. The identity crisis that most youth go through and the problems it creates are
fuelled by long-running deterioration of the family unit, poor social and economic
conditions and large amounts of unsupervised free time to spend with friends of the
same age. The resulting peer group pressure or youth culture identity results in many
adolescents getting into various types of trouble, of which football violence is only one,
yet inter-related to other forms of youth culture. 61'62'62 & 64
Although youth cultures are easy to find on the terraces they are generally not a focal
point of terrace troubles in Scotland. The terraces tend to be a mixture ofmany youth
cultures united under the banner and cause of the team they support. Any direct
59. Sigmund Freud, Op. Cit.. pp. 66.
60. Both leaders and mobilisation for action will be discussed fully later in this chapter.
61. John Clark, Football Hooliganism And The Skinheads. Birmingham, 1973.
62. also see Mike Brake, The Sociology Of Youth Culture And Youth Subcultures. London, 1980
63. also see Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, eds., Resistance Through Rituals. Youth Subcultures In
Post-War Britain. London, 1976.
64. also see David Downs and Paul Rock. Understanding Deviance. A Guide To The Socioloev Of
Crime And Rule Breaking. Oxford, 1982.
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reference to a youth culture is often not tolerated by the clamjamfry because the identity
is so strongly associated with the team. In England, youth cultures are far more active
on the terraces and often are very active in starting violent activities. Movements such
as the National Front and the skinheads have used football crowds as convenient cover
for violent incidents not related to the game; violence for the sake of violence.
Observations indicate many young people in Scotland identify with a football club and
not a recognised youth subculture, contrary to the situation in England. A young
supporter or group of young supporters may identify so strongly with a team that they
wear team colours every day to show their support for the team and their identity with
the cause just as any other youth culture member would. 65 In identifying with the
club and the clamjamfry, the supporter gains a sense of belonging to a collective unit.
Supporters seek a sense of belonging and feel they have an impact on team success,
which has a direct effect on the cohesiveness of the crowd. 66 The supporter thus
becomes an important part of the football structure; he is needed. The supporter is
needed by the club for his money at the turn stiles and his voice on the terraces.
Through being totally involved in the football structure the importance of winning is re-
emphasised. Everyone wants to identify with and support a winner. Attendance
figures show that the fortunes of the team on the pitch have a direct relation to the
numbers of supporters on the terraces. At a point when the identity with the club and
winning becomes so strong, so emotional that a loss by the team becomes a personal
loss, then there is a strong possibility that action may be taken to avenge the team's loss
by individual or collective action. 67
65. also see Lloyd Slone, Op. Cit.. pp. 325.
66. Lloyd Slone, Op. Cit.. pp. 328.
67. J. A. Harrington, Soccer Hooliganism: A Preliminary Report. Bristol, 1968, pp. 21.
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Many individual supporters go to matches to seek comradeship with others in their
support group. Supporters often go to the same place on the terraces match after match
to meet friends and discuss the week's and especially the afternoon's activities.
Supporters meet and build the collective excitement necessary for football to provide the
entertainment needed in the working class setting. As a result of the comradeship on
the terraces peer pressure is a major factor in drawing supporters to the terraces and
controlling their behaviour while there. For many young persons the terraces are the
only place to be on a Saturday afternoon. As Harry Edwards notes:
". . . involvement seems to be regarded as serving two personal
functions for the fan: (1) it engenders in him a feeling of belonging, and
(2) it provides a socially approved outlet by which behavior and
attitudes otherwise socially unacceptable can be expressed." 68
Peer group pressure can bring uninterested youths into the terraces and greatly affect
their behaviour while there. The influence of the crowd on the individual is generally
toward behaviour patterns that are generally unacceptable outside the terrace setting.
The individual and the peer group are very loyal to the team and use the football terraces
as a staging area for displays of that loyalty which create or add to the comradeship,
tension, excitement, entertainment and winning or losing. At certain times the game
may not provide enough excitement or entertainment or provide much tension and with
peer group pressure help produce acts of individual bravado.
Acts of individual bravado result for two reasons. The first is the individual seeking
recognition from other supporters, and the second is the peer group's pressure on
individuals to prove themselves or repeat a past act. Individual actions often go
undetected by the police because they take place within the crowd which makes
68. Harry Edwards, Op. Cit.. pp. 238.
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identifying the individual difficult, and often the police have no real desire to attempt an
individual arrest and create a confrontation with the supporters. Individual, yet crowd
influenced, acts of bravado include the throwing of toilet rolls on to the pitch, throwing
coins at opposing supporters if they are close enough, running on to the pitch, and
throwing missiles at opposition players or the police. The most noteworthy individual
act of violence witnessed was at Celtic Park when someone from the Jungle jumped the
restraining fence and ran out on the pitch and attacked Gordon Strachan, then of
Aberdeen, with an empty whisky bottle. After being chased and caught by the police
the individual was taken bodily from the pitch. Most supporters booed the individual
when he gestured for support from the terraces. These actions, although serious, are
not viewed by most observers as a group or crowd action, but strictly as individual
actions. This concept must be questioned. An individual may throw a missile or do
some other act on his own but these acts of bravado are the result of peer group
pressure, crowd action, and the individual desire for recognition from the crowd. If the
individual were not in the crowd the probability of similar actions would be greatly
reduced.
Any observer at a Scottish football match will see that the vast majority of the terrace
supporters are male. Women are accepted in the crowd but generally make up less than
five to fourteen per-cent of the average crowd, 69 although the percentage of female
supporters is slowly increasing.70 One of the reasons for the lack of female supporters
71 is that football has traditionally been a male dominated sport and despite many
69. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit. pp. 59.
70. Many clubs, of which Hearts are one of the most active, encourage women to stand in the
enclosures or sit in the stand and thus aviod the anti-social behaviour of the main male
dominated terraces. As a result few women are found on the main tenreces while a much higher
percentage are fornd in the enclosures and in the stand.
71. Clubs with a traditional mixed class support have a much higher percentage of female
supporters, while those from traditional working class areas are still predominately male
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social changes continues to be so. What Charles Critcher states in a historical sense for
English football is still accurate for Scottish football today, especially in Glasgow.
"Pre-war football was an integral part of working class culture which,
whatever its regional variations and inconsistencies, had maintained
broadly similar contours across the country for over half a century. The
core values of the game as a professional sport - masculinity,
aggression, physical emphasis, victory, and regional identity - meshed
firmly with this relatively homogeneous working class culture with its
network of small-scale working men's clubs, mutual insurance
schemes, cooperatives, public houses, trade unions, and a myriad of
smaller leisure time groupings." 72
Historical traditions are still carried on and masculinity or toughness is still rewarded in
play on the pitch by today's young supporters. The tough masculine tradition
represented by play on the pitch has carried over on to the terraces. One of the major
reasons for the increase in the use of the terraces as a proving ground for masculine
toughness is the departure of older supporters. The younger supporters have become
the dominant age group on the terraces and are in the process of proving their
masculinity. Being tough in the working class community is of paramount importance,
and the football match offers an ideal opportunity to prove one's toughness while being
fairly well protected by the crowd from police detection.
While the crowd is entering the ground through the turn stiles and taking up their
respective positions on the terraces and in the stand, real crowd activity begins to take
place. This is not to overlook the activity of supporters on their way to the match, but
since this activity is somewhat different from the activity on the terraces it will be left
for the moment and examined in conjunction with crowd activity after the match. The
supported. Ipswich Town is a good exmple of a club with a mixed class support, as they have
an estimated female attendence of thirty percent at most home matches.
72. Charles Critcher, Op, Cit.. pp. 1.
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many variables associated with each game dictate much of the response of the terrace
supporter. The size of the crowd, importance of the match, reputation of the opposing
team and their support, temperament of the match, past scores to settle, religious
affiliation of the team and supporters, inter-city rivalry, police action, and perpetrating
factors both on and off the pitch are all directly related to crowd activity and the
possibility of violence. As has been previously mentioned the crowd is self-
segregated, and that segregation results in four categories of spectators for each
team.73 In addition to self imposed divisions in the crowd artificial divisions are
created in every ground. These include the separation of visiting and home supporters
by barriers in the form of steel fences, separations between the stand and the terraces
and barriers separating the supporters from the pitch. Each of the aforementioned
factors directly affect various sections of the crowd in different ways dedepending on
the stimulus toward violent activity.
Since this thesis is most concerned with the element of the crowd that causes the most
trouble to the police, public, and property most of the discussion will be directed
toward the clamjamfry. Since the clamjamfry and the violent supporter are the most
active segment of the crowd much of the focus will be on them, with comparisons
made to the majority of football fans who are ordinary non-violent supporters. The
terrace supporter has been, and will continue to be, used as the basis for discussion,
but it must be noted that two Premier League stadiums are structurally different from
the normal ground. Pittodrie Stadium in Aberdeen is an all-seated ground, the first in
the United Kingdom, and Ibrox Stadium in Glasgow is seventy-five percent seated.
Seating facilities do have an affect on crowd activities and these changes will be noted
after the situation on the terraces is fully analysed.
73. Theses four catigories of supporters are defined on pages 24 and 25.
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An Integrated Approach To Collective Behaviour
Within the general framework of the value-added approach to collective behaviour Neil
Smelser starts with the most general concepts and proceeds to the most detailed through
a set structure of required steps which can result in collective action. The first step
towards collective violence starts in the wider society and moves on to the specific
analysis of events leading to violent collective behaviour. Even though in this case
much of the evidence is looked at from a retrospective position, these or similar
circumstances can lead to collective crowd action; the past can provide evidence for
anticipation of similar action in the future even though the location and culture may be
different from that of Scotland.
Within the value added approach to collective behaviour Smelser set out four basic
components of social action which provide the basis for his explanation of collective
behaviour. They are to recapitulate:
". . . (1) the generalized ends, or values, which provide the broadest
guides to purposive social behavior; (2) the regulatory rules governing
the pursuit of these goals, rules which are to be found in norms-, (3) the
mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the
normative framework. If we consider the individual person as an actor,
we ask how he is motivated', if we move to the social-system level, we
ask how motivated individuals are organized into roles and
organizations; (4) the available situational facilities which the actor
utilizes as means; these include knowledge of the environment,
predictability of consequences of actions, and tools and skills". 74
As a result of the definition of social action used by Smelser social movements are
normal within the organised structure. The detailed structure of social action allows for
changes in society based on alterations of norms, values, mobilisation of motivation
74. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behavior. London, 1962, pp. 24-25.
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into organised actions and situational facilities within the normal framework. 75 When
the framework does not provide for legitimate social change or does not change fast
enough as a result of social strain then; "any kind of strain may be a determinant of any
kind of collective behavior". 76 Strain affects all four levels of social action and when
the structure does not accommodate change collective behaviour can result (an issue can
fail to become collective action due to a lack of interest) and is defined as:
. . uninstitutionalised mobilization for action in order to modify one
or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a
component of action". 77
As a result collective behaviour is based on strain and generalised beliefs which lead to
five types of collective action, the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-
oriented movement and, the value oriented-movement. Although it can be argued that
football crowd violence could be approached as a norm or value-oriented movement, it
is the contention here that these arguments do not analyze the relationship between these
movements and the structure of violence, which in the case of football is paramount.
Smelser indicates that these movements are restricted to generally non-violent attempts
at social change. As a result, values and norms will be analysed as part of the social
strain context within the hostile outburst structure for the analysis of collective
behaviour. The craze is a structure for analysis of social changes such as fads,
psychosomatic illnesses and style. The panic offers a structure for the analysis of
spontaneous crowd action, usually associated with actions taken in fear of injury. Both
formats for the investigation of collective action are aimed at specific types of behaviour
which are not generally found on the football terrace. The panic does play a part in
football crowd violence, but only in the sense that several disasters have happened at
75. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 25-46.
76. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 49.
77. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.. pp. 71.
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matches resulting in large numbers of supporters being killed. The analysis of the
hostile outburst is the only part of Smelser's work which looks directly at the structure
of violence and accounts for the social strains which creates it. For these reasons
football crowds will be analysed as a "hostile outburst" within the general framework
of the value-added approach. Factors relating to norms, values, crazes and panics will
be incorporated into the structure of the hostile outburst where they apply.
Within the hostile outburst concept of collective behaviour Smelser set out six steps for
the analysis of this type of collective action.
"(1) structural conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) growth and
spread of generalized beliefs, (4) precipitating factors, (5) mobilization
of participants for action, and (6) the operation of social control". 78
These six steps for the analysis of collective behaviour will be used throughout the
remainder of this and the following two chapters as a framework to investigate football
crowd activities. Although Smelser's value added approach has been chosen as a
framework for this analysis because of its superior analytical strength, it does not mean
that other accounts of collective behaviour are irrelevant. Many of the works cited in
Chapter Three have valuable insights to contribute to this analysis, and for this reason
an integrated theoretical concept will be developed where the context set by Smelser
needs alteration.
The aim of this research is not to undertake an empirical test of Smelser's approach to
collective behaviour. Rather, it is the aim to use his work as a basis to develop,
through modifications, where necessary a more adequate explanation and analysis of
78. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 15-17.
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football crowd violence. Within this framework the previous section has been added
since the setting in which collective violence occurs is important to scope, nature,
duration and structure of it.
The next major point of modification in Smelser's account arises, not from any
empirical disagreement with it, but from a practical analytical problem. The first two
elements of structural conduciveness and structural strain are similar in content and are
very general in their level of analysis. Consequently, much of the data recorded can be
included under both headings. In an effort to avoid unnecessary repetition areas of
common information will be included under one heading, structural conduciveness and
structural strain.
Structural Conduciveness And Structural Strain
Since almost any major social problem or division within the wider society can be
considered an element in building the stress necessary to create hostile crowd action,
identifying the particular divisions that are present within an outburst or series of
outbursts is the first step in the analysis of crowd violence. Even though every society
has natural divisions which separate individuals and groups of people from one
another, many of these divisions are not divisive and do not create stress within the
larger society. Rather, certain divisions within the wider society create tension and
stress among individual and groups. It is these divisions which must be identified and
investigated, especially in the case of hostile outbursts at football matches, as a basis
for the violence.
79. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior", Social Problems. 18:197, pp. 300
- 302. See Chapter One for the context which Blumers definition is being used.
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As has been noted, Scotland has a history of divisions within its society that has
separated people into opposing groups with many of these groups living within the
same community. In the case of football the most obvious of these divisions is
religious. Religious divisions have led to the greatest cleavage in Scottish society
which manifests itself on the terraces. Its sheer magnitude overshadows many other
social problems that are evident in the community and on the terraces. Problems such
as class identity, national pride, social deprivation, the purported breakdown of the
family unit, and youth culture all exist on the terraces to varying degrees but are often
masked over by the overriding problem of religious intolerance, even though religious
identity is often not as obvious as the other social divisions within the wider
community.
Divisions within society are the first part of a series of general components which
Smelser set out as one of the required steps for collective action. 80 Divisions on the
terraces are a reflection of their presence in the wider society as a whole and are based
on firstly, the structure of responsibility in situations of strain. Football terrace crowds
provide the perfect situation to reflect strain within the wider society because the
supporters are homogeneous in nature and reflect what Emile Durkheim called a
"collective effervescence" 81 or common purpose. Secondly, opposing crowd groups
divided over a social differences, religious persuasion, rooting for their team to be
victorious while holding the opposition and their support responsible for the many ills
of society as a whole, again provide the perfect setting for action to be taken to alter
perceived deprivations. As a result of the historical animosity built up over the years of
stereotypes, prejudice and generalised attitudes towards the supposed opposition,
80. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 227.
81. Stephen Lukes, Emile Durkheim. His Life And Work: A Historical And Critical Study.
Harmondsworth, 1973, pp. 462.
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group hatred can be manifested in many forms, only one of which is at football
matches. In the case of football crowds the structure of the crowd provides the
opportunity to vent hostile feelings that would otherwise not be tolerated in the
community as a whole, even though the feelings expressed by the crowd may be a
reflection of the general attitudes of the community. In this case the actions of Rangers,
Hearts, Hibs, Celtic and to a much lesser extent, Dundee and Dundee United
supporters may reflect the underlying current of religious intolerance of their
communities. In many cases football terraces are the place that vocal members of
society go to vent their frustrations and hatred towards other members of society who
hold opposing views. The clamjamfry is the representation of this section of the
younger society while often those with more tolerant views stay away from the
clamjamfry or away from football altogether.
Responsibility
Within the wider society, when avenues of change are blocked within the normal
framework for change, alternative avenues of conduciveness open to those seeking
change. Finding and using avenues of conduciveness is the first step toward the
possibility of collective crowd action. Within structural conduciveness there are three
main elements which those seeking change must find and exploit:
"(a) the structure of responsibility in situations of strain, (b) the
presence of channels for expressing grievances, and (c) the possibility
of communication among the aggrieved." 82
Following on from structural conduciveness is structural strain which focuses general
82. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 227.
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problems into specific grievances. 85 This stage is vital to the collective behaviour
process. If general social issues remain general in nature then the collective process is
abridged and no collective can take place.
"It is such cleavages accompanied by stereotypes that assign
responsibility for evils to other groups, strains are built into the social
situation and ready to be combined with other conditions that might
permit hostile outbursts. Thus strain, like many other determinants of
collective outbursts is often an established feature of social life".84
From these points it is possible to investigate social problems within the community
and nation which create the general conditions of social strain that is reflected on the
terraces. From the analysis of strain in the community it is possible to identify the
specific points which create the condition of strain on the terraces which can result in
violence being the only avenue to social change open to the opposing support groups.
Scotland as part of the United Kingdom has many common links with England yet
enjoys an independent history and cultural identity, and many hope for an independent
future. Any historical text about Scotland can set out the past relationship with England
and provide a basis for understanding the the fierce pride Scots have in their
country.85' 86'87 Not only did the Scots fight the English but they fought amongst
themselves in clan wars and religious battles as well. In many ways two of these
historical disputes are still alive in Scotland today. Although the clans no longer fight
one another, the tradition of national pride and religious intolerance continues to this
day.
83. see Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp.241.
84. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp.11.
85. see Ronald McNair Scott, Robert The Bruce King Of Scots. London. 1982.
86. see Gordon Donaldson ed„ The Edinburgh History Of Scotland. Edinburgh, 1985.
87. Jenny Wormald ed., The New History Of Scotland. London, 1984.
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Much of the rivalry between various factions have that influenced Scotland's past have
been maintained in inter-city rivalries of today. Not unlike the old clan wars,
Scotland's cities compete for social, economic and cultural acclaim while many
residents like to view their city as being better than other competing towns and cities.
The inter- city rivalry is often evident on the terraces, especially when there are two
teams with the same religious background playing one another. When Hibs and Celtic
play, the religious identity is the same, so the differences between Glasgow and
Edinburgh will be brought out in the chanting by the supporters. Common references
are made to Glasgow slums and eating dead rats by Edinburgh club supporters in an
effort to put down the city and the football teams. The inter-city rivalry is one of the
main issues that allows teams with the same religious background to have notable
problems with terrace violence.
On a structural conduciveness level, religious intolerance in Scotland goes back to the
reign of Queen Mary and before. During the reformation, battles were fought over the
question of how Scotland and the monarchy should interpret the question of religious
persuasion. Even after the eventual triumph of the Reformation there was still a small
Catholic population in Scotland. 88 Immigration brought a vast number of Catholic
and a limited number of Protestant Irish to Scotland, especially during the Irish potato
famine of the 1840s and 1850s. Many of these immigrants settled in the West of
Scotland. 89 As a latter result of the Irish-Catholic influence in Scotland two of the
most prominent football clubs were formed: Hibernian in 1875 and Celtic in 1888, 90
both of which were originally founded in Catholic-Irish areas in Edinburgh and
88. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 93.
89. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 94.
90. John Rafferty, One Hundred Years Of Scottish Football. London, 1973, pp. 7.
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Glasgow. 91 Originally both teams were for Catholic players only, but that policy was
abandoned in 1895. 92 On the opposing side Rangers were formed in 1872 93 in a
Protestant section of Glasgow, mainly for Protestant players, although a few Catholic
players have played for Rangers. The no-Catholic policy by implication applies today,
as no Catholic players have played for Rangers since 1952. 94 95 The religious
prejudices that were created during the Reformation, Irish immigration, and economic
conflicts have, for the most part, been fairly subdued within the society as a whole, and
only surface in special circumstances such as football matches, gang fights, religious
holidays, or Orange marches. However they remain an underlying current in many
large Scottish communities. Overt hostility rarely occurs except on special occasions
due to each group's relative physical isolation in each community. This is evidenced by
the housing arrangements in Glasgow and Edinburgh which keep Catholic and
Protestant populations somewhat isolated within certain districts. 96
The underlying social stress created by religious intolerance is directly linked to the
historical development of the Irish revolution and the continuing political and social
problems in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Not only did
immigration of Irish of both faiths bring added emphasis to a long existing problem in
Scotland, it created a distinct Irish minority group that could be identified by dress,
91. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 19.
92. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 60-63.
93. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.. pp 7.
94. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 81-87.
95. Rangers public policy is that players of all colours and religions are welcome at Ibrox, if they
are good enough to play for Rangers. At the point of writing one Black player, one Jewish
player and several English players, but not one Catholic player, are on the staff at Ibrox. The
no-Catholic policy is effectively enforced by demands of official supporters clubs who have told
the Rangers management that they will boycott the turnstiles if a Catholic player puts on the
Ranger blue strip.
96. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp. 93-94, for a statistical break down of the concentration of the
Catholic population in certain communities.
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name and accent. As a result of many economic upheavals levels of unemployment
have risen from time to time resulting in open discrimination in hiring practices with
each side protecting their own. Glasgow in particular and Scotland as a whole had:
"... a period of spectacular growth from 1875 (to) 1914 (and) a period
of almost spectacular decline from 1945 and especially from 1960". 97
Celtic, especially identified with the problems of the east end of Glasgow - social
deprivation and unemployment ofmany Irish immigrants - and through their success on
the field helped establish the tradition of religious identity even though they hired
Protestant players. Rangers did not identify with the Protestant cause directly in the
early years but slowly established a 'no-Catholic' policy in response to the playing
success of Celtic and their predominantly Catholic support.
". . . the real origin of sectarianism in Scottish football lay in the very
formation of the Celtic Football Club and their unprecedented success.
The success of Celtic at this time coincided with a resurgence of
Catholic militancy both in local matters and in Irish national affairs.
Every country with a large immigrant population went through these
same problems, but in Scotland there was a combination of features that
made them more volatile than in any other country outside Ireland. 98
Religious intolerance on a structural strain level is evidenced by overt antagonism
between various organisations with church connections. Despite active church
participation in trying to ease tensions religious identification has remained a point of
identification for young football supporters over the past fifty years. The stereotypes
that have been built up by young people as a result of parental misguidance and peer
pressure has created hostility which in some ways does not reflect wider community
opinion. Each religious identity has its fanatical groups which encourage strong
97. H. F. Morehouse, Op. Cit.. pp. 294.
98. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. pp.
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sectarian feelings, the Orange Order being the most noteworthy. This strong stereotype
attitude is reflected in the following reflection on Ranger versus Celtic matches.
"The religious bigotry is expressed in serious crowd rioting at virtually
every meeting between the two clubs both inside and outside the
ground." 99
Despite the previous commentary on Ranger versus Celtic matches only two serious
incidents were witnessed and several minor scuffles seen in the course of twenty five
matches. Most matches between the two clubs are generally peaceful with one hundred
arrest viewed as a quiet day by the police. 100 101
The Catholic community is not totally to blame for the religious divisions in Scotland as
Bill Murray suggests. To have any social division there must be conflict with an
opposition and the majority Protestant community can be just as fanatical as the
Catholic community. The historical build-up in the Protestant community parallels that
of the Catholic community in that a victory for one was a loss for the other. From the
Reformation to the ascension of William of Orange to the throne, the Protestant
community has generally had the upper hand in the struggle for religious superiority.
With the development of the troubles in Northern Ireland some of the Protestant
community began to identify with the threat posed by the possible takeover in the North
by The Republic of Ireland, a Catholic state. Although the influence of the Protestant
Northern Irish community in Scotland is far less direct than that of the Irish-Catholic
community, the identity with the Protestant Northern Ireland cause has still developed
in opposition to the Irish Republican Army's campaign to drive the British out of
99. Dennin Lehane, in New Society. 28-11-80, pp. 13.
100. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, Celtic Park, 1 January 1983.
101. See Appendix A for a detailed discription of the violence in the Scottish Cup final of 1980 and
the League match between the tow clubs on 1 January 1982.
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Ireland. If one side identifies with an issue then the other takes up the opposite side,102
and as a result both sides are deeply entrenched in their views on the issues in Northern
Ireland. This is not to infer that the entire Scottish community is divided by religious
identity and the issues in Northern Ireland, merely that the football supporters on the
terraces are.
This is particularly evident when observing the support groups from Rangers versus
Celtic, or Hearts versus Hibs matches. The support groups will sing religious songs at
each other for the entire match if necessary. Underlying the the religious differences on
the terraces can be friendship on an individual or group basis. At one Ranger - Celtic
match amidst the din of the support groups chanting at each other , a Ranger fan and a
Celtic fan were overheard making plans to meet in the city centre after the match for a
pint, before returning their attention to the support group and rejoining the verbal
jousting match between the support groups. Even though the support groups may
outwardly sing songs about religious identity and beliefs few of the Protestant
supporters questioned attended church regularly or understood the basics of Protestant
religious beliefs. However Catholics claimed they attended church on a more regular
basis and showed a far better awareness of Catholic religious beliefs. 103
The trouble in Northern Ireland is only one of the factors that divides the churches in
Scotland. The Northern Ireland problem receives wide publicity while other problems
get passed over. Mistrust between the religious factions goes much deeper than the
open hostility in Northern Ireland. Different governing structures between the two
102. During the Falklands War, Celtic fans supported Argentina because the country is predominately
Catholic and Rangers fans supported Britain.
103. These interviews were conducted as part of a pilot study of a questionnaire which was later
discarded as impractical. See appendix B.
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churches leads to ambiguity and mistrust of the others' worship and structural process.
These factors, combined with conflicting policies on the way one should conduct one's
personal life which are espoused by the two churches, provide an obvious division
about how the church members view each other and their policies. With the ambiguity
and mistrust about each other's church both Catholics and Protestants fear the other's
ability to impose their beliefs on their own church. This fear is reflected in the open
hostility to Northern Ireland on the terrace of many Scottish football matches. In
Scotland the acting out of religious intolerance is limited in scope and is nowadays
centred around football, gang fights, discrimination in hiring, and marches by fanatical
organisations. The fear of Protestant supporters in Scotland is obvious when events
such as the Pope's visit are imminent and Rangers supporters continually sang "no
Pope from Rome" in an attempt to reduce the effect of the Pope's visit. On the other
side Catholic supporters sang "the Pope is coming over" to taunt Protestant supporters
and show their superiority in the situation.
Although Scotland and Glasgow in particular is supposed to be a divided country on
religious grounds when the Pope visited Scotland he was greeted by large crowds, and
very few people outside Pastor Jack Glass and Reverend Ian Paisley openly
participated in defiance of the Pope's visit. On the day of the Pope's open air mass in
Glasgow's Bellahouston Park, which was observed by the author, there was no
observed Protestant protest. From observing the crowd of an estimated 300,000, a
large number did not participate in Holy Communion and from those interviewed as to
their reasons for not taking Communion the overwhelming reason given was that they
were Protestant. Most of those spoken to went to the mass out of a sense of religious
occasion and did not care if the service was Catholic or not. This indicates that a lot of
liberal Protestants attended the Papal Mass or that religious intolerance may have one of
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its few places of public display on the Scottish football terraces.
The sense of threat that the opposition church wishes to impose its beliefs on the
members of one group or another is fed by the belief that the opposition represents the
threat of deprivation or is in some way to blame for one's own deprivation. 104
Deprivation, whether real or perceived, is a genuine source of hatred in the community.
The deprivation can be in the form of discrimination in hiring, housing, distribution of
social benefits, and social status. Scotland has a unique position within Great Britain in
that it has educational segregation that provides for separate education for Catholics.
The Act of Union between England and Scotland provided for separate education for
Catholics throughout Scotland, but it is mainly found in Glasgow and other big cities.
Just by saying the name of one's school a prospective employer will know an
applicant's religious persuasion, and thus be able to discriminate against one group or
another without open questions about faith. Not only do separate educational facilities
provide a basis for social and job discrimination they reinforce the differences between
the religious groups and in other ways foster and breed increased religious hatred. For
many people the difference in religious distinction is not an important issue until formal
education begins.
"Many children do not understand why they are told they cannot play
with their friends anymore, just because they now go to separate
schools, but they soon learn." 105
The social and economic disadvantages that each community blames on the other are
built through the educational system where most students gain most of their formal
religious training. 106 Although the churches claim to provide religious training in this
104. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 245-246.
105. Interview with a thirty-five year old native of Glasgow.
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case the evidence does not concur. From interviews conducted on the terraces and in
private with football supporters of every Premier Division club in Scotland it was noted
that church attendance of the supporters is very low. Most supporters on the terraces at
Ibrox do not attend church or if they do it is on an infrequent basis, yet many
supporters on the Ibrox terrace are extremely religiously bigoted. This may reflect a
higher proportion of Rangers supporters being involved in the Orange Order than in the
various Protestant churches, many of those interviewed were active in a Orange Lodge
but did not go to church. On the other side the supporters at Parkhead attend church on
a much more regular basis and are not as bigoted as their Ibrox counterparts. From all
the interviews that were conducted on the terraces some additional noticeable
differences between the supporters of Rangers and Celtic became apparent. Protestants
will support Celtic, but Catholics will not support Rangers. This is basically due to the
policy of the clubs in employing playing staff. One one occasion over twenty-five
percent of those asked on the Parkhead terraces were Protestant while not one Catholic
was found one week later in the enclosure at Ibrox; at least not one willing to admit to
being Catholic. Of the Protestants who support Celtic most do so because they do not
like what Rangers stand for and prefer Celtic's style of play. Rangers are a Protestant
team through and through, and that is the way the supporters want it. Even when
Rangers' opposition is non-sectarian the shouts from the terraces can be heard, "come
on you Prody boys", and "we are the Prody team". Rangers supporters identify so
closely with the Protestant cause, even though they seldom go to church, that they do
not let outsiders in and would abandon the club if a Catholic were to play for them. At
Parkhead the situation is slightly different. The supporters identify with the Catholic
Church and the unification of Ireland to a limited extent. Even though this is a definite
106. Interviews with supporters indicate that they do not attend church or chapel on a regular basis
but obtain most of their religious education in school where approximately twenty minutes of
instruction is given each day.
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religious and political connection it seems to be a problem that non-Catholic supporters
can tolerate in exchange for watching a mixed team play good exciting football. The
crowd structure at Parkhead is far more friendly and receptive to outsiders and the only
requirement is to support Celtic.
Intolerance extends - at Ibrox in particular and at other grounds to a lesser extent - to
racial minorities. Few if any people of identifiable racially different backgrounds
attend matches in Scotland, but when they do they are often made unwelcome,
especially at Ibrox. The first Black player in Scotland plays for Rangers and supporters
of all clubs have given verbal abuse and thrown banana skins on the pitch in an effort to
affect the player's performance. Although racism is not a focal point of any match
individuals of non-European descent have been attacked by supporters. This has been
witnessed by the author at Ibrox and Tynecastle.
Channels For Expressing Grievances
Football again provides the ideal setting for the second component within structural
conduciveness, 'channels for expressing grievances'. 107 As previously noted,
football stadiums as they have evolved are ideal for venting the common opinion of one
crowd section to another, which they do frequently. When there is a game, matching
teams with supporters who represent opposing religious factions, then the situation is
ideal for each support group to vent their opposition to one another. In situations
where religious persuasion is not a factor the crowd must take up another cause, which
is generally related to inter-city rivalry, the playing sides, or outside issues. In some
107. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 227.
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cases a religiously-oriented support group will label the opposition as having the
opposing religious identity or the opposition will assume the opposing religious identity
to taunt the others and have something to shout about.
The implication is not that support groups focus only on outside social issues - they do
not. The major focus at every game is the play on the pitch, but to listen to the support
groups the observer would assume that religious intolerance is the major focus of the
supporters. The support groups react vociferously to play on the pitch and follow the
action intently but are always willing to turn their attention to the opposition support
and issues not being contested on the pitch. When religious differences are not the
overriding issue between the rival support groups the singing and chanting is usually
directed at supporting one's own team and hurling abuse at the opposing team and their
support, much of which is based on inter-city rivalry. Games between Dundee United
and Aberdeen are classic examples of this situation. Both teams have Catholic and
Protestant supporters, so support for intolerant religious views is limited, and as a
result the chanting is directed at insulting the opposition and building up one's own
team and personal image.
Occasionally, other outside influences can creep into the terraces, but this generally has
not been the case in Scotland. The focus of the terrace dwellers is on the game and the
opposition support with religious intolerance as the overriding outside influence. In
England many other outside influences can be found on the terraces which directly
influence crowd behaviour. Youth cultures, political interests, gratuitous violence
seekers and smaller local issues have a great influence on English football crowds. 108
108. Mr Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit.. pp. 60.
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In allowing singing and chanting plus more animated activity on the terraces, Smelser
contends that formal and informal social control in the society as a whole, and on the
terraces, must be adequate to prevent willful violent behaviour. Adequate policing and
community standards, are not enough to prohibit collective action if the police or
political authorities do not use the force they have against the crowd. 109 In some ways
this contention is correct in relation to football in that there is not an adequate social
control mechanism to deal with religious intolerance within Scottish society, despite
laws outlawing open forms of discrimination. Religious divisions are deeply rooted in
all parts of Scottish society and extend into the police and government, resulting in
supporters on both sides seeing most official bodies as being biased against them. Less
formal control factors such as the various churches, news media, and the collective
conscience have been totally inadequate up to this point in controlling religious
intolerance and its manifestations on the terraces.
Once religious intolerance has manifested itself in the form of collective violence on the
terraces the control agents become much more formal. Official stewards and the police
present a very high profile in reaction to crowd violence. Smelser claims that adequate
police presence is not enough to stop collective action, and that their permissiveness
only adds to the problem, but in this case the evidence does not support this
suggestion. 110 The question of police permissiveness adding to to problem of
collective action as Smelser claims is totally reversed in the terrace situation. The police
permit a certain amount of activity on the terraces that would be dealt with more
severely outside the football arena. As one Glasgow Police Inspector noted:
"If we tried to stop this (referring to a Celtic versus Ranger match with
the normal singing and chanting going on) we would have a riot on our
109. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 234-235.




"We would rather have them (referring to the two groups of supporters)
in here doing this (referring to the singing, chanting and general rowdy
behaviour) and blowing off steam where we can control them, than out
out on the streets where we cannot. This allows them to come in and let
off steam, and we would rather have them here than have to deal with
the problem on the streets." 112
In the case of football crowds the evidence indicates that police permissiveness helps
solve a problem rather than adding to a later one. 113 If the police tried to stop the
singing, chanting and rowdy behaviour that accompanies almost every football match
there would be unacceptable police and supporter confrontations. Trying to subdue or
arrest those engaged in singing, chanting or'animated behaviour would create an
impossible logistical problem. Added to this police action could cause adverse reaction
from the entire crowd and facilitate the exact situation the police are trying to control,
that is collective violence. Police permissiveness in this case solves what could be a
massive problem trying to arrest thousands of supporters for a breach of the peace or
threatening behaviour, and allows the support groups to vent their anger and frustration
towards one another in a controlled environment which allows for relatively easy police
supervision. As a result, the football terrace situation serves as a social pressure valve,
or a way of draining off social tensions for the supporters. In this way social pressure
can be expressed without causing undue concern or damage, even though the behaviour
is not generally acceptable except in the football crowd situation. 114 Football terraces
111. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, at Celtic Park during a match
between Celtic and Rangers.
112. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, at Celtic Park during a match
between Celtic and Rangers.
113. also see Alan Grimshaw, "Intrepreting Collective Violence", in James Short and Marvin
Wolfgang eds., Collective Violence. New York, 1972.
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serve as a social escape and pressure release because there are no other institutional
means of acceptable redress adequate to fill the needs of those involved.115
When the football crowd is singing and chanting most collective behaviouralists would
agree that the crowd is well on the way to becoming hostile. Most analyses of
collective behaviour would indicate that all crowds pass through a stage similar to a
football crowds singing and chanting on their way to collective action. Football crowds
are somewhat unique in this situation because they always reach this level of activity,
but very rarely exceed it. As a result, adequate police are usually enough to control this
type of crowd action, but if collective violence is going to occur then no number of
police are adequate for control, no matter what the situation or location.
Singing and chanting has been labelled 'ritual behaviour' by Peter Marsh and his
colleagues. 116'117 This is a generally correct analysis in that most football crowds do
sing and chant which creates a very important part of the atmosphere at every match.
For most supporters, singing and chanting is a vital part of terrace life and is actively
participated in by both the clamjamfry and ordinary supporters. Even though this type
of activity can be viewed as ritual behaviour it is still vital to the collective behaviour
process. In football, the crowd's singing and chanting is an important step toward the
possibility of collective action, and although ritualised at most matches provides a basis
for the further development of the required steps towards collective action.
114. see Jesse R. Pitts, "Social Control, The Concept", in David Sills ed., International Encyclopedia
Of The Social Sciences. New York, 1968.
115. Kurt Lang and Glaydis Lang, "Collective Behaviour Theory And The Escalated Riots Of The
Sixties", in Tumotsu Shibutani ed.. Human Nature And Collective Behaviour. Englewood
Cliffs, 1970.
116. Peter Marsh, Op. Cit.
117. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.
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Formal Communication
"... Audience . . . facilitates the formation of crowds because it
permits the rapid communication, common definition of the situation
and face-to-face interaction." 118
The third and most important part of structural conduciveness is communication.
Communication takes various forms within collective behaviour, 119 120 but when
limited to football crowds is found in six forms; the written word found in newspapers
and club programmes, rumours, face-to-face interaction, visual.perceptions,.television,
and the public address system in all grounds.
For any terrace crowd to take collective action, communication in some form must
exist. For most supporters newspapers provide an ongoing source of information and
speculation. Newspapers provide inside information about the club management and
players that is otherwise unavailable to the ordinary fan. The clubs use the newspapers
to pass on information important to the supporters and to encourage their attendance at
all matches. The print media can also have an adverse affect on the terrace supporter
and can create an increased probability of collective action. 121
The most formal type of communication used by football clubs to inform their
supporters is the official programme. The official programme is sold by each club at
each home match. The programme is filled with information about the club and the
118. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp, 270.
119. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp, 11.
120. F. H. Allport, Social Psvcholog. Boston, 1924, pp. 295.
121. A detailed analysis of the affects of the news media on football crowds appears in Chapter Three
and more specifically in Chapter Five.
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day's match. The programme is often used by the clubs to pass on information about
all ticket matches, travel information to away matches, and to ask for assistance from
supporters in controlling activities on the terraces. The effect of the programme is
somewhat limited due to the varying percentage of the crowd who actually buy and read
them. Programme commentaries on crowd behaviour become more effective when
combined with other forms of communication.
The second type of formal communication used directly by the clubs to communicate
with the supporters is the public address system. Clubs and the police can use the
system to pass on information to the crowd throughout the ground. The public address
system has its greatest effect in telling the support the names of the players playing in
the match and providing half and full time scores from other matches. The system is
also used to play music before each game in an attempt to break up the singing and
chanting of the support groups by drowning out the combined support group voices.
The attempt works to a point. When there are small support groups the sound system
can drown out the singing and chanting. If there is a large sectarian support, no
volume of music will drown out the singing and chanting. When the public address
system is used to ask supporters for cooperation in controlling behaviour the supporters
will generally respond positively depending on whether the request goes for or against
crowd sentiment. When a request is made that goes against crowd sentiment, the
supporters will often comply with the request while voicing their displeasure with the
request.
The newest type of formal club-sponsored communication is the electronic scoreboard.
Hibs were the first Scottish club to install an electronic scoreboard. This form of
communication is very effective in passing information to the support groups. When
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electronic scoreboards are used to pass on important information, it often disrupts the
singing and chanting between the support groups by forcing the supporters to focus on
the scoreboard and not on each other. Electronic scoreboards may develop into the
most important form of club - spectator communication because of their ability to divert
attention away from support group rivalry and onto a neutral object.
Rumour and Informal Communication
Informal communication appears most often in the form of rumour. "Rumour is the
characteristic mode of communication in collective behaviour." 122 Rumour appears in
several forms within the spectator group. Before the match many rumours can be
spread through verbal communication about speculated activities surrounding the
match. Verbal communication continues throughout the match and can lead directly to
collective action by spreading information about confrontations between supporters,
whether real, false, or exaggerated. Rumours can be about past incidents, anticipated
actions on the day, atrocities by the opposition support, and many other subjects
important to the support group. Within the football crowd rumours generally take place
on a one-to-one or group basis, and as a result the information can spread rapidly and at
the same time become greatly distorted.
"... a rumour is an unconfirmed message passed from one person to
another in face-to-face interaction that refers to an object, person,
situation, rather than an idea or theory".123
Rumours take place both in the wider society and in crowd situations where they serve
122. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 32
123. H. Taylor Buckner, "A Theory Of Rumour Transmission" in Robert Evans, Readings In
Collective Behaviour. Chicago, 1975, pp. 87.
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as a barometer of increasing tension. 124 Rumours within society as a whole directly
influence crowd action on the terraces. Any issue in the wider society, whether or not
covered in the media, can be reflected in the activity on the terraces if that issue is in any
way related to football crowd conflicts. This situation often facilitates the formation of
the spontaneous crowd but is only one of many factors influencing the recurring
football crowd. The recurrent football crowd with its loyal weekly participants and
occasional participants creates a situation where they cannot be considered spontaneous
in nature. Many early collective behaviour authors were aware of the difference
between the two types of crowd situation, but most modern work tends to overlook the
differences. One of the major differences between the two modern approaches to
collective behaviour, value-added and emergent norm, is the concept of the recurring
crowd situation, and this creates one of the major objections to Turner and Killian's
analysis. The crowd in the emergent norm concept is based on the spontaneous crowd,
and as a result has problems dealing with the recurring crowd situation. For Turner
and Killian every crowd develops its own new norm of behaviour. In the recurrent
crowd, behaviour has a carry-on effect from one game to another. This is not
accounted for nor is there scope to incorporate this type of crowd situation in the
emergent norm concept. The value-added concept does not account for the recurrent
crowd situation either but is flexible enough to allow for this type of crowd pattern
without destroying the basic components of the concept, which is what happens to the
emergent norm concept.
In the football crowd rumours take two basic forms, the spreading of rumours through
person to person communication, and through singing and chanting. Rumours
circulating in the local society can raise passions and anger within the individuals
124. Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, Op. Cit.. pp. 193.
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concerned who in turn bring these amplified social issues with them on to the terraces.
The effect of formal communication of real incidents fuelled by rumours with their
exaggeration, distortion and prejudice, can and often does increase the tensions of the
crowd resulting in a hostile belief that can lead directly to collective action.
The most noticeable form of rumour is the singing and chanting between the support
groups. The singing and chanting begins well before most matches and continues until
just after kick-off when the game takes the attention of the clamjamfry. The chants and
songs take on three forms; self-esteem, support of the team, and hatred of the
opposition and their support. This includes religious songs and chants. The chants
and songs serve as the basic from of aggression on the terraces, which is acceptable in
the situation. 125 The clamjamfry will alter their songs and chants to react to or taunt
the opposition support, depending on the circumstances. If one fan group is far larger
than the other, songs of self-esteem are far more frequent, especially form the larger
support group who can dominate the opposition group. When there is a small travelling
support there is usually little verbal abuse between the two groups due to the numerical
disparity.
If there is a large travelling contingent that tends to balance the support groups in size
then songs aimed at inciting the opposition are far more common. The major factor
that lends emphasis to the fervour, cohesiveness and tone of the chants and songs is
again religious persuasion. If there is a religious conflict between the groups then
songs of self-esteem and hatred of the opposition will predominate. The sense of
identity, cohesion, solidarity will increase and and the verbal jousting will become
heated with passion and animated behaviour if the two support groups concentrate
125. see Linda Hill, Language As Aggression. Bonn, 1976.
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solely on one another to the exclusion of outside influences. The heated verbal jousting
match before, during and after the game always takes place when there is a religious
conflict, including situations where there is support of vastly different sizes. Given a
religious overtone even the smallest travelling support group will verbally challenge
their hosts.
Incidents in Northern Ireland are classic indications of the rumour process and its effect
on the terrace crowd. If an incidents or series of incidents has taken place in the
province which are particularly sectarian and violent the media will have covered the
events so that both religious factions in Scotland will know generally what has
happened, and then the rumour process, fuelled by media coverage, will distort and
exaggerate the preconceived prejudices about the incident. If there happens to be a
Rangers versus Celtic or a Hibs versus Hearts match soon after a major incident, the
tension on the terraces will be greatly increased in comparison to matches played during
periods of calm in Northern Ireland. The increased tension resulting from sectarian
problems is reflected in the intensity of the singing and chanting of the support groups,
which can take over from the match as the focal point of the afternoon's activities.
During times of high tension a second indicator arises which is reflected in an increased
size and animated activities of the clamjamfry. Many young supporters become very
animated in their actions when singing and chanting, especially when the chants
propose physical harm or death to the opposition support. The waving of fists,
jumping up and down and violent head movements are the most obvious signs of
animated actions and these should be noted as indicators that a large segment of the
crowd might participate in collective violence if a precipitating incident takes place.
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Rumour also spreads as verbal communication amongst the members of each
clamjamfry in a less animated style. The most noticeable incidents of non-animated
verbal communication can be seen immediately after a particularly bad foul on the pitch,
126 especially during prolonged periods of poor play. A bad foul will produce a loud
response from the supporters of the fouled player, and quick conversation about how
bad the foul was and how the referee should handle the situation. The supporters of the
offending player may cheer the action especially if the fouled player is a good one, and
the knock received may reduce his ability to play well for the remainder of the match.
Since most supporters are former or current players on an amateur level cynical fouls
which may or do injure the opposition are tolerated by either support group. However
the referee handles the situation will be judged as wrong by one set of supporters, and
not harsh enough by the other, and the decision will be attacked by both support
groups, although usually one support group will view any disciplinary action against an
opposition player as a positive step.
If there is an incident between the support groups before the match the rumour of the
incident will spread quickly through the crowd and become increasingly distorted and
exaggerated in its travels. Rumours and stories of old incidents may be recounted and
amplified to add evidence against the offending support group. This biased view of the
situation and a sense of "critical accountability" helps build hostility in the respective
clamjamfries. 127 Rumour has a great effect on the clamjamfry; it amplifies the original
incident far beyond what actually happened, and places total blame for the atrocity on
the opposition support. The amplification either glorifies the support group or
condemns the opposition support for starting the trouble. No matter what the actual
126. see Russel Geen and Leonard Berkowitz, "Some Conditions Facilitating The Occurrence Of
Aggression After The Observation Of Violence", in Leonard Berkowitz, Roots Of Aggression.
New York, 1969.
127. H. Taylor Bucker, Op. Cit.. pp. 87.
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outcome of the incident, the support group spreading the rumour is always victorious.
The police may be blamed for the incident, or at least for ruining a good fight by
arresting many of the participants. Informal communication helps build tension within
and between the support groups, which is an important step towards collective action.
"No riot ever occurs without rumours to incite, accompany, and intensify the
violence".128
The effect of television on crowd activity has been hotly debated by both the football
authorities and those in the television media. There can be little doubt that television
has had some effect on football crowds, but the extent of the effect is open to debate.
Television as part of the expanding leisure industry has added to the problem of falling
attendance figures in recent years. Television cameras at matches also influence the
activity of some supporters who 'want to get on 'tele" and do various things to be seen
by the cameras, including violence. 129
The conduciveness towards crowd action within the context of football is further
enhanced by certain aspects of the stadium setting. Since communication plays such a
vital role in the crowd, secondary issues that enhance the informal communication
system within the football crowd must be looked into as to their influence on the
collective behaviour process. The major factors that influence communication within
the support groups are transportation and alcohol. Transportation plays an important
part in the build-up of the triangular crowd. In general the home team support is far
less dependent on transportation to the match than the visiting supporters. In most
cases home supporters use local buses to get to and from the ground, while the
128. Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology Of Rumour. New York, 1947, pp. 191.
129. A further critical anlaysis of the affect of television of football crowds appears in Chapter Five.
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travelling support tend to use trains, hired buses special football trains, and personal
cars plus local transportation for away matches. It must be noted that both Rangers and
Celtic have extensive support throughout Scotland, and private buses with supporters
travel to every match from all over the country. Celtic supporters have a bus running
from London to every match of the season. When travelling supporters join in group
travel the communication and sensitising process begins. This is what Turner and
Killian called the milling process, 130 the build-up to the match where expectations are
highlighted, past grievances and activities remembered, and a platform for tension
established. Although Smelser does not mention the milling or sensitising process at
all, it is a result of the communication process. The milling process 131'132 in football
crowds is not as Turner and Killian see it either, for it does not require personal
movement, and in fact physical movement can actually reduce the crowd effect. 133
The proper term to apply to football crowds is the sensitising process. The sensitising
process never really stops, but heightens in anticipation of the next game, or games of
great importance, or games against traditional rivals. Any type of communication can
increase the person's or group's sensitivity to the game and the activities of the crowd.
This is why transportation can play such an important part in this process; apart from
supporters club meetings it is often the first time larger groups of supporters have face-
to-face contact before a match. Communication at this point heightens tensions about
the game and crowd activity. Groups of supporters are often confined in a small space
for varying amounts of time with one common purpose, to support and help their team
win, at any cost. After a long bus or train ride with normal communication tensions
130. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 37-38.
131. also see Michael Smith, "Sport And Collective Behaviour" in Donald Ball and John Loy, eds.,
Sport And The Social Order. London, 1975, pp. 295.
132. also see Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behaviour", in A. M. Lee, ed., New Outline Of The
Principles Of Sociology. New York, 1968, pp. 170.
133. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 31-33.
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can be increased, thus leading to an increased possibility of collective crowd action.
Communication and sensitising on transport does not generally lead to hostile
outbursts. The communication process can function as a control factor. Even though
communication and the sensitising process are vital elements required in any incident of
collective action they can also serve as a calming influence and actually reduce tension
amongst the supporters. This usually happens when a powerful leader has information
which goes against the perceptions of the group. If the leader can convince the group
he is right in his analysis then rumours counter to rumours creating hostility are created
and this can desensitize a potentially violent situation. Even with the control element
the sensitising process incorporates all forms of communication; the media, rumour,
face-to-face contact, perception of events by the viewer, interpretation, and when added
to personal prejudice can easily heighten tension levels on the way to and during the
match.
Most of the supporters buses in Scotland are organised by officially recognised
supporters clubs. The supporters clubs usually organise a bus to every away game and
may organise transportation to home games if the supporters club is located far away
from the football clubs' ground. Officially recognised supporters clubs help the clubs
through fund raising and attendance while the club give discounts and preferential
treatment on tickets plus other special privileges to club members. Supporters clubs
also provide a direct communication link from the terraces to club management.
Football clubs often send officials and players to supporters club meetings to pass on
information and requests and to listen to supporter grievances. The supporters clubs
are held responsible for the behaviour of their members and misbehaviour at a match is
grounds for expulsion. Through the direct communication process the football club can
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pass on requests for good behaviour on the terraces and have a direct effect on the
sensitising process. When supporters club members know of the direct wishes of the
club for good behaviour the sensitising process is often altered into a control process
where the supporters work at good behaviour. In this way supporters clubs can have a
positive effect on terrace behaviour, but most football supporters do not belong to
supporters clubs and thus this effect is often limited. When non-supporter club
supporters travel to matches they are often not aware of the wishes of the football club
for good behaviour and thus the sensitising process takes place and the result can be a
conflict on the terraces between supporters seeking good versus those seeking bad
behaviour. Depending on the size of the two sensitized groups and the events of the
day one will usually dominate the overall crowd activity, those seeking good
behaviour.
The second and possibly the largest factor in crowd sensitivity and action at football
matches in Scotland is alcohol. For over one hundred years alcohol was common on
the terraces. Many men would go to the pub for lunch after Saturday morning work
and have a few pints of beer before going to the match, and possibly take drink to the
match with them. In today's society it is still common to go to the pub for a few drinks
before the match. 134 Many supporters' buses still stop at a pub on their way to and
from a match, even though this practice is now illegal. 133 Since 1980 it has been illegal
to take alcohol into or to be drunk going into a football ground. 136 Before the ban on
134. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 79.
135. When doing the research for this thesis, I travelled on supporters' buses, on scheduled trains and
football special trains to matches all over Scotland. In this capacity while riding supporters'
buses I stopped in many pubs along the way. Most of the supporters would have several drinks
before resuming their travels to the match. This practice is expressly forbidden in the Criminal
Justice Scotland Act, 1980 but the practice of stopping at pubs on the way to and on the way
home from matches continues to this day.
136. Criminal Justice Scotland Act 1980. London, 1981, pp. 53-56.
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alcohol came into affect, alcohol of every type in various containers was common at
every game and at the end of every match the terraces would be littered with thousands
of empty containers. 137 Not only does alcohol add to the possibility of hostile crowd
action but the containers serve as excellent missiles to throw at the opposition
supporters. Alcohol has been one of the main ingredients associated with and adding to
violent acts at football matches in Scotland through reducing the effect of formal and
informal social control, increasing the crowd's identity with itself and hatred of the
opposition, produces a false sense of superiority, increases the sense of masculinity,
and acts as an amplifier of collective crowd activity. 138 Ragnar Hauge in an analysis
of all existing research on alcohol and crime came to the following conclusions which
support the observed effect of alcohol on football crowd activity.
"... on an individual level, the higher alcohol consumption a person
has, the higher is his risk of committing crime. 139 On an aggregate
level, one may draw the conclusion that most studies seem to indicate
that, as far as violent crimes are concerned, a relationship exists. 140
Even if this may be due partly to intoxicated offenders being more often
caught by the police, it is doubtful whether this can explain all the
differences. Experimental studies have also shown that aggressive
behaviour, is more prevalent when the person concerned is under the
influence of alcohol. The most realistic conclusion is probably that
alcohol intoxication can be a contributing factor in events which lead
persons to commit acts which they would have abstained from under
other circumstances, especially acts of violence which arise out of
personal conflicts. 141
In the United States studies indicate that forty-six percent of those who commit
137. A mixture of whisky and sherry was very popular in the Jungle at Celtic Park. The biggest
insult anyone on the terraces to do was to refuse a drink from the numerous bottles being passed
around. This could create a hostile reaction and accusations of supporting the opposition, so I
often drank what was offered, and staggered home after the game.
138. also see Leonard Berkowitz, "The Contagion Of Violence", in Leonard Berkowitz ed., Op.Cit.
139. Ragnar Hauge, Alcohol And Crime. Strasbourg, 1984.
140. Ragnar Hauge, Op. Cit.. pp. 38.
141. Ragnar Hauge, Op. Cit.. pp. 47.
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offences and are sent to jail were under the influence of alcohol when committing their
142
crimes.
The Scottish Cup Final riot of 1980 between Celtic and Rangers fans is a good example
of the affect of large quantities of alcohol on crowd activity. Once the hostile outburst
started many who had been drinking all day from bottles and cans brought into the
ground joined in with the crowd action. The bottles and cans made excellent missiles to
throw at opposition supporters.143 After the ban on alcohol came into effect in 1981
the amount of alcohol taken into grounds decreased dramatically as evidenced by the
almost clean terraces at the end ofmost matches. At the same time the number ofmajor
crowd disturbances at matches in Scotland decreased. 144
Alcohol can have one other bad side-effect on the terraces. Fights between supporters
of the same club can start when one supporter urinates down the leg of the person in
front of him instead of going to the traditionally bad toilet facilities in Scottish grounds.
The terraces in any ground can easily become soaking wet 145 on a warm day after the
supporters have stopped in a pub on the way to the ground and then not bothered to
leave the terraces to use the toilet facilities.
142. United States Department Of Justice. Profile Of Jail Inmates: Social Demographic Findings
From The 1978 Survey Of Inmates Of Local Jails. Washington D.C., 1980, pp. 44.
143. See Appendix C for a complete description of the Hampden Park Riot of 1980.
144. Although no statistics are available to substantiate this contention, the conclusion is based on
observed matches and careful monitoring of the media during the study period.
145. One English girl was amused to find herself standing on wet terraces in the Jungle at Parkhead
and asked a Celtic supporter standing next to her, "does the roof leak?" the reply was a simple,
"no", with a big smile. The wet terraces were caused by supporters urinating on them.
163
Symbols
Symbols have a vital function in any crowd, especially if that crowd is moving along
the stages towards violent activity. Symbols for the football crowd appear in three
basic forms; the opposing support, the police, and the identifying factor of dress. The
opposition support automatically becomes a symbol of contention because of their
support of the opposition team, their segregation and dress, especially in big matches.
In matches with smaller crowds the symbol of the opposition support is not as strong,
but can become a factor if an incident occurs to incite one or both of the support groups
which intensifies feelings amongst group members. In certain cases the support groups
are identified with religious factors which adds emphasis to the symbolic identification
between the support groups. The identifying symbol of the home and opposition
support is the scarf and other clothing in the colours of the team supported. Even when
there is a religious difference between the support groups if there is no visible means of
identification no major violence can take place between the two sides. This is why
many supporters remove their scarves if there is any threat of trouble because they are
identifiable as a target to opposition supporters.
The symbol of the opposition support when combined with other factors in collective
behaviour takes away all the good qualities of the opposition and re-labels them as an
undesirable group, especially if the opposition team has won the match. The
opposition support becomes a non-personal symbol of everything that is wrong, while
the group participated in is the symbol of righteousness, thus action is defined as right
versus wrong. In the process of dehumanising the opposition chants and songs are
used to build self esteem and reduce the image of the opposition. In this way
individuals can justify collective action to correct perceived injustices represented by the
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opposition support.
The police are the second symbol of opposition at every football match. Because of
their uniform they are readily identifiable as a symbol of control and of the state.
Although the police rarely disrupt the interaction between the support groups enough to
control the attention of the supporters they still occupy a specific important role in the
minds of all supporters. Police action, if perceived as unjust, can bring one or both
support groups into singing and chanting against the police and if necessary collective
action against them. As long as the police maintain a neutral stance and do not become
the focus of spectator attention then their presence is generally overlooked by the
supporters.
The concept of having a crowd divided into three opposing segments consisting of the
two opposing crowd groups and the police is one that collective behaviour has passed
over. Most collective behaviour research looks at a crowd in opposition to the police
who end up on the side of defending whatever the crowd is trying to destroy. In the
case of workers striking against unfair work practices the police end up protecting the
property of the employer from damage and thus become the opposition. In riots aimed
at looting the police try to protect property and again become the symbol of opposition
to the will of the crowd. In the case of football crowds, the police do not take sides or
protect one side from another. They are strictly in the role of maintaining peace and
protecting property which places them in opposition to both support groups. The
police by design tend to be in the middle between the support groups, suppressing their
ability to create trouble as representatives of the state and social order. As a result of
their position in the football crowd, and in society as a whole, the police are not liked
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by the supporters but respected as a symbol of power and authority. Interviews with
supporters supported this point, as the supporters generally approved of police actions
as long as they kept a neutral non-aggressive position. In Scotland the police are not a
symbol of opposition unless they do something perceived as unjust which angers the
fans. Supporters on the terraces agree with the role of the police in the crowd as a
requirement to help keep the peace. "If the police wer nae here, there would be trouble
at every match". "We come to watch the match and the police have to watch them (the
opposition) to 'em from starten any trouble". Although the supporters do not like the
police they have a great respect for their authority, especially their ability to inflict
immediate physical pain on those who violate the well-known norms of behaviour on
the terraces. The Glasgow police have a reputation for being very tough and most
supporters would not do anything to draw attention to themselves by the police because
of the summary justice they might incur, "the police are mean bastards, but they have a
job to do and I don't mess with them". 146'147
In England the police are often a symbol of opposition to one or both support groups.
There is often conflict between the police and the support groups in addition to the
conflict between the two support groups. In England, when the police have
successfully controlled opposing support groups from getting at one another, the
attention of the fans switches to the police who are the nearest identifiable opposition
and the symbols of authority who have prevented 'aggro'. Part of the reason for this
situation being more prevalent in England is that 'aggro' has become a major part of
football and many people go to matches who are not fans but youths looking for
violence within the anonymity of the crowd, and thus they are willing to assault the
police where other football supporters are not. Many of the televised crowd violence
146. Quotations are from Rangers and Celtic supporters.
147. See Chapter Six for a further discussion of the role of the police in the football crowd.
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incidents in England show direct evidence of crowds attacking the police after the police
have intervened to control violence between support groups. Although the possibility
of the support groups involved in violence altering their target from one another to the
police does exist, often the violence is for violence's sake and any opposition will do,
especially if the violence is the result of social stresses and the police are the
representative of state who are held responsible for the stress.148
In Scotland, the only examples of supporters intentionally taking on the police have
taken place with Hearts supporters. Both at Tynecastle and at other grounds Hearts
supporters have attacked one another and the police in search of 'aggro'. Once Hearts
supporters start fighting amongst themselves, the police usually move in to stop the
fighting and are set upon by the supporters once they get well into the middle of the
crowd. Since most police supervisors are not interested in a large-scale battle on the
terraces, the only action taken in reprisal is to rescue the officers involved and to make a
few arrests, hopefully of those involved. Hearts supporters were able to attract police
attention in a match against Motherwell in the last game of the 1982 season at
Tynecastle when the comer supporters started a mock fight amongst themselves, and
when the police responded two policemen were severely beaten by the supporters. The
two policemen were eventually rescued by other police, but not before sustaining
severe injuries requiring hospital treatment and long recovery periods. 149 Other
similar situations have been witnessed involving Hearts supporters in matches against
Celtic at Celtic Park on 11 March 1983 when two Glasgow policemen were attacked
148. The Luton versus Millwall disturbances on Wednesday 13 March 1985 are a good example of
supporters turning on the police when the police intervened to stop violence between the support
groups. Both support groups turned on the police when they got between the combatants on the
pitch.
149. Personal interview with one of the officers involved. West End Police Station, Edinburgh,
17 November 1982.
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and on 2 September 1983 against Hibs at Easter Road when two more Edinburgh
police were attacked. The incident at Celtic Park received a quick response from the
Glasgow Police who inflicted swift punitive corporal punishment in rescuing the two
policemen being attacked. Several dozen Hearts supporters were hit with truncheons
and several arrests were made. Generally in Scotland only genuine football supporters
go to matches and thus there are few incidents of attacks on the police; the support
groups would rather watch the match or fight each other but are not interested in
fighting the police.
It must be noted that during the course of the research a new development started in
Aberdeen known as the 'casuals'. The casuals started slowly in 1982, and have
progressed to open organising techniques on most large club terraces. Letters were
sent out during the 1984-5 season to known supporters clubs urging supporters to join
casual support groups to uphold the traditions of the club and reputations of the support
groups. Casuals are a group of supporters originally of middle class background who
go to matches wearing stylish clothes and looking for violence. The casuals concept
has spread to many Scottish clubs, although the extent is difficult to identify. The most
common form of casual activity is to go to a game without club colours and try to create
trouble on the terraces through attacking either home or visiting supporters. The
casuals represent the main outside influence dedicated to violence on the Scottish
football terraces. Aberdeen and Hibs have the largest casual support groups, but both
are relatively inactive since the main terrace support know what they are about and taunt
them to become involved in violence since the scarf-clad supporters far outnumber the
casuals. The casuals rarely engage in violence simply because they are out numbered
by traditional supporters, although they may become involved in isolated incidents
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outside the ground. 151)' 151» 152
Generalised Hostile Belief
Rumours when fuelled by structural strain and structural conduciveness create what
Smelser calls a hostile belief. The hostile belief is built on a series of effects that
rumours have on the crowd. An inflammatory rumour, no matter what it is about,
creates ambiguity through strain, distortion, prejudice and exaggeration of the original
facts. The ambiguity in turn creates anxiety about the current situation and one's own
position within the crowd, but often personal anxiety is overshadowed by the overall
crowd reaction to the situation. 155
"... rumours display all the components of a hostile belief system -
anxiety, generalized aggression and omnipotence - and the attachment,
by short circuiting, of these generalized elements to specific persons,
places, situations and events".154
The crowd as a whole can reflect the ambiguity 155 and indecision created by rumours
about a particular situation. The crowd often jumps to quick decisions based on faulty
information and prejudice as a result of the anxiety created by ambiguity. Scottish
football crowds, as previously mentioned, react to religious problems, and react to
rough or violent play on the pitch which is fuelled by anxiety 15(1 and ambiguity about
150. The basis of this description of the casuals is based on observation and interviews with
supporters. Unfortunately no none was able to provide a copy of the casual's recruiting letter.
151. A further discussion of the casuals appears later in this chapter and in chapter six.
152. On 25 August 1986 BBC News documented some of the organised violence groups in English
football and noted the Aberdeen casuals.
153. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 248.
154. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 248.
155. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 88-89.
156. Neil Smclser, Op. Cit.. pp. 89.
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the game and its outcome. A particularly bad tackle or violent act, even if punished by
the referee, can create a noisy hostile outburst from the support groups because of its
effect on the players' performance and the outcome of the game. Violent acts on the
pitch increase the anxiety of the crowd about the outcome of the game, thus increasing
the tension in the support groups and adding to the possibility of violent crowd
action.1^7, ^
Goals can obviously have the same type of effect. When one team scores, its
supporters go wild in celebration, partially as a result of the reduced anxiety over the
outcome of the game, and also because it is what the supporters have come to see. On
the other side the support becomes very quiet after an opposition goal which increases
the anxiety about the outcome of the match and places them in a position of inferiority.
If the scorer of the goal goes to the opposition support to show off his contempt for
them and his elation over scoring a goal against their team, the reaction is quick and
hostile towards the offending player. Players like Davy Cooper of Rangers making
rude gestures to the Jungle after scoring a goal not only incite the crowd to a frenzy,
but place themselves in danger by doing so. Having a goal scored by the opposition is
bad enough but having the player who did the damage insult the support group in
addition, increases the tension and anxiety to a higher level which pushes the crowd
further towards mobilisation for hostile action against the aggressor and his support
group. Not only can play on the pitch increase aifiriety levels, the reaction of the
support groups to one another, to the police , and to the tension of outside influences, it
can also bring about mobilisation towards collective action.
157. Arnold Buss, "Physical Aggression In Relation To Different Frustration", in Journal Of
Abnormal And Social Psychology. Vol . 67, 1967, pp. 1-7.
158. also see Russel Geen and Leonard Berkowitz, Op. Cit.
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In the case of Davy Cooper's gestures to the Jungle after scoring in an "Old Firm" 159
match at Parkhead, Celtic supporters reacted wildly to the player's insulting gestures as
he ran in front of them. The support group surged forward crushing many against
crash barriers as the vast majority of the clamjamfry tried to push their way toward the
player. 160 Many coins and other objects were hurled towards Davy Cooper as he
continued to slowly jog up the touch line toward the halfway line, directly in front of
the Jungle. As the crowd surged toward the fencing separating the terraces from the
pitch, the police quickly moved in to block the supporters from climbing the fence and
charging the pitch and the player concerned. Several Celtic supporters tried to climb the
low fence but were pushed back by timely, non-violent, intervention by the police.
While the police were dealing with a potential pitch invasion the referee stepped in,
pulled Davy Cooper away from from his position in front of the Jungle and spent
several minutes talking to the player, but no official action was taken in the form of a
booking. In this particular situation the quick and timely intervention by the police
stopped what might have been a serious crowd situation. This particular incident
emphasises the effect that players can have on supporters. Many other incidents of
lesser magnitude have been witnessed at matches, none of which came close to inciting
the crowd into collective action.
When the average crowd arrives in the terraces a division of labour takes place where
the crowd is naturally divided into predesignated groups which is not unlike the
division of labour found in the work place. 161,162 The violent supporter who is part
of the clamjamfry and the ordinary supporter make up the division of labour on the
159. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit.. for a description of the full meaning or the Old Firm.
160. The clamjamfry on this day in the Jungle is estimated at between 12,000 and 15,000 out of a
total attendance of 65,000.
161. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian. Op. Cit.. pp. 88-89.
162. Sam Wright, Crowds And Riots: A Study In Social Organization. London, 1978.
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terraces. Early in the crowd build-up the support group is "solidaristic" 163 as it has a
common objective which the individual cannot achieve alone. In this case the football
support groups want to support their team and help them gain a victory. As Ian Taylor
notes, the unity of the support group is based on common identity, which is an added
ingredient to the collective basis of football crowds.
"If there is a central value which unites the rump of the soccer sub¬
culture, it is the belief that the team is theirs".164
Voices in unison are far more effective than each individual yelling his own support for
the team, especially when trying to be heard by the opposition support. The unity of
the crowd depends on the power and strength of symbols and how strongly each
individual identifies with those symbols. Within the solidaristic crowd many
individuals may identify with the same symbol, but when the football crowd grows and
identification changes to include personally undesirable symbols such as religious
hatred or violence, that individual may then remove himself from the overall crowd
activity. At this point the football crowd shows its division of labour as it breaks up
into the clamjamfry who identify with the symbols and the ordinary supporters who do
not identify with the symbols as strongly. This separation of the supporters is normal
and an intricate part of 'differential participation': supporters are totally united under the
banner of team support but divided in their identity with more controversial symbols.
"... the crowd is characterized not by unanimity but by differential
expression, with different individuals in the crowd feeling differently,
participating because of diverse motives, and even acting differently.
The illusion of unanimity arises because the behaviour of part of the
crowd is perceived both by observers and by crowd members as being
the sentiment of the whole crowd". 165
163. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian. Op. Cit.. pp. 103-104.
164. Ian Taylor, 1971, Op. Cit.. pp. 156.
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The division of labour on the terraces follows the observed differences noted in Chapter
One; ordinary supporters, casual supporters, the clamjamfry, and violent supporters.
The divisions beginning to develop as the ground fills, most people going directly to
the section of the terraces where they know they will be in the group they identify with.
Those supporters with no identification with violence usually stay well away from the
clamjamfry, who are easily identified because of their singing chanting and general wild
behaviour. This division is very important in that it reflects personal feelings of
acceptance of varying terrace behaviour patterns and indicates the likelihood of
participation in collective violence. As a general rule people with generally conservative
- non-violent - personal behaviour patterns in the community stand at varying distances
from the clamjamfry, the distance away usually being determined by the individual's
desire to join in with the singing and chanting. The people in the clamjamfry have a
greater identity with the club and generally have more antisocial attitudes towards
conformity in the wider society. Interviews with the fans and the police support this
contention; as one senior officer noted, they tend to arrest the same people at football
matches who have been arrested for violent crimes outside the football setting. 166
The division of labour on the terraces is vital in the build-up towards collective action.
Since most of the support group have no predisposition toward violence they are
willing to let those who do stand in a form of surrouaded isolation. This isolation
allows the clamjamfry total freedom to engage in actions deemed necessary without
interference or control from the majority of the crowd who may resist opportunities to
push toward collective violence. The violent supporter can use the clamjamfry as a
165. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op, Cit.. pp. 22.
166. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, at Celtic Park during a match
between Celtic and Rangers.
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cover for his potential violent activity, just as the casual supporter can use the ordinary
support as a cover for potential violent activity. If the situation develops to violence
then both the violent and casuals will emerge and be followed by the majority of the
clamjamfry. The ordinary supporters in this situation, simply by their mere presence,
are viewed as lending their support to the clamjamfry, violent supporter and the casuals
as they engage the opposition support. The crowd is still seen as united even though
there is differential participation in collective violence. 167
Symbols
Although symbols have been mentioned previously in this chapter, they have a specific
effects when combined with other components of collective behaviour that only happen
under the generalised belief. Thus, as with other components of the value-added
approach, they reappear at various points.
Symbols for football crowds are both positive and negative. This situation is unique to
football crowds since most symbols for crowds are negative in nature; leaders cannot
be seen as symbols because of their unique place in the crowd structure. Positive and
negative symbols take on very important meanings, especially in the case of religious
intolerance between the support groups. Depending on the identification with religious
symbols, which helps create the division of labour in the support groups, and other less
important symbols such as inter-city rivalry, casuals, and general social stress, will
determine the intensity with which the crowd acts. Every support group has a positive
symbol in their team, themselves, and possibly a religious identity. These positive
167. also see Peter Marsh et. al. Op. Cit.. chapter three for a similar description of the division of
labour on the terraces at the Manor Ground in Oxford.
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symbols are the incentive to actively support the team. The negative symbols of the
opposing team, their support, religious identity and community identity creates the
incentive to verbally attack the opposition support. Identifying with the positive and
negative symbols narrows the support group's perception and to focus on those issues
relating to the symbols. The narrowing of attention to the symbols intensifies the
crowd solidarity, thus adding to the possibility of collective action. For the individual,
especially in the clamjamfry, the unanimity of the total crowd, however illusory this
may in fact be, makes the person see the crowd as morally right, incontestable, and
invincible, thus he may join in collective action, which at this stage is still limited to
animated singing and chanting. For most football crowds animated singing and canting
is the extent of their collective action since the symbols, both positive and negative, are
not sensitised enough to provoke collective violence without further components of the
value-added concept coming into play. 168
As crowd action begins to intensify, two basic changes take place. The clamjamfry
becomes more tightly packed and the symbol identification changes from positive to
negative. The actions of the clamjamfry also begin to become more animated.
Threatening gestures and chants are made toward the opposition support. As the crowd
reaches this higher level of intensity it is more expressive, ^ with generalised beliefs
170 that the actions of the support group are right and their actions will benefit the team.
The image of the crowd is also changing to accept erratic socially unacceptable
behaviour as normal in the situation. 171 The language of the supporter is usually very
profane, another reason women do not go to the terraces. Much of the animated action
168. also see Herbert Blumer, Op, Cit.
169. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 102-103.
170. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.. pp. 80.
171. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 100-109.
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of the clamjamfry, if observed on an individual basis, would provoke some form of
police response, but since the actions take place in the crowd they go unnoticed or at
least are not responded to by the police. Only when the actions of certain individuals
become so animated that they are noticed by the police as being a potential threat are
they removed from the crowd. Very expressive crowds tend to over-react to any
incident, either on the pitch or from the opposition, although the reaction is still verbal
in nature and non-violent. The support groups react with fervour to rough play,
referees' decisions and incidents relating to the opposition support. The crowd still has
internal social controls that keep the situation from progressing to violence. Norms of
acceptable social behaviour still have some controlling influence even though it has
been greatly reduced in the build-up of the crowd process. It is the reduction of self-
consciousness through crowd interaction and increasing uncertainty about the situation
that continually reduced social control within the crowd. In the expressive crowd social
control is weak, but still strong enough to prevent violent outbursts. 172
Crowd Leaders
For any crowd including the triangular crowd to exist leaders must appear. 173
Although the value-added concept does not mention leaders at all in this stage of crowd
structure, 174 they are a vital part of the football crowd. Leaders in the support group
appear at the point when the supporters' attention concentrates on the day's events.
The first chant or song of the afternoon is when identifiable leadership appears.
Leaders may emerge on the spot, or they may be continuous throughout the match and
from match to match. Observations indicate that leaders appear in two types; one
172. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 102-103.
173. Gustave LeBon. The Crowd: A Study Of The Popular Mind. London. 1896.
174. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 254-255. The leader for Smelser emerges as part of the
Mobilization For Action stage of collective behaviour.
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comes to every match and continually leads chant and songs, the second type emerges
to lead one chant or song then disappears back into the crowd. In the Scottish terrace
situation leaders of both types usually lead the crowd activities throughout the match by
simply starting the appropriate song or chant at the proper time. Depending on the
situation and the amount of hostility built up through the crowd process, songs and
chants are all the leaders orchestrate, so the rest of the crowd follow the leaders and the
situation remains non-violent. 175
The English football crowd situation in relation to leadership is distinctly different to
that in Scotland. Observation of English matches indicates that leaders are continuous
and go to matches every week to lead support group activity. As Peter Marsh indicated
the "hard case or aggro leader" is the person with a reputation for toughness or violence
and thus commands respect. His leadership is followed out of fear and respect whether
the activity is simply chanting or in some cases violence. 176,177 Marsh's observations
do not hold true in Scotland where the emergent or single chant leader predominates the
terraces. Leaders emerge, start one chant and fade back into the crowd. Even though
every Scottish support group has its 'hard men' with reputations for violence, the size
of the clamjamfry, especially in Glasgow, overshadows their activities and does not
allow them to dominate the leadership position. Hard men also tend to avoid leadership
roles and emerge as violent supporters in response to crowd activity.
The differences between crowd leadership styles in England and Scotland is directly
related to the English condition where many individuals or groups go to matches
175. also see Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op, Cit.
176. Peter Marsh, "Carrers For Boys, Nutters, Hooligans And Hard Cases", in New Society. Vol. 36,
13 May 1976.
177. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 64.
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looking for violence. The crowd situation in England being related to youth sub¬
cultures and organised hooliganism extends this leadership structure into the football
crowd where Scotland's crowds do not identify as strongly with sub-cultures and thus
the leadership must emerge from the crowd. 178 Since there are several leaders in each
Scottish support group the leaders in most instances serve in one capacity only; leading
songs and chants. New leaders appear for other activities like violence.
Since it is the leaders who orchestrate chants, songs and other support group actions
which can lead to violence, they usually attract police attention. If the police feel that a
leader is inciting undesired crowd activity they may remove the person from the support
group to reduce tension. Although this action may alter crowd attention from the game
or opposition to the police, it usually tends to reduce the tension in the crowd because
the new leaders who emerge to replace those removed will act in a way as not to attract
police attention.
For any crowd leader to be effective the crowd must have a degree of suggestibility. 179
180 Although not mentioned by Smelser, the concepts of suggestibility as used by
Turner and Killian when associated with differential participation goes some way
towards explaining why crowds have a division of labour and why certain individuals
participate in collective violence and others do not.
Football crowds are very different in forms of suggestibility when compared to other
types of crowds. Football supporters are frequent visitors to the terrace crowd
178. Research by the BBC, BBC News 25 August 1986, and John Williams, Eric Dunning and
Patrick Murphy, Hooligans Abroad. The Behaviour And Control Of English Fans In
Continental Europe. London, 1984, support this contention.
179. William McDougall, The Group Mind. 2nd. ed., London, 1927.
180. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 32.
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situation, they know the activities that go on and have preconceived notions about
following or not following leaders. Preconceived notions about participation in crowd
actions make the structural process towards violence move quite quickly because the
clamjamfry wants to participate and are often open to suggestion of leaders and will
follow when directed to. The preconceived notions of participation in the non-violent
behaviour of the clamjamfry is, as Peter Marsh noted, ritualised behaviour since it has
been going on over a thirty-year period. 18 ^ 182 The preconceptions and ritualisation
within the clamjamfry heighten the suggestibility of those involved towards collective
violence, should the need arise.
Supporters with preconceived notions against violent actions are much harder to sway
into crowd activity, even though they may stand close to and sing along with the
clamjamfry. People with preconceived notions against violent activity help provide an
internal control factor in the support groups because they represent non-violence and
refuse to participate in any violent activities. Preconceived notions of non-violence are
generally held by older and ordinary supporters who tend not to stand with the
clamjamfry but stand in close proximity to it. Many join in the singing and chanting and
thus present an outward appearance of being associated with the clamjamfry while in
fact exercising restraint on the crowd activity.
The variance between the willingness of individuals to participate or not in collective
violence is related to personal attitudes and values. These attitudes and values are often
learned through the family, education and the environment, both in sociological and
psychological sense. 183 The learning process is heavily influenced by the family, sub-
181. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.
182. Peter Marsh, 1978. Op. Cit.
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cultural associations, and symbolic models presented by the media. 184 The affects of
learned aggressive roles are very evident on the terraces. Individuals who accept the
activities of the terraces can almost always be found in the clamjamfry, or a group like
the casuals. Individuals who do not have an identity with the violent side of the
clamjamfry stand some distance from the centre of it, but still within contact so that the
singing, chanting and other legitimate behaviour can be participated in. Interviews on
the terraces support the concept of Albert Bandura that aggressive behaviour is learned
through observation and / or direct experience which is then reinforced through status
or material gain.18-5 Although interviews were not aimed at testing how aggressive
behaviour was learned, those closest to the centre of the clamjamfry universally
accepted violence in response to aggression of the opposition support.186 The distance
the supporters stood from the centre of the clamjamfry had a direct relationship to the
reduction in acceptability of violent responses to aggression of opposition supporters.
The second major result of this observation is the age difference of the supporters. The
younger supporters who were in the clamjamfry were totally willing to participate in
violence. As the supporter stood further from the centre of the clamjamfry he generally
became older, was employed in a good job and had a higher income level. The
conclusion drawn is that age and material wealth are the two biggest influences in
overriding socially learned violent behaviour.
The suggestibility factor in the clamjamfry is enhanced by informal communication
within the crowd. As the individual becomes more involved in the crowd and takes up
183. Edwin Sutherland and Daonald Cressey, Criminology. Philidelphia, 1978.
184. Albert Bandura, "Psychological Mechanisms Of Aggression", in R. G. Geen and E. I.
Donnerstein eds.. Aggression: Theoretical And Emperical Reviews. Vol. 1, New York, 1983.
185. Albert Bandura, Aggression: Social Learning Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, 1973.
186. Interviews were conducted as part of a pilot study of a questionnaire in Appendix B, see
questions 9 through 21.
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its sentiment, his openness to suggestion increases while his personal perception is
eroded until the crowd is the major controlling influence. 187,188 This type of circular
reaction is intensified by singing, chanting and tight physical packing of members in the
clamjamfry. 189 With the increased influence of the crowd over the individual,
animated behaviour spreads as more and more clamjamfry members imitate the actions
of others. 190 Suggestibility is also influenced by de-individualisation. 191 De-
individualisation reduces feelings of personal distinctiveness, identity and responsibility
due to high arousal generated by the crowd which results in the reduction of personal
standards of norms of behaviour. Individuals are more anonymous, less responsible,
less inhibited, and thus are more willing to participate in antisocial behaviour associated
with selfishness, greed, hostility, lust, cruelty and destruction. 192 De-
individualisation reduces self-awareness and thus reduces standards of appropriate
conduct and personal behaviour. 193 If the intensity of the crowd is strong enough
animated behaviour will spread to segments of the support group adjacent to the
clamjamfry. Once this happens the individual is much more likely to participate in
violent crowd action. Without a high degree of suggestibility in the crowd and more
importantly the clamjamfry, there will be only limited collective action, unless violent
supporters are seeking violence. 194
187. Gustive LeBon, Op. Cit.
188. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 32.
189. Herbert Blumer, Op, Cit.. pp. 170.
190. see Neal Miller and John Dollard, Op. Cit.
191. P. G. Simbardo, "The Human Choice, Individual Reason, And Order Versus Deindividualation,
Impluse And Chaos", in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Op. Cit.
192. P. G. Simbardo, Op. Cit.
193. E. Diener, "Deindividualation: The Absence Of Self-Awareness And Self Regualtion In Group
Members", in P. Paulus ed., The Psychology Of Group Influence. Hillsdale, 1980.
194. A further discussion of the violence seeking supporter appears in Chapter Six.
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Mobilisation Under The Generalised Belief
Mobilisation within the generalised belief is non-violent, unlike "mobilization for
action" where direct crowd action takes place, and is the last major step towards
collective action, generalised beliefs bring the aforementioned components of strain
and conduciveness into sharp focus through communication and the rumour process.
The crowd or support group always bring with them basic forms of generalised
aggression which exists in the wider society. 195> 196 This form of aggression may or
may not be related to football but is a reflection of general strain in the wider society.
General violence and violent activities in the community provide a basis of knowledge
for football supporters to bring on to the terraces. In Scotland much of the violence has
sectarian overtones and limited gang and youth culture relationships which provide a
well-grounded basis for further violence on the terraces. The violence experienced by
many youth outside the football situation is clearly evident on the terraces. Many of the
supporters who make up the clamjamfry are associated with violence outside the
football ground. The violence-prone supporter, who often appears in the forefront of
collective violence, is often engaged in violence in the wider community. " Many of the
people we deal with on the terraces we have arrested before for other offenses". 197
Before any crowd can take action against any form of opposition blame must be
attached to something or someone for the perceived grievance.198 Once blame has been
attached to someone or something then further action to change the situation can take
place. Blame in football crowd situations is generally aimed in three directions; the
195. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 249.
196. F. H. McClintock, "Crimes Against The Person", in Transactions Of The Manchester
Statistical Society 1962-3. Manchester, 1963.
197. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, Celtic Park, Glasgow.
198. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.. pp. 104-105.
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opposition team and support, the police, and one's own club. The blame for most
incidents at most football matches is placed squarely on the opposition and their
support. Depending on the action taken by the opposition the reaction by the home
support will reflect the identification of the transgression and the blame placed upon
them for it will determine the type of action taken in response. Reactions can take many
forms; ambivalence, a return chant or song, threats of violence, and reciprocal violence.
The second direction of response is toward the police who can create the same type of
response from the support group as the opposition can. All police actions are watched
by the crowd, and if the police actions are perceived to be unnecessary, overly
aggressive, or wrong the crowd may react to thwart the police actions.
The third place blame can be applied is to the club itself. Supporters may, as in the case
of Rangers support demanding a managerial change, identify the club through the
players or management as being to blame for poor play and demonstrate their
displeasure. The situation is not, as Ian Taylor proposed, a case of working class
youth trying to re-establish their supposed control of the club back from upper-class
ownership. 199,200,201 &202 j^ere has not been one documented case in Scotland of
supporters actively attacking the club offices or the Board of Directors in an attempt to
change the process of decision making. Supporters may voice displeasure with
management decisions or try to force changes that they think will produce a winning
side. These actions are usually non-violent. The violence involving supporters usually
199. Ian Taylor, "Hooligans: Soccer's Resistance Movement", in New Society. Vol. 14, 7 August
1969.
200. Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology Of Football Hooliganism", in Eric
Dunning ed., The Sociology Of Sport. London, 1970.
201. Ian Taylor, 1971, Op. Cit.
202. Ian Taylor, "On The Sport Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in J. Hargreaves ed.,
Sport Culture And Ideology. London, 1982.
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takes place amongst themselves and the police and is not in any way directed towards
the club. Once collective action has started destruction and violence can be aimed
indiscriminately at various objects, and club offices may become a target, especially of
the opposition club. Even though Taylor notes the differences between the footballing
and social traditions in England and Scotland, 203 the concept of football being
predominantly working class youth revolting against upper class ownership that has
taken their position in the club and then discarded them is not the basic reason for
collective crowd action. This concept has been, and is now a general illusion;
supporters have never had any real control over clubs, only a better relationship with
the management and players. In some instances collective action may be taken against
the club and its officials by the supporters but this is the exception. The supporters fight
each other, the police, and destroy property. Most fans in Scotland support the
management because the owners are usually the only people who have the money to put
into the club and make it successful.
In the case of both Hearts and Hibs wealthy people have taken control of the clubs
during the course of this research. Both new Chairmen have put personal money into
improving the clubs' performance on the pitch and improving the physical facilities. In
the course of interviews with fans of both clubs, supporters may question an individual
issue like the transfer of players, but generally have an overall positive view of the
ownership and management of the clubs, unless the playing side is performing
particularly poorly. Most supporters recognise the necessity of people with
independent wealth to be involved in the club ownership and support the ownership in
the quest to create a winning side.
203. Also see H. F. Moorhouse, Op. Cit.
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Once blame for a situation has been placed on those perceived to be the perpetrators of
the act then there must come a desire to punish those responsible. 204 Without the
desire to punish the perpetrators no matter what the action taken by the opposition no
reprisal will take place. This does not mean that non-violent reactions will not take
place as most reactions to perceived aggressions by the opposition are non-violent in
nature, usually only involving chanting, animated crowd movements, and threats.
Even if there is a desire to punish the opposition for their actions the police are almost
always able to stop any real trouble before it gets started in the ground due to the
physical barriers that separate the support groups. The desire to attack or punish the
opposition, and thus remove or destroy the responsible party is a major determinant
step which every crowd must pass before it can reach a stage for collective action. 205
After the crowd has achieved a wish to punish the opposition it acquires a stronger
sense of crowd unity and power. 206 Once the crowd has identified and blamed the
opposition support for some act it has perpetrated it must develop a sense of
omnipotence before any collective action can be taken. 207 Similar to the concept of
crowd power that Canetti uses omnipotence gives the crowd the feeling that it has the
exaggerated ability to remove the perpetrator. Even if a crowd has gone through the
stages of anxiety, ambiguity, blame and the wish to punish, if the crowd cannot
develop a sense of superior power or omnipotence it will not act against the opposition.
This is one of the main reasons few acts of collective violence take place between large
and small support groups. The small support group will not gain a sense of superiority
and thus will not attack the larger support group, and on the other side it will not
204. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 223-224.
205. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 107.
206. Elias Canetti, Crowds And Power. Harmondsworth, 1973, pp. 327-329.
207. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 103.
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perpetrate acts which the larger support group will perceive as aggressive and thus
incur an attack. Fear of violence plays an important role in keeping smaller support
groups' fans from doing anything outside normal terrace behaviour. When there is a
small opposition support group the larger support group can feel in a position of power
quite quickly, but if there are no acts by the opposition to justify using their numerical
superiority then no collective violence will occur. It is when the support groups are
similar in size, or the visiting support is large enough to be intimidated by the home
support, that one group may through formation of crowd unity develop the feeling of
omnipotence necessary to take collective action.
Conclusions
The Scottish football crowd brings with it an array ofwider social stresses which find a
place for expression in the support group. Although none of the social stresses present
are unique to Scotland their combination is distinctly Scottish, thus giving the Scottish
football terrace an independent identity and creating a unique situation from which
'football hooliganism' emerges. Scottish history, religious, intolerance, class
structure, social change in wider society and younger supporters becoming
predominant on the terraces, inter-city rivalry, youth sub-culture influences, and the
crowd structure itself all help to account for the modern day non-violent terrace
situation.
The recurring or continuous crowd of football supporters have long established
traditions, structure and leaders who through generalised beliefs based on social stress
and conduciveness have become an innate part of terrace life. Although always
evolving the football crowd maintains a structure based on the physical facilities of the
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football stadium which isolates sports crowds and especially football crowds from
other crowd types. The triangular crowd, with the two support groups and the police
finds its most common forum in sports and particularly football crowds.
Football crowds are what Turner and Killian called "expressive crowds", 208 in that
they form an active collective almost immediately upon assembly on the terraces. The
football supporter knows the situation very well. The crowd has social conduciveness,
social strain, built-in generalised beliefs that Smelser identifies yet has additional
components which make football crowds unique. The football crowd is highly
structured, triangular in nature, and its actions are ritualised, 209 which places football
crowds in a special situation not generally recognised in the field of collective
behaviour.
This type of structured crowd situation is one of the main obstacles to the emergent
norm theory as an analytical tool. Within the emergent norm theory the crowd develops
its own norms of behaviour, which the football crowd has done, but the development
of behavioural norms should take place in each new crowd situation which is not the
case in football crowds. The norms of behaviour do not change quickly or from match
to match. The outbreak of violence is not the norm of football crowds, it is the
exception. Less than one half of one percent of football supporters become involved in
crowd violence. 2I® Although the development of violence from ritualised behaviour
could be viewed as emergent this still does not explain the ritualised behaviour or why
on a particular day ritualised behaviour becomes violent.
208. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit,. pp. 102-105.
209. As Peter Marsh noted, ritualised behaviour is important to the supporter and is not seen as
anything out of the ordinary on the terraces but this behaviour pattern is extremely important in
the buildingblock structure of the value-added process towards collective violence.
210. John Harrington. Soccer Hooliganism: A Preliminary Report. Bristol. 1978, pp. 5.
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Despite the overall lack of acceptance of the emergent norm concept it still offers many
vital points to the analysis of football crowds, many of which were overlooked by Neil
Smelser. In this context Turner and Killian offer an analysis of the historical
development of the now ritualised terrace behaviour pattern. The dominant younger
supporters have brought a different set of values on to the terraces, and the values of
youth have had a definite influence on the behaviour of football crowds. Whereas the
older supporter placed little or no value on semi-organised chants and songs, young
supporters do. The young supporters created new norms of behaviour for themselves
within the terrace setting as the older supporters left for other leisure activities. As
terrace activities changed noticeably in the early 1960s emergent norms of behaviour
developed. This type of emergent norm is not the type that takes place in the
spontaneous crowd, as this norm emerges and disappears with each crowd. In the
football crowd norms of behaviour have developed much more slowly. Initially,
norms may have developed quickly along the lines of a spontaneous crowd by creating
new definitions of normal behaviour, especially in the violent situation. Early non¬
violent and violent events had to develop new definitions of behaviour because no
ritualised patterns existed, as is the case today. The evolving terrace structure and
behaviour patterns set standards and precedents by establishing unwritten codes for
both non-violent and violent activity. The norms evolve at each and every match, vary
noticeably between support groups, and are carried on from match to match, but can be
altered quickly to respond to new issues or new forms of control placed in the crowd's
way. The evolution of terrace activity tested social acceptability and the police. As new
types of behaviour were tested the police, community, media and the government all
reacted to a greater or lesser extent. When little control was exercised against an
emerging behaviour pattern it would often become an established pattern, but if the
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authorities reacted to restrict the behaviour pattern it would often not be engaged in on a
regular basis. Once new forms of collective non-violent behaviour became established
on the terraces the possibility of violent collective activity increased. Despite the
installation of physical barriers, crowd segregation, all-ticket matches, and increased
police presence the possibility of violent collective action is now far greater than it was
before ritualised patterns of behaviour that now pervade most football crowds were
established by the clamjamfry.
Despite the historical usage of the emergent norm approach to collective behaviour it
still does not adequately deal with the ritualised behaviour patterns in the modern
football crowd. As ritualised behaviour patterns have become established and the
football terrace become a place for adolescents to go and engage in unacceptable
behaviour Turner and Killian's approach finds difficulty in explaining this pattern and
finds further problems in explaining how this type of acting crowd moves on to
become a violent crowd. Smelser's value-added concept, although not directly
addressing all these issues, is elastic enough to accept the issues in the football crowd
without contradicting the entire concept.
While not attempting to test the value-added framework certain modifications have been
made to it in order to allow for a more adequate analysis of football crowd violence.
Within the hostile outburst concept, the setting in which violence or potential violence
takes place is a major contributing factor influencing all subsequent elements in the
crowd structure. Social strain and stress are enhanced as a result of the football terrace
setting where two isolated support groups are in confrontation over both the match and
themselves. By combining the structural conduciveness and structural strain elements
of the hostile outburst, it has been possible to analyze the wider social concerns
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appearing on the terraces without the repetitive problems inherent in Smelser's original
framework. These modifications do not detract from Smelser's overall framework,
other than to indicate that modifications are necessary in the analysis of football
crowds.
Football crowds, outside Glasgow, have evolved since the 1960s into a social situation
where an individual can go and identify with a cause and engage in unacceptable
behaviour with little possibility of arrest because the antisocial behaviour is acceptable
in the setting. 211 The behaviour on the terraces is not normally violent, just a bit wild
and noisy. Individuals can go to football matches and express social dissatisfaction and
other grievances in a setting where ritualised non-violence is acceptable, but sets the
stage for further developments towards violent collective crowd action.
211. Kurt Lang and Glavds Lang. 1970. Op. Cit.
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CHAPTER V
PRECIPITATING FACTORS IN COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR
Introduction
Social factors that influence strain on the football support groups must include,
leadership, previous experience, and some kind of precipitating incident to spark off a
new episode of collective violence. Very few football crowd riots are truly
spontaneous, most occur in response to social strain, the terrace situation, reputations,
and learned experience from previous football crowd disturbances witnessed in person
or on television.
As the building block approach to explaining collective crowd action proceeds, it
reaches a contentious point. The precipitating factor, as Smelser originally designated
it, was an important ingredient in the structure of collective violence. 1 In later work,
Smelser, responding to the criticism of Currie and Skolnick, 2 reduced the emphasis
on the precipitating factor and placed it in the category of a subheading within
generalised beliefs. 3 Although Smelser reduced the emphasis on the precipitating
factor, it is still of vital importance to football crowds. Even after the crowd has
reached a point where they are ready to take collective violent action something or
someone must instigate the actual violence. Since football crowds are carefully
1. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour. London, 1962, pp. 249-253.
2. E. Currie and Jerome Skolnick, "A Critical Note On Conceptions Of Collective Behaviour", in
J. E. Short and M. E. Wolfgang eds., Collective Violence. Chicago, 1972.
3. Neil Smelser, "Some Additional Thoughts On Collective Behaviour" in Sociological
Quarterly. Vol 42, 1972.
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segregated and generally kept in a restricted area, there is a limited focus of attention
and awareness due to the intensity of the football match as a spetacle. The focus of the
supporters is on the match, the opposition support, and the police, in that order. When
the focus narrows to the opposition support or the police, then the probability of
collective action increases. When the focus of the supporters is limited, an individual
act, no matter how insignificant, can be perceived by one or more crowd members as a
signal to participate in violent collective action. When this happens, the crowd leader
takes the initative, or a new leader emerge, acts on the precipitating incident and takes
the crowd, or support group into collective violence. 4
After observing in excess of four hundred football matches and the ritualised 5' 6
behaviour patterns that exist on the terraces, the question of a precipitating factor is
shown clearly to be very important. Ritualised behaviour creates high levels of
excitement which can easily become violent and thus there must be something missing
from, or added on to, the structure that prohibits collective violence. The missing
element is the precipitating factor or incident to spark off violence. Social control
agents and individual restraint may keep the precipitating factor from ever occurring,
but social controls can not restrain collective violence once it starts. For whatever
reason the precipitating factor does not occur, whether this is due to crowd activity not
reaching a level of intensity required, personal restraint, or to social control agents. It is
the lack of an incident, however significant or insignificant, that keeps football crowds
from becoming violent. The precipitating incident breaks up ritualised behaviour
patterns, solidifies support group identity, and narrows the focus of the support group
to the events at hand and those responsible. Even though Smelser discounts the value
4. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 249-253.
5. see Peter Marsh Elisabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder. London, 1978
6. Peter Marsh, Aggro: The Illusion Of Violence. London, 1978.
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of the precipitating factor, once one has occured, some form of collective crowd action
will take place, but that reaction will not necessarily be violent.
In the football setting the precipitating factor is very hard to identify, especially at the
time it happens. There may be more than one incident that sparks the opposing support
groups into action. In the Hampden Park Cup Final riot of 1980 between Rangers and
Celtic supporters one newspaper identified the precipitating factor as a ball being kicked
into the back of the Rangers' net by a Celtic supporter. This was in fact the signal for
overt action, but other precipitating factors brought the supporters to the ready stage.
Earlier in the post game festivities, Celtic players ran to the Celtic end to wave and
receive their acclaim. When the players went to receive the Scottish Cup their
supporters jumped over the low protective barriers and ran across the pitch to watch the
cup presentation. This may not have actually started the trouble, but it certainly
enhanced the possibility of what eventually happened. The Rangers supporters
followed suit by jumping over the barrier and charging onto the pitch to see the
runners-up medals presented and the scene was set for violence. The support groups
take great meaning out of minor things, but these actions can be the initial precipitating
factor in collective violence. In the case of the Hampden Park riot the precipitating
incidents followed a three stage sequence. First, Celtic players went to their supporters
end before going to receive the Cup. When they went to the main stand the supporters
climbed over the barrier in pursuit of the team and a good vantage point for the
presentation. Second, the Rangers supporters climbed over the barrier at their end of
the ground. Third, a Celtic supporter kicked a ball in the Rangers' net, this was the
incident that sparked widespread violence.
Before any precipitating factor can spark off collective violence, the generalised and
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hostile beliefs of the support groups must have reached a state of omnipotence 7 and
power 8 to react to the perceived action. Even if the most outrageous precipitating act
is performed, if the crowd is not at a stage of mobilization ready to be sparked off, then
no major violent reaction will take place. The best example of this witnessed was at
Celtic Park in 1982 when a Celtic supporter jumped out of the Jungle, ran out on the
pitch, and hit Gorden Strahan, then of Aberdeen with an empty whisky bottle. The
police quickly grabbed the culprit and forcibly removed him the ground. This type of
incident in an important match with a charged atmosphere could easily have been the
precipitating factor to ignite a violent exchange between the two support groups. The
incident did not cause collective violence because neither support group had reached a
stage of aggressive crowd activity necessary to create a mass reaction.
This points to acceptance of the crowd's intrepretation of an action as a precipitating
factor. If the focus of the support groups is still on the match then the incident will
pass, but if the support groups are focused on each other, then the incident could spark
off a hostile outburst. As a result, many acts that might normally be interpreted as
precipitating incidents become seen as individual acts of bravado or violence and are
generally seen as such by the crowd and the police.
Once a precipitating factor is interpreted as such by one or both support groups, the act
can have several effects which help justify action against the opposition.
"The precipitating factor for the hostile outburst channels generalized
beliefs into specific fears, antagonisms, and hopes. . . . The
precipitating factor confirms the existence, sharpens the definition, or
exaggerates the effect of... (1) confirm or justify existing generalized
fears or hatreds, ... (2) introduces a sharp new deprivation in the
7. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 102-105.
8. Elias Cannetti, Crowds And Power. London, 1973, pp. 327-329.
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midst of generally difficult conditions,... (3) suddenly closes off an
opportunity for peaceful protest, ... (4) signalizes a 'failure' which
demands explanation and assignment of responsibility,... (5) one
hostile outburst may be a precipitating factor for further outbursts, . . .
and (6) a rumor reporting one or more of the above events." 9
The precipitating event always intensifies the negative image of the opposition support,
while at the same time confirming and justifing the individual's own feelings of
righteousness in the cause - this further justifies taking collective action against the
opposition. Since the incident signals the beginning of some sort of crowd activity it
usually closes off any form of alternative action. In the case of football crowds there is
little alternative but violence if action is to be taken, because there is little else available
for the crowd to pursue except verbal insults to rectify the injustice. Other crowd
situations may have the option to negotiate an acceptable outcome to a problem, but that
route is not open to football crowds because the grievance is immediate and not
negotiable. They must either take action or return to ritualised terrace behaviour.
When "normal" social control totally disappears from the crowd, then violent collective
action will occur. At this point the crowd has become an acting crowd. 10 The acting
crowd builds on the aforementioned steps, but it still needs additional emphasis placed
on certain criteria to go beyond the "point of control". 11 The symbol of the opposing
support group must have reached a stage where it is thought of as an overt enemy
which must be defeated. The polarisation has developed to the point where violence is
seen as creating solidarity between the support group members and the team, 12 and
9. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 249-252.
10. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 1957, pp. 98-102.
11. Neil Smelser, Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in
James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence. Chicago, 1972,
pp. 104-105.
12. Kurt Lang and Glaydis Lang, "Collective Behaviour Theory And The Escalated Riots Of The
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the opposition support must be punished. The focus and aim of the crowd has changed
from supporting their team to taking positive action to physically punish the opposition
supporters. This action is perceived as totally legitimate within the support group by
those who participate and by many who do not. Collective action has the effect of
reducing the legitimacy of the opposition support and increasing future solidarity
because the opposition rarely seems to have lost when the participants reflect on their
actions.
Precipitating factors take many forms, both inside and outside the ground. Once the
crowd has reached the intensity necessary to take action even minor incidents can cause
major hostile outbursts. In football crowds there are three major areas in relation to
which incidents take place; play and players on the pitch, individuals in the crowd, and
control agents. When the visual perceptions of the opposing support groups are
already excited by religious fervor, action on the pitch can intensify the tension,
excitement, fear and hatred. If play on the pitch becomes more violent than normal, the
support groups will react to support their players and barrack opposing players. Even
in the situation of a small clam crowd, violent play can incite the support groups. In
most cases, verbal abuse towards offending players is the only reprisal available to
supporters, but violence in the form of objects being thrown and physical assaults can
n
occur.
Players actions toward the crowd, especially the opposing support group, can greatly
increase the potential for violence. Players' react to support group animosity by
Sixties", in Tomotsu Shibutani ed., Human Nature And Collective Behaviour. Englewood
Cliffs, 1970.
13. also see Jeffery Goldstein and Robert Arms, "Effects Of Observing Athletic Contests On
Hostility", in Sociomentrv. Vol 34, No. 1, 1971, pp. 83-90.
196
showing disrespect, especially from the relative safety of the pitch. Insulting or rude
gestures to the opposing support, especially after a goal, or at any time the referee is not
watching can incite the support group into a frenzy and it only requires a single minor
incident to set off collective violence. Since the supporters' focus is still on the game
players' actions usually only create an animated response from the support group with
missile throwing being the only form of violent behaviour. One player was observed to
drop his shorts to the opposing support group on several occasions, when the referee
was not looking. This cheeky gesture not only incited the support group into animated
actions but was also very dangerous as many types of missiles were thrown at the
player.
Individuals can commit numerous acts including; missile throwing, pitch invasions,
and support group infiltration, which can spark off violence. Often the acts involve
throwing some type of missile because of the protection from detection and
apprehension the crowd offers. Once missiles begin to fly, retaliation is usually fairly
quick and the terraces turn their attention to the 'aggro' from the game. Occasionally
individuals will invade the pitch on their way to the opposition end and be followed by
other crowd members. This usually invites a counter invasion from the opposition
support so the resulting collective violence can be intense. Support group infiltration is
the third style of precipitating incident. Usually carefully planned, supporters wearing
opposition colours enter the opposing terrace and, on cue, or when the opposition score
a goal, attack the opposition support. This situation is common at Easter Road when
Celtic play Hibs since the official club colours are the same. Celtic supporters often go
into the Hibs terrace and cause trouble if Hibs score a goal.
The police can also precipitate terrace trouble. If the police make what seems to be an
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unjustified arrest, use what seems as unnecessary force against an individual or show
too much strength for the situation, they can receive a quick and violent reaction from
the support groups. Although previous discussion has focused on support group
conflicts, Smelser contends that it is social control agents that dictate crowd response
actions.
"These (the police) determine how fast, how far, and in what direction
the episode will develop". 14
In the triangular crowd - the two support groups and the police - it is the two support
groups who dictate the response, with the police occupying a middle ground. The
police can easily create a potentially violent reaction by over-reacting in their duty and
further incite the crowd by altering the focus of the combatants from one another to
themselves. This situation seldom happens in Scotland but is more common in
England where there is more open animosity between the police and the crowd. The
supporters occasionally do challenge the police, especially if the police have to take
some form of action, even in the normal line of duty to prevent or stop collective crowd
violence. 15 In Scotland the police have to be seen to act in a very unjust way to incite
hostile crowd reactions. For normal police actions verbal abuse is the only response
from the support groups. The police can receive a rude animated response from both
support groups with a massive show of strength. Even Rangers and Celtic supporters
will unite to verbally abuse the police when they march in to provide replacement
officers around the pitch. The supporters see the police action as being either an
14. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 17.
15. The televised match between Luton and Millwall in The Football Association Cup in 1986
where major crowd disturbances took place is a prime example of the situation in England. The
supporters fought a battle with each other on the pitch after the match until the police moved
in to stop the fighting, when the supporters collectively turned on the police and fought them
on the pitch for several minutes before order was restored.
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obstacle to 'aggro' or unnecessary in the situation. 16
The focus of the supporters is the vital element to the interpretation and reaction of the
support groups to any observed precipitating incident. Although the support groups
must have gone through the stages of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and
mobilization under the generalised belief in the building block process of the value-
added approach to collective behaviour to reach a level where collective violence can
take place, it is the focus of the support groups that decides what, if any, action will be
taken. In most cases football crowds as a result of ritualised behaviour, are at a level of
a generalised belief simply by being in the ground. The question then becomes, why
does every overt act of aggression or direct violence not spark off collective crowd
action? The answer lies in the focus of the supporters. If the focus of the support
groups is on the match then most incidents which could be interpreted as a precipitating
incident either are not seen or are interpreted as an individual action because the focus
remains on the match. If an incident is not witnessed, the rumour process must alert
the crowd to the situation which slows the reaction process, results in distortions which
often amplify minor incidents into horrific episodes, and still can produce a violent
response. Incidents that are actually witnessed by the clamjamfry produce a greater
likelihood of a violent response because they can alter the focus of the supporters
16. At a match between Partick Thistle and Celtic at Fir Park on 24 April 1982, several girls'
football teams were presented to the crowd at half time and given awards for participation in a
girls football league sponserd by Partic Thistle. After the trophy presentation the girls ran
around the ground in front of the terrraces to shouts of "take it off, take it off, take it off',
from both support groups. One very well endowed girl removed her top to give the boys a
show. To the biggest ovation of the day the girl ran in front of the Celtic supporters only to
be grabbed by two policemen who covered the girl's substantial assets with their hats. Both
support goups immediately began to chant, "if you hate the fucking police clap your hands",
while trying to hold back the laughter. When the two officers returned from escorting the
young lady from the pitch, both support groups hurled abuse at them for the rest of the match.
The abuse was given in a humorous manner concerning what the officer had done with the
girl while away.
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instantly, thus providing a quick refocus onto violence. Since the focus of the
supporters is the main determinant of collective action, the match itself becomes one of
the main controlling factors in keeping the support groups from focusing on each other
and producing collective violence. Football over all, is the main point of common
interest amongst the supporters. 17
In contrast to the limiting effect of the match on the focus of the majority of the
supporters, this disappears when the match ends or is stopped. The focus can now
change to alternative events which can become precipitating incidents. The Rangers
versus Celtic Cup Final of 1980 is a classic example of the match having ended and the
supporters' focus leaving the match and turning to interpret the precipitating factors that
were to follow. As a result, several thousand supporters fought a major battle on the
Hampden Park pitch after the match. Since there was nothing to divert the focus of the
support groups, the violence spread quickly to include all those who wanted to
participate and the collective action developed quickly, was easily maintained, and
became one of the major modern crowd 'riots' in Scotland. 18
17. An illustration of this point can be seen in the disturbances that occured at a Dundee United
versus Celtic match at Tannadice in 1983. During the first half the two support groups were in
their normal positions which allows for close contact along the north terrace, the supporters
only divided by a twelve foot space set off by high fences. A few individuals in the support
groups began to throw rocks, bottles, coins, and other missiles at each other over the dividing
fences. While standing in the area where the missiles being thrown by the Celtic supporters
were landing, general observations were made of the crowd situation. Many supporters who did
not want to be involved moved out of the area while others who wanted to participate moved
in. Missiles continued to be thrown with increasing intensity as more aggressive or violence
prone supporters arrived in the area and focused their attention on the missile fight. The
average supporter only became involved in the missile throwing when a missile would hit
them and they would throw it back; their focus remained on the match. As a result of only a
minor number of supporters on both sides diverting their focus from the game to missile
throwing a major disturbance was averted without police intervention.
18. See Appendix A for a full account of the Hampden Park Riot of 1980.
200
Indirect Precipitating Factors: The Media
Precipitating factors do not necessarily have to take place in the football stadium.
Influences outside the football ground can and often do have a direct bearing on the
probability of an individual having preconceived notions to act in a specific manner
when in a crowd situation. Although indirect precipitating factors could be considered
as structural strains and conduciveness, the media fall outside this category because of
the distinct effect the media have on football terrace violence. This is a distinction that
Smelser does not make in his work, but is important in the analysis of football crowds
because the indirect precipitating factor has a greater long-term influence on behaviour
than social stress or conduciveness. Social stress does not specifically lead to
predetermined behaviour patterns while indirect precipitating factors can.
The media, unlike social strains, reflect, analyse and condemn the activities of the
minority of supporters who engage in violence. The coverage of events by the media
brings information of incidents of terrace violence, however minor, into almost every
home in Great Britain. The dissemination of information about this social problem may
in turn influence further outbreaks of violence. This particular facet sets the media apart
from social strain and conduciveness and places it within the area of a precipitating
factor in collective football terrace violence.
As noted in Chapter One, the media are highly influential in defining a social problem
and demanding that action be taken to control it. 19 In this process, the media can
expand the awareness of the activity they wish to condemn and have the effect of
19. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems As Collective Behaviour", Social Problems. 18:197,
pp. 300.
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spreading and accelerating the actual problem they wish to curtail. 20 The media can
and do provide information to terrace supporters who may imitate 21 the activity
through social learning 22 and thus acquire the knowledge necessary to increase the
probability of future participation in outbreaks of collective violence. As a result it is
important to look at the structure of the media and to investigate how the influences of
the media affect football crowd violence.
The Print Media
As noted in Chapter Four many factors enter into structural strain in the build-up to
possible collective action. The effect of the newspaper coverage of football crowd
violence through identification, exaggeration and stereotyping of football supporters
helped build the process of social strain. The identification, definitions and
exaggerations of the press created another division within the community, this time
over football. The media campaign to control hooliganism plus prominent stories of
each new event, helped increase the rate of departure of older traditional supporters,
leaving more and more young supporters on the terraces by themselves. Older
supporters who left the terraces, due to the changing social patterns of Saturdays and
the emerging behaviour patterns on the terraces were left with the newspapers to
provide information about the match and the problems of the terraces. As has been
noted, the newspapers provide the definition of crowd violence and orchestrate the
reaction to it. If hooliganism, either real, threatened, or defined by the press has caused
the traditional supporter to leave the terraces the emerging problem of hooliganism can
20. Stuart Hall, "The Treatment Of 'Football Hooliganism' In The Press", in Rodger Ingram,
et.al., Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context. London, 1978.
21. Gabriel Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation. New york, 1903.
22. Albert Bandura and Richard Walters, Social Learning And Personality Development. London,
1975.
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easily provoke reactions of outrage, resentment, reprisal and a demand for control of
those involved. Thus, for those traditional supporters forced off the terraces through
the fear of, or actual crowd violence, the stage is set for a newspaper orchestrated
reaction and call for control of 'football hooliganism' which they agreed with and
promoted.
The control campaign in this case found a receptive and supportive audience because
the problem was real - although highly exaggerated - and of personal importance to
former and current football fans. The control campaign was a totally media defined and
orchestrated problem for those who had never visited a football terrace, which accounts
for most of the public, especially women. As a result, both the average supporters and
those who had never attended a football match were receptive to media demands for
control of the supposedly increasing problem of football hooliganism because any
demand for the control of violence appeals to most people. As Ian Taylor contends:
.. with any headline social problem, it is very difficult to decide how
much of a real increase in the reported activity there has been. When
there is this greater sensitivity to soccer hooliganism, the police will
increasingly be unconstrained in cases of 'trouble' on the terraces,
magistrates will increasingly be willing to sentence, and criminal
statistics will increasingly be full of 'objective' evidence giving details
of the problem." 23
As noted in Chapter Two, football crowd violence has existed since the beginning of
the sport itself. The style of violence has changed as the game has changed. The
amount of football crowd violence has increased and decreased due to various social
factors throughout history. The current situation is simply one where the media have
played an important part in the supposed increase of 'football hooliganism' where in
23. Ian Taylor, "Hooligans, Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society. Vol. 14:7, August,
1969, pp. 206.
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fact the amount of violence may not have increased but the amount of reporting has. As
Stanley Cohen notes, the effect of media attention to a specific subject can have major
consequences.24
"Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods ofmoral
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is
presented in a stylized and stereo-typical fashion by the mass media; the
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often)
resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates
and becomes more visible. Sometimes the panic is passed over and is
forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has
more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce such
changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society
conceives itself." 25
Football hooliganism has created a moral panic as defined by Ian Taylor. Unlike the
analysis of mugging by Stuart Hall et. al. which took place over a thirteen month
period, 26 the moral panic over football crowd violence has existed at varying levels
since the mid- 1960s, which coincided with the development of the tabloid press. Press
coverage of football violence before the emergence of the tabloid press was generally
limited to notations in match reports, but became a headline story in the new popular
newspapers.
"The press can have the effect 'of boosting' the very phenomenon
which society and the press want to control. If the official culture or
society at large comes to believe that the phenomenon is threatening, and
growing, it can lead to a panic about it. This often precipitates the call
for tough measures of control. This increased control creates a situation
24. Neil Smelser, Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in
James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence. Chicago, 1972,
pp. 104-105.
25. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers.
London, 1972, pp. 28.
26. see Stuart Hall, et. al., Policing The Crisis: Mugging. The State And Law And Order.
London, 1978, pp. 7-8.
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of confrontation, where more people than were originally involved in
the deviant behaviour are drawn into it - forced to 'put up a good show'
or increase the wager, up the odds. Next week's 'confrontation' will
then be bigger, more stages, so will the coverage, so will the public
outcry, the pressure for more control... This is what is sometimes call
the amplification spiral - and the press has a significant part to play in
each twist of the cycle. Press coverage can, inadvertently help produce
the direct opposite of what is aimed at - more rather than less of the
deviance it is trying to control". 27
The press, radio and television not only define a social problem and orchestrate the
reaction to it, they place information on the structure of crowd violence in the minds of
terrace dwellers who in turn become more susceptible to involvement in collective
violence. By reporting an isolated incident or series of incidents from the limited and
controlled circumstances in which they occur to the public as a whole, the media place
football hooliganism in the forefront of public concern. When incidents of crowd
violence first appeared as headline stories in the press they had an informing effect, but
as the reporting increased it had an exaggerating effect on the perceptions of the public
and the terrace supporter. The perception of escalating violence occurred at the same
time as changes on the terraces brought on by emerging social and work practices.
As the older supporters left the terraces the opportunity of violence amongst the
younger supporters increased due to a major form of control having a reduced effect.
With the increased opportunity for violence, an undoubted increase in violent incidents
and press interest in football hooliganism the structure was set for a moral panic over
football violence.
"It is more likely that media - depicted violence has an undesirable
'triggering' effect than that it has a desirable 'carthasis' effect. This
triggering effect is probably only operative among some small faction of
the population who have predispositions towards such violence in the
first place, and even then only under certain restricted
circumstances".28
27. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit,. pp. 25.
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The triggering effect is clearly illustrated in relation to the clamjamfry. Press coverage
of early restricted and isolated incidents of football crowd violence provided the
information about the structure of collective action to the clamjamfry who are the group
who are 'predisposed' in a 'restricted circumstance' toward violent activity. As a result
of increasing press coverage of incidents that had previously gone unreported or
reported only in match reports a triggering effect took place. As incidents of violence
increased, further reporting followed thus triggering further events and thus a vicious
cycle of repetitive collective violence was reinforced by media coverage.
As noted in the previous chapter, communication is vital to any episode of collective
violence. Without communication within the crowd collective action is impossible. The
communication process runs throughout the crowd, in interpersonal contact both in the
crowd and in wider society, and is amplified by the information provided by the
media. Even though the media do not have a direct influence on communication within
the crowd itself, they have an indirect a carry-on effect from match to match. Even if a
supporter is not directly involved in a violent incident the media can define the problem
and give a description of what happened. If the supporter was involved in a violent
incident the press can redefine the incident and provide information about the incident
not perceived while actually involved. This results in a real and media definition of
football hooliganism. The press, in reporting violent incidents, defines what 'really
happened' to participant and non-participant alike. This in turn provides information
used in the communication process which increases the strain on the terraces through
sensitising supporters to the problem and thus increases the probability of further
outbreaks of collective violence.
28. Robert K. Baker and Sandra J. Ball, eds., Violence And The Mass Media. Vol. XI,
Washington D. C., 1969, pp. 501.
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The cycle that develops from media coverage of football hooliganism is collective
behaviour reinforced by publicity, which in turn creates an increased knowledge of
violence on the terraces, which in turn leads to an increased probability of further
collective action. This cycle builds on itself, especially if there is a continuous
reference to crowd violence in the press after every Saturday match. With one hundred
and thirty league football teams in Scotland, Wales and England, and sixty-five games
scheduled on a normal Saturday only one violent incident receiving prominent national
press coverage can overshadow well behaved supporters at every other match. One
violent event handled in the style of "SOCCER FANS'S RAMPAGE" 29 can
reinforce the violent concept of those who occupy the terraces in every ground and give
the public the impression that all football matches are violent. This concept needs only
one and a half percent violence rate per Saturday to function. The stigma of one violent
incident is spread to all clubs. The carry-on effect not only relates to the specific
incident but can result in long-running coverage over several days which focuses public
concern resulting in a 'moral panic' about football hooliganism. The Hampden Park
Riot of 1980 is a good example of this, with newspapers running follow-up stories for
two weeks after the event. 30 The follow on effect and moral panics give the
impression the football terraces are continuously violent and stigmatise all supporters as
being violent.
With a policy of reporting crowd violence, the tabloid press use terms like 'rampage,
bother boys, thugs, riot, hooligans, terror, horror, yobs,' and others which present an
image of violence. Football crowd violence sells newspapers. By using large headlines
and pictures which catch the public eye, and create sales, even the most minor incident
will receive coverage. With approximately four thousand league and cup football
29. The Sun. Tuesday 6 April 1971, pp. 1.
30. The Scotsman. 12-22 May 1980.
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matches in Britain in a forty week season the possibility of of crowd trouble and the
resulting media coverage is fairly high.
Press coverage has another effect which is directly related to the triggering effect, and
that is in building violent reputations for clubs' supporters. When newspapers report a
violent incident the supporters are identified by their colours and and associated with a
club. The reported violence, either real or exaggerated, helps build a reputation for
violence which amplifies the triggering effect by the desire of supporters to maintain or
challenge reputations. Glasgow Rangers supporters have a very violent reputation. As
a result of violent crowd actions in Barcelona, Birmingham and Newcastle the club was
banned from Europe. Many Rangers supporters openly admit "we have a reputation to
maintain', which results in Rangers supporters trying to maintain that reputation and
other supporters often challenging it.
"The prominence of reporting on 'football hooliganism' thus helps
promote it as a topic in the general agenda of concern in the minds of the
public. Second, we know we are encountering a phenomenon of very
great public resonance when we discover stories which break out of the
segregated enclave of the sports pages, and gain a wider, more general
coverage on the front page of the paper. This signals that something has
happened which links or connects sports with other news ... that sport
has gone political". 31
The effect of football violence reporting has not only increased public awareness of the
subject, it has created what can be called a cycle or recurring moral panic about football
hooliganism. The moral panic as noted by Stanley Cohen 32 and Stuart Hall 33 was
studied as a singular phenomenon which occurred once and then died away as a news
31. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp.18.
32. Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit.
33. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit.
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story. Football hooliganism through cycles of violence, often coinciding with each
new season, has resulted in corresponding cycles of reporting resulting in a recurring
moral panic. As Cohen noted, moral panics often reach the political arena if the public
outcry is strong enough. In the case of football hooliganism, governments of both
parties have addressed the problem in the House Of Commons, through government
White and Green Papers and through legislation. 34 Most government reports and
legislation deal with controlling football crowd violence through physical containment,
but have generally not addressed the underlying social issues which cause the problem.
As a result, successive governments have legislated over a thirty year period with little
effect in controlling football crowd violence. Certain measures, generally regarding
safety, segregation, all ticket matches and policing policy, have been enforced, but all
they have done is to force the combatants to alter their tactics in a style similar to the
evolution of football violence through history. While this pattern of governmental
reaction to moral panic continues the cycle will continue, a series of violent incidents
brought on by the triggering effect, media coverage, moral panics, ineffective
government action, more violence, recurring moral panics and further ineffective
government action.
The press has been singled out for much of the criticism concerning the portrayal of
football crowd violence. The press, unlike radio and television, send reporters to every
match which means that one violent incident, however trivial, can be reported in the
national press the next morning. As a result an isolated incident at an English fourth
division or a Scottish second division match can produce national headlines when well
behaved crowds at larger grounds are not mentioned. Thus one violent incident can
overshadow a peaceful Rangers versus Celtic match. This type of coverage can give
34. See the bibliography section, Offical Reports, for a list of government studies and reports on
football crowd violence.
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the impression that every football match is violent when in reality violence is the
exception at every match.
The triggering effect, reputation and the recurring moral panic are clearly demonstrated
by the aftermath of the Chelsea versus Sunderland Milk Cup semi-final second leg
played at Stamford Bridge on Monday 4 March 1985. After the game major
disturbances took place between the rival supporters and the police. Chelsea supporters
have a long tradition of violence, and the frustration of being eliminated from the Milk
Cup was one of the main issues which sparked off violence in and around the ground.
The press reported the violence and on Wednesday 13 March, Millwall played Luton
Town in the Football Association Cup at Kenilworth Road. After having seen
newspaper, radio and television coverage of the violence at Chelsea, Millwall
supporters - having another long-standing reputation for violence - became involved in
a nationally televised episode of football hooliganism. The first event triggered the
second through reputation, the second episode created a moral panic which led to the
Prime Minister calling for reports on how to solve the problem. The triggering effect
continued with several incidents reported at League matches on Saturday 16 March.
The media campaign in 'reaction' to the violence was swift and effective in that official
acknowlegement resulted, but when no further incidents of violence occurred the issue
became old news and thus no further stories appeared, no further violence occurred and
the moral panic was over, until the next incident started the cycle again. As a result of
press coverage after three weeks of violence and public concern, the government did act
by calling for fencing between the supporters and around the pitch, measures required
under the Safety At Sports Grounds Act, 35 and to introduce legislation banning
alcohol in English grounds. 36 The Football Association also fined all the clubs
35. Safety At Sports Grounds Act 1975.
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whose supporters were involved and ordered future matches played with all-ticket
crowds only. Despite the moral indignation and government action, the carry on effect
culminated in the violence at the European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool
on Wednesday 29 May. The violence started by Liverpool supporters caused a crowd
panic resulting in thirty eight Juventus supporters being killed in a crush caused by a
collapsed barrier. 37 The moral outrage as a result is still being felt three years after
the incident. Many accused of being involved are still awaiting trial in Belgium and the
British government is still struggling to find answers about curtailing violence- prone
supporters travelling to European matches.
The Broadcast Media 38
Radio and television supplement and expand the coverage given to football hooliganism
by the press. While the press enjoys more 'freedom' to print what it sees fit, the
broadcast media are restricted in their coverage to being impartial. The press -
"... whose private, commercial character gives it greater freedom to
comment - is a more active agent than television or national radio, which
are governed by stricter rules about 'impartiality'. However, once a
phenomenon like 'football hooliganism' has been widely defined as a
'problem' about which 'we ought to do something', even television and
radio can work from the basis of a common consensus about it. They
can then comment and recommend without much fear of contravening
the rules of impartiality and balance. Hooliganism like crime, violence
and acts of aggression against the state, is a matter about which even
publicly-owned or controlled medial, like radio and TV, are not required
to be balanced. 39
36. Alcohol was banned in Scottish grounds under the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980.
37. See page 1 & 2 for a full description of the Hessel Stadium riot.
38. The term broadcast media is used in the American sence to mean both radio and television.
39. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 16.
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As Stuart Hall notes, the broadcast media cannot ignore a major social problem, once it
has been identified, defined and condemned by the press. Unlike the press, radio and
television occupy a vastly different position in relationship to the crowd violence
syndrome than that of the print media. Newspapers collectively cover every match
played, while radio and television are restricted to a limited number of matches each
week. 40 The restriction on televised matches reduces the probability of live or
recorded broadcasts of violent incidents. When violent incidents do take place in front
of the cameras they are broadcast for all to see.
Radio and its effect on the listening audience has not been a subject of extensive
research, but the effect of television on the viewing audience has. The results are
contradictory, but in the case of football hooliganism certain television - behaviour
relationships are evident. Chants of "can you hear us on the box", extreme profanity,
and arm waving are common at matches when the television cameras are there but are
not evident at non-televised matches. The "I want to be on tele" attitude of generally
younger supporters often produces increased incidents of individual bravado and
greater possibility of collective action if individual acts are seen as precipitating actions
by the crowd. In this fashion the television cameras, simply by their presence,
influence football crowd behaviour.
Although many experts urge caution in relating a direct causal relationship between
television viewing and viewers' subsequent activity, in this case the relationship may be
more clear cut.
"Other features of our culture in general, such as the mass media may
40. The number of matches covered and the format on television changes from season to season
depending on agreements between the television networks, the Leagues and the Football
Associations in England and Scotland.
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promote acceptability of male violence or make violence so banal that
large segments of the population are no longer sensitive to expressions
of violence. At least these fail to encourage non-violence. Whether
television viewing or otherwise vicariously experiencing violence
functions as a catharsis is not a scientifically resolved issue. The sheer
frequency of screen violence, its intensity as well as context, and the
myriad forms it takes, cannot be claimed to instill firm notions of non¬
violence in the children who are witnesses. Unless the logic of the
assertion that violence in the mass media encourages violent behaviour
is destroyed by scientifically acceptable evidence, we play dangerous
games with the socialization process of the adult products". 41
Although informal opportunities for violence in the wider society have been slowly
reduced by the police and other forms of social control over a prolonged period of time,
opportunities for violence in certain situations have increased as evidenced by the
reported increase in football crowd violence and other forms of general hooliganism.42
The increase of football hooliganism in the 1960s took place at the same time as
television viewing increased in Britain, especially viewing of football. 43 The increase
in football crowd violence, the changing terrace population, and increased television
viewing of football may only be coincidental but the conclusion drawn is that a
relationship exists between television violence and subsequent terrace violence.
One effect of watching matches on television is to keep some supporters off the terraces
resulting in the 'armchair supporter' who only sees football through the camera and is
limited in perception to what is broadcast. A second effect, as previously noted, is that
television cameras affect the behaviour of supporters as they attempt to "get on tele". A
third effect of television coverage is that any incident of violence shown can and often
does have a carry-on or triggering effect for future incidents. Although the evidence is
somewhat contradictory the findings of the National Institute of Mental Health who
41. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Violent Behaviour. Cambridge, 1969, pp. 10.
42. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Of Violence. London, 1963, pp. 241-247.
43. see "Football - Our Most Popular Sport", New Society. Vol. 54, 23 October 1980, pp. 171.
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studied over three thousand individual research projects into the effect of television
violence on the viewer is, "violence on television does lead to aggressive behaviour in
children". 44,45,46 Although this conclusion is based on general television
violence, learned violence patterns from television can influence behaviour when
similar incidents occur to the individual in person. 47 As a result, viewing live or
recorded football hooliganism on television can have triggering and carry-on effect to
future matches.
"It would appear that producers of sport telecasts are eagerly attempting
to satisfy home viewers' love for violence and competition by giving
them a 'double dare' - the action plus the dramatic commentary . . .
television coverage can out do what ever live attendance things - it can
dwell on and amplify the violent aspects of the game, the exploration of
the precise mechanisms by which enjoyment is derived from witnessing
violence ..." 48
Televised crowd violence at any match always results in different perceptions from the
participant, non-participant, television viewer, and newspaper reader. The participant
may be caught up in the crowd structure or be violence-prone and willing to participate
in the violence with internal justification. The non-participant on the terraces may have
some sympathy with the cause of his side, but as a witness gains a different perspective
from the participant or television viewer. The television viewer is limited in perspective
44. D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet, and I. Lazar, eds., Television And Behaviour, Ten Years Of Scientific
Study And Implications For The Eighties. Vols 1&2, National Institute For Mental Health,
Washington D. C„ 1982.
45. also see Eli A. Rubinstein, "Television And Behaviour", American Psychologist. Vol. 38,
July 1983.
46. also see Thomas Cook, Deborah Kendzierski, Stephen Thomas, "Implications Of Television
Research", Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 47, Summer 1983.
47. David L. Lange, Robert K. Baker and Sandra J. Ball, Violence And The Mass Media. Vol. 9,
Washington D. C., 1969. pp. 376.
48. Jennings Bryant, Paul Comisky, and Dolf Zillman, "The Appeal Of Rough-And-Tumble Play
In Televised Professional Football", Communications Quarterly, Vol. 29, Fall 1981,
pp. 261.
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to what is actually shown on the screen and thus may have a completely different
interpretation of the events in comparison to those in attendance.
"A general characteristic of the television presentation was that the field
of vision of the viewer was enlarged while, at the same time, the context
in which these events could be interpreted was less clear. Whereas a
participant was able to make direct inferences about the crowd as a
whole, being in constant touch with those around him, the television
viewer was in the center of the entire crowd. Yet, unlike the participant,
he was completely at the mercy of the instrument of his perceptions. He
could not test his impressions - could not shove back the shover, inspect
the bystanders' views, or attempt in any way to affect the ongoing
activity. To the participant, on the other hand, the direction of the
crowd activity as a whole, regardless of its final goal, still appeared as
the inter-play of certain peculiarly personal and human forces. Political
sentiment, whenever encountered, could thus be evaluated and
discounted. Antagonistic views could be attributed to insufficient
personal powers of persuasion rather than seen as subjugation to the
impersonal dynamics of mass hysteria. The television viewer had little
opportunity to recognize this personal dimension in the crowd. What
was mediated over the screen was, above all, the general trend and the
direction for the event, which consequently assumed the proportion of
an impersonal force, no longer subject to influence".
This view of the 'overwhelming' effect of public moods and the
impersonal logic of public events is hypothesized as a characteristic of
the perspective resulting from the general structure of the picture and the
context of television viewing". 49
The effect of viewing real violence on television produces an increased possibility of
future violence on the part of the viewer. "Adolescent aggression increases with
perceived reality of TV violence". 50> 51> 52 This type of imitative 52' 54 behaviour
is clearly seen in young supporters trying to imitate professional players, by the fact
49. Gladys Lang and Kirt Lang, "The Unique Perspective Of Television And Its Effect", American
Sociological Review. Vol. 37, 13 February 1953, pp. 11-12.
50. Charles Atkin, "Effect Of Realistic TV Violence vs. Fictional Violence And Aggression",
Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 60, Winter 1983, pp. 615.
51. also see Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, 1973.
52. also see Leon Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis. New York, 1962.
53. Gabrial Tarde. The Laws Of Imitation. New York, 1903.
54. John Dollard, et.al., Fustration Aggression. London, 1944.
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that chants are similar all over the country, new behaviour patterns seen on television
spread quickly to other clubs, threatening gestures and blatantly violent activity as seen
on television are quickly picked and repeated. "... television teaches aggressive
styles of behaviour". 55 Not only does media coverage influence the crowd into
repeated violence it identifies a place where a violent individual can go to seek out
violence thus further adding to the carry-on effect. As a result repeated televised
incidents of football crowd violence, whether live transmissions or in repeated news
and documentary programmes, have a generally adverse effect in the effort to control
the problem. Imitative behaviour patterns increase the probability of further collective
outbursts at subsequent matches which reach a peak associated with a general moral
panic before receding to start all over again with the next major outburst. 56
Conclusions
The nature of this study, with a primary emphasis on participant observation, does not
allow the scope empirically to test the relationship between the media and football
crowd violence, but the systematic way in which this research has been carried out
gives strong support to the view that football crowd activity is greatly influenced by
media coverage. The idea of being on 'the tele' encourages young supporters to attract
attention by becoming involved in incidents in the hope they will attract the cameras and
be seen by family and friends for the status this may bring. Media coverage helps build
the process of the moral panic by covering as many occurrences of crowd disorders as
possible while at the same time, even if inadvertently, triggering off new incidents of
55. A statement by Albert Bandura in "Is Television A School For Aggresion", Center Magazine.
Vol 14, November-December 1981, pp. 20.
56. also see Gladys Lang and Kirt Lang, "Some Pertinent Questions On Collective Violence And
The News Media", Journal Of Social Issues. Vol. 28, 1972, pp. 108-109.
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collective action, at the same time calling for action to be taken to stop the problem.
The triggering effect, reputation building, and imitative effect created by the media leads
to an increased possibility of collective crowd action at subsequent matches.
The media, through normal and sensational reporting of football hooliganism in many
cases, have brought the behaviour patterns of a minority of supporters to the attention
of all supporters and the public as a whole. By defining the problem and calling for
control of the problem many non-violent fans have left the terraces in fear, thus leaving
a greater opportunity for violent supporters to control the activities on the terraces who
through imitative behaviour patterns are then more likely to engage in collective
violence.
With reporting of violent incidents and repeated analysis the stage is set for a triggering
effect on future crowds which in turn sets off a moral panic as an ever-increasing cycle
of violence develops. This process is repeated at least once during every football
season because supporters are sensitized to the possibility of crowd violence. This
results in a recurring moral panic over football hooliganism which eventually leads to
governmental action to try to control the problem.
Precipitating events play an important role in any football crowd situation. Both the
media influence and the actual physical act are vital ingredients in the collective
behaviour process in relation to football crowds. Although down-played by Smelser
the precipitating event, both in the indirect influence of the media and the direct
influence of a physical act, make it vital in linking the non-violent crowd situation to the
violent crowd. By being aware of the media effect on crowds, and by swift, fair action
using as little force as possible in dealing with individual actions the police can avert the
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possibility of a precipitating event sparking off collective crowd acdon.
Once collective violence has taken place the media must be encouraged to downplay the
incident in an effort to reduce the carry-on effect. Although direct control of the press,
radio and television is not recommended, the media must realise the problem that
reporting and dwelling on violent incidents causes, and in their understandable effort to
control the violence, must voluntarily restrict the amount of coverage given, especially
in lengthy follow-up reporting. Since the media are a prime influence in the carry-on,
triggering effect resulting in moral panics, or in this case recurring moral panics, this
voluntary change in reporting practice will help reduce the imitative behaviour on the
terraces and as a result reduce the probability of future collective violence.
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CHAPTER VI
MOBILISATION FOR ACTION: THE VIOLENT CONDITIONS
Introduction
After all the stages of the building block process have taken place the crowd is ready for
mass violent collective action. Once the crowd has responded to a precipitating event
"mobilization for action" 1 takes place in which the rest of the crowd responds and
follows the leaders into action against the opposition. The crowd has moved from a
general analysis to a specific one. To re-emphasize the value-added framework, the
following components are necessary in the mobilisation for action before collective
violence takes place.
". . . (a) leadership; (b) organization of the hostile outburst; (c) the
shape of the hostility curve". 2
Mobilisation for action in the football crowd takes place outside the ground, inside the
ground and after the match. Since the elements of collective violence take place in a
variety of situations, it becomes necessary to to use Smelser's framework in relation to
the setting of football crowds. As a result this chapter will look into; outside influences
on football crowds, violence outside the ground, violence inside the ground and control
of collective violence.
Neil Smelser's work in collective behaviour was based on political activities in the
1. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour. London, 1962, pp. 25.
2. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 253.
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United States in the 1960s in which crowds became violent in response to social and
political stress. Most crowd activity is two dimensional with confrontations between
the crowd and the police. Football violence is unique in that the confrontation is
triangular in nature; between two support groups and between the support groups and
the police. 3 This results from the physical structure of football stadiums with two
isolated support groups separated by physical barriers and the police. In addition,
outside influences may influence crowd behaviour at this stage, influences that are not
reflected at earlier stages of the analysis. As previously noted, subcultural influences,
leadership, and the focusing process become important in the analysis of football
crowds.
Influences On The Mobilisation For Action
The casuals in Scotland are a loosely organised group of generally young, well dressed
supporters associated with each large club who choose to attend matches seeking
violent confrontations with home or visiting supporters. Usually without identifying
scarves, the casuals congregate in a prearranged section of the ground and attack the
nearest supporters of either club. They also run around outside the ground before and
after the match attacking small groups of supporters from any club. Because of their
youth, the casuals are ineffective as their physical stature will not allow them to attack
older supporters for fear of reprisal and their organisation and numbers involved are not
large enough to challenge the clamjamfry. 4
3. Robert E. Park, The Crowd And The Public. Chicago, 1972, pp. 56, notes that social
opposition creates competition. This is reflected in the two opposing support groups, and the
support groups conflict with the police.
4. Whilst standing in Easter Road before a Hibs versus Rangers match a group of approximately
fifty very young Hibs casuals ran up and threatened violence, but ran away again when the
leaders were threatened with more severe pain than they were likely to inflict. I was not wearing
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In England semi-organised groups use football as a staging ground for violence just as
the Mods and Rockers use Brighton as a staging area for their confrontations. 5 This
type of external influence can be viewed as another aspect of structural strain, but since
its presence is not a problem at most matches it can only be considered as part of
mobilisation for action since violent subcultures do not necessarily require the elements
of collective behaviour to become violent.6' 7
Despite limited research conducted at English football grounds, the indications are that
the violent youth subcultures of 1970s have shifted from recognised traditions, 8' 9
to using football grounds as points of confrontation as this lessens the chances of being
apprehended by the police. This has developed as a result of police success in reducing
opportunities for violence between established subcultures, media coverage of
seemingly successful football crowd violence, and the natural evolution and change in
identity of youth subcultures. In England, subcultures of violence exist who follow
certain football clubs. This has come about because of the long tradition of football
violence, guaranteed victims for the violence, and reduced possibility of apprehension
by the police due to the presence of the crowd.
any identifying scarves to indicate support for either of the clubs which helped convince them to
go and look for another victim.
5. see Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers.
London, 1972.
6. Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit.. pp. 19-20.
7. The casuals are not active enough to influence most matches because there are too few involved.
When there are enough casuals at a match, their influence can be significant on the crowd and the
value-added system.
8. See Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures In Post
War Britain. London 1976.
9. see Mike Brake, The Sociology Of Youth Cultures And Youth Subcultures: Sex Drugs And
Rock'n Role. London, 1980.
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Although this study is concerned with the structure of crowd violence, subcultural
influences are present in a limited number of grounds and may help to explain the
rationale behind the use of football as a staging ground for violence. As mentioned in
Chapter Four many working class values are expressed on the terraces. Similar values
are also expressed in subcultural organizations, especially those dominated by working
class membership including:
". . . demonstrations of masculinity and toughness, . . . lower - class
boys, appear more likely to be oriented towards direct expression of
aggression than are middle class boys", feelings of belonging, status,
autonomy, fate, excitement, and smartness." 10
When subcultures emphasise violence and seek "... trouble, which frequently
involves fighting or sexual adventures while drinking," 11 they often express attitudes
similar to the clamjamfry except that football is not the reason for the subcultures
presence at the match. The similarity of values between the subculture seeking violence
and the clamjamfry results in little animosity between the two and often times means
that the clamjamfry will respond to and participate in violence started by the subculture.
If a subculture group starts violence, its leaders can act as leaders for the clamjamfry
and direct violence towards specified targets such as the police, which normally the
clamjamfry would not assault themselves.
Despite the insights given by subcultural literature into gang and organised violence,
subcultural identities are not a major influence on the Scottish terraces. Most
supporters do not have subcultural allegiances and nor do they identify with or
participate in violence unless it is a crowd activity. Although Lewis Yablonski12 and
10. Walter B. Miller, Lower Class Culture And Gang Delinquency, Journal Of Social Issues, vol..
14, 1958, pp. 8.
11. Walter B. Miller, On. Cit.
12. Lewis Yablonski, The Violent Gang. New York, 1962.
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David Matza 13 have argued that football crowds can be viewed as gangs with a fluid
membership and limited leadership, football crowds are much more complex and the
explanation of their violent activity can not be accomplished through a subcultural or
gang theoretical framework. This is because of the broad make-up of football crowds
and the lack of any general alienation from cultural norms. In Scotland, this includes
both the average supporter and the clamjamfry. Only where subcultures or gangs seek
violence at football grounds do the above perspectives become applicable, however
they must still be examined with regard to collective behaviour and how they affect
overall crowd activity. 14
The violence prone supporter is often involved in violence outside the football setting
and finds the Saturday terrace situation highly conducive to violence with limited scope
for arrest. Interviews with the police and supporters in Scotland, indicate that many
well known aggressive individuals, who may or may not have a subcultural affiliation,
go to football matches and come to the attention of the police through their leadership of
animated chants, isolated violent incidents, and leadership of collective violence.
"Many of the supporters we remove from the terraces have previous arrest records for
other violent activity." 13
Gratuitous Violence
Although there have always been a few violent supporters in every clamjamfry, the
13. David Matza, Delinquency And Drift. New York, 1965.
14. This type of research has been conducted by Stanley Cohen in relation to youth subcultures but
it is not the intention to examine football crowd violence in a subcultural context, except to
note the relationship and its influence on the football crowd in England and Scotland.
15. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, Celtic Park, 1 January 1983.
222
identification of football as a place to create gratuitous violence is impossible to date,
but it is the result of media coverage of collective violence at matches. The actual
structure of the crowd and crowd activities block specific analysis of the violent
supporter since they only appear as a direct precipitating agent or are involved in
gratuitous violence away from the crowd. 16 The difference between gratuitous
violence and collective violence can be established by eight factors: 1, Violence prone
supporters often follow various clubs looking for violent opportunities; 2, gratuitous
violence does not follow the basic crowd structure, building towards violence; 3,
gratuitous violence is conducted by a relatively small segment of the crowd, usually
without the support of the clamjamfry; 4, those involved in violence for violence's sake
do not follow basic crowd patterns of violence, the violence is aimed at individuals or
small groups and not at the opposition crowd; 5, The violence is aimed at doing real
physical injury to those attacked and does not follow "the rules of disorder" outlined by
Peter Marsh; 6, the police are seen as legitimate targets for violence; 7, the football
crowd itself is used as a place to stage violence and as a place to escape police attempts
at identification and apprehension; and 8, the result of violence prone supporter
activities can accelerate crowd activity or be a precipitating event in a collective
outburst, thus giving the impression that large segments of the crowd actively support
the violence.
Violence seeking supporters are often attached to subcultural or political groups who
support violence such as the National Front 17 who are active at Ibrox and
Tynecastle.18 Their actions are difficult to separate from that of the crowd when there
16. For further information on violent supporters arrested at matches see John White, A Social-
Legal Approach To Football Hooliganism. Edinburgh Ph. D. 1985.
17. Similar information was found by Mr. Justice Popplewell, (Chairman), Committee Of Inquiry
Into Crowd Safety And Control At Sports Grounds. Interim Report. London, 1985, pp. 39.
18. The National Front is active selling their newspaper Bulldog outside both Ibrox and Tynecastle
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is a common sentiment between the violence prone individual and the clamjamfry but
when there is conflict between the two, the individual engaging in violence may put
himself at risk of reprisal by the clamjamfry, including being handed over to the police.
19 In this way collective crowd activity can and is often non-violent, although some
outside observers would call the crowd activity hooliganism.
The violence prone individual in Scotland can accelerate the collective process toward
violence only if the crowd is at the point where a precipitating incident could be
effective. However, most of these incidents are viewed by the crowd as individual acts
that do not represent the collective sentiment of the crowd and thus are not supported.
At Ibrox, during half-time in a match between Rangers and Celtic a Celtic supporter
jumped on to the track around the pitch, ran toward the Rangers end and attacked the
first Rangers supporter he found. The supporter was immediately and mercilessly
beaten up by several Rangers supporters before the police arrive to rescue and arrest
him. Not one Celtic or Rangers supporter followed the individual's lead despite heated
verbal exchanges over religious intolerance because neither support group wanted to
have the second half cancelled due to their activities. The focus of the support groups
was on football, not on collective violence, so what could have been a precipitating
incident was seen rather as an individual act of stupidity.
Groups of violence-seeking persons at matches can have an increased effect on the
crowds activity over that of individuals. If large groups go to matches to seek violence
they can do so in two distinct styles; one by attacking isolated groups of supporters
Parks. Rangers supporters have been witnessed to give Nazi salutes while singing God Save The
Queen, a National Front hallmark.
19. This type of activity has been witnessed at Parkhead and Annfield where individuals tried to start
fights only to be set upon by the clamjamfry, severely beaten and bloodied and then handed over
to the police, when they arrived.
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before, during and after the match and two by antagonising one of the two support
groups into collective violence. Group activity can quickly accelerate collective action
in response to threats or actual attack. As Smelser notes, the collective process allows
for new situations of strain to emerge within a known situation and sharp new
deprivations to become apparent, thus allowing those involved to shift their attention
and react accordingly. 20 In the case of groups seeking violence, the crowd's reaction
can accelerate the collective process very quickly since there is no minimum or
maximum time frame for a crowd to take action. If a group attacks the clamjamfry the
collective response will be quick and coordinated because of the ongoing terrace
relationships between supporters. The resulting collective violence will follow a format
similar to that between support groups with those not wanting to participate leaving the
area and with others joining in.
The casuals originated in Aberdeen as a generally middle class group who went to
matches to start trouble against visiting or home support. They enter the terraces and
walk around looking for violence, but only start trouble if the fight is one they can win.
Even though the casuals started as a middle class phenomenon in Aberdeen, the fad has
spread to other Premier Division and some First Division clubs. Many casuals have
been recruited by formal letters sent to known football supporters, most being members
of official supporters clubs, of all major clubs. 21 As a result of active recruitment,
many members are now of working class origin, but still wear smart clothes, no
scarves, and are organised on a club by club basis. They view themselves as
representing the tough violent part of the support group.
20. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.
21. Unfortunately the letter was sent out while research was being conducted in England and as a
result a copy was unavailable for this study.
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The clamjamfry of any club can identify the casuals quite easily. Celtic supporters in
the Jungle often see the casuals in their own ranks or in the opposition support and sing
"casuals, casuals, come on in, casuals, casuals, come on in". Since the casuals are
usually small in number they will not actively engage a large clamjamfry in violence,
but instead attack isolated supporters outside the ground or go to poorly attended
matches to start trouble. Just as in the triangular crowd, casuals need numerical
equality to make the risk involved acceptable. Since the casuals of all clubs represent a
small segment of the support, their activities are restricted to minor altercations, usually
before or after matches.
The casuals fit into and follow the crowd pattern, in that they actively join in the
collectivity or they create their own isolated group on the terraces. When the casuals
join in with the clamjamfry, they often provide leaders who intensify crowd activity by
engaging in actions that the normal clamjamfry would not. Through animated and
provocative actions, casual leaders may move the clamjamfry towards collective action,
although these actions often result in police response. If the leader is too animated in
his actions, the police will often move in and remove the individual and others nearby
who support him. The removal of a casual leader may meet with general approval by
the clamjamfry or be seen as a provocative act. This can intensify the crowd situation
through new leaders appearing and orchestrating animosity towards the police. The
most common result of police intervention in Scotland, is the tension in the clamjamfry
being reduced with the supporters reducing the number of chants and returning their
attention to the match.
From personal observations and interviews with Hearts, Hibs and Celtic supporters,
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the casuals are not a major influence on the Scottish football terraces. The casuals are
generally too young to be an effective force within the crowd and thus limit their
activities to minor violence in and around the ground. Although most clubs have some
kind of group that call themselves casuals, they are not automatically welcome in the
support groups. The casuals claim to represent the club in battles with other
supporters, a view not held by most in the clamjamfry. As a result the casuals operate
on the fringe of football, creating the odd incident, but generally being too small in
number to cause any major trouble on their own. Their main influence on football
violence is to incite the clamjamfry into possible collective action.
Influences on the terraces in Scotland are distinctly different to those in England. As
previously noted, religion is the main influence on Scottish terraces despite the presence
of the casuals. Religious bigotry provides a common cause for many terrace
supporters, and influences the organisation of all terrace activities, including collective
violence. Organisations like the Orange Order within the Ibrox support, while not as
strong the National Front in some English clubs, have influence throughout the
terraces. The National Front is also active at Ibrox and when combined with the
Orange Order provides strong leadership in opposition to the Catholic community in
Scotland. The National Front is active in organising English attacks on Scottish
supporters in London and Glasgow, which is an anomaly since they are active at Ibrox
and Tynecastle. With the Skin heads at Easter Road, Catholic influences at Celtic Park
and the casuals at Pittodrie most major Scottish clubs have some kind of outside
organization to influence terrace behavior. Despite the presence of these influences on
the Scottish terraces they are not as influential as their counterparts in England. 22
Even without major organisational influences, the percentage of supporters who engage
22. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit.. pp. 39.
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in collective action is far greater in Scotland than in England. 23
Nationalism is one influence that cuts across all sectarian and club boundaries in
Scotland. Almost every football enthusiast in Scotland supports the national side,
either in an active or passive role. Scottish supporters will follow their team anywhere,
in vast numbers, to support one of the few symbols of national identity left to them.
Club and religious issues are forgotten as the tartan is worn in common cause of
national pride and victory. Every May 24 when Scotland play in the annual game
against the "Auld Enemy" most Scots unite to beat the English. The tradition of all
Scottish travelling support is non-violent. Scottish supporters have celebrated victories
on the Wembley pitch, only to be branded as 'football hooligans' by the English press,
the Football Association, and Parliament. 25 English supporters have until recently
stayed away from the match at Hampden, but recently have caused trouble in Glasgow
after the match, only to be dealt with severely by the Strathclyde Police. 26 They are
23. Also see Stephen Wagg, The Football World: A Contemporary Social History. Brighton,
1984, pp. 207.
24. The Scotland versus England match is the oldest international football fixture in the world.
Scots set aside money every week for the bi-annual trip to London. Up to two hundred thousand
Scots travel to London for the match even though Wembeley Stadium only holds one hundred
thousand spectators. The trip to London, the drink, the weekend out, taking the mickey out of
the English, and the game draw Scots by the thousands to London every other year. Every form
of transportation is completely booked, as the "Tartan Army" invades London. For most, the
trip to London is an over exuberant celebration with little or no malice towards their English
hosts. As in every support group there are always a few who go beyond the bounds of control
and cause trouble. Any trouble involving the Scots tends to be over exaggerated by the English
press and exploited by the Football Association, who want to end the travelling tradition of the
Scottish supporters by moving the match to Wednesday night.
See John Rafferty, One Hundred Years Of Scottish Football. London 1973. pp. 61.
25. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.
26. In the match between Scotland and England at Hampden Park in 1985, approximately 300
National Front turned up in the Scottish terraces and taunted the Scottish supporters. The police
moved in and removed the English supporters. Many of the National Front supporters were
severely treated by the police, who 'helped them from the terraces onto busses and back into
England'.
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influenced by the National Front and have rioted all over Europe in the past ten
years.27 The Scottish support may be over-exuberant, but they rarely if ever get into
trouble. 28 If the situation does develop where action is required, the Scottish
supporters can become one of the largest collective crowds in regards to the number
involved in mass violence. 29 • 30
Despite the lack of influence by the casuals in Scotland, they and other more powerful
subcultural groups that appear on the English terraces can be described as a "subculture
of violence", as formulated by Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti. 31 Since these
subcultures are often seeking violence they can have a noticeable influence on the
collective structure of the crowd, increasing the possibility of large scale violence. 32
With the decline of subcultural identities such as the Mods, Rockers, Skin Heads, and
Punks, football has been identified as a place for violence, replacing previous areas for
staging violence which have been effectively closed off by the police. The subcultural
problem is most evident in England since the groups are more organised and dedicated
to violence.
The subculture of violence approach may not provide a complete framework for the
analysis of collective football crowd activity but it may help to explain why certain
individuals go to matches and seek violence. The violent supporter can be part of a
subculture of violence or naturally violent in a biological 33 or anthropological
Personal interview with an Edinburgh Police Sergeant on duty at the match, May 1985.
27. John Williams, et. al., Hooligans Abroad: The Behaviour And Control Of English Fans In
Continental Europe. London, 1984.
28. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.
29. New Society. 14 May 1981, pp.253.
30. Stephen Wagg, Op. Cit.. pp. 207.
31. Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture Of Violence. London 1967.
32. Stanley Cohen, Op, Cit.. pp. 19-20.
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sense,34' 35 both of which contend certain individuals are born more violent than
others. In either case, these contentions help explain differential participation in
collective action. 36 The violent supporter and the supporter with subcultural
affiliations have "pre-existing orientations and perceive the situation from the outset as
one in which certain attitudes and actions are appropriate". 37 As a result of media
coverage, football has become a place for subcultures and violent individuals to go and
engage in desired violent activity. Since these individuals are part of the crowd they
may increase the rate at which the crowd moves toward collective action, the probability
of violence, the amount of violence, the duration of the violence, and influence those
against whom the violence is aimed. Before the crowd becomes violent these
individuals or groups are almost impossible to distinguish unless they engage in
animated or leadership behaviour. Consequently they are only distinguishable as the
main protagonists in collective violence once it starts.
Violence In The Ground
In Smelser's framework for the analysis of collective behaviour, leaders emerged at this
point to take the crowd into violence. Leaders have existed in football crowds starting
chants and other non-violent terrace activity since the beginning of the crowd
formation. 38 Once the crowd has reached the mobilisation for action, previously
established leaders may continue to lead the crowd into violence or new leaders, as
Smelser suggests, may emerge. 39' 40 Leaders who emerge to lead violent activity
33. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression. New York, 1966.
34. Robert Ardrey, African Genesis. New York, 1963.
35. Ashley Montegu, Man And Aggression. Oxford, 1968.
36. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 93.
37. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit,. pp. 93.
38. See Chapter Four under the subheading Leaders, where this point is discussed.
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are often "hard men" or violence seeking individuals who use crowd activity to engage
in violence. 41, 42 It is these individuals who often respond to precipitating events
and take the crowd into collective violence. Without a leadership response the crowd
will not respond to a precipitating event. Leaders play an important role in the structure,
organisation and duration of the violence.
The Heysel Stadium riot followed a pattern similar to patterns of violence at the
Hampden Park riot. Leaders of the violence from the Liverpool supporters charged
into the Juventus support. Taking advantage of poor crowd segregation and few
physical barriers, crowd leaders were able to attack the Juventus support on the terraces
with large numbers following behind. The leaders charged the Juventus support who
retreated under fist and missile bombardment, just as would happen in a battle on the
pitch. The leaders and the organisation of the violence itself reflect the structure of the
terraces with the violent supporter emerging from the clamjamfry to engage in collective
violence. After the initial success of the violent supporters, the Liverpool clamjamfry
occupied the area vacated by the Juventus support. The deaths caused by the terrace
invasion by the Liverpool support were not the result of physical violence, but due to
the panic caused when average supporters tried to leave the area. The panic caused a
wall to collapse and the supporters died from being crushed or suffocated.
Leaders or violence - disposed 43 individuals often go to football matches as a place
where violence can be participated in in relative safety from arrest. After a violent
39. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 255.
40. also see Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 89-90.
41. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., The Rules Of Disorder. London, 1978.
42. also see Peter Marsh. Aggro The Illusion Of Violence. London, 1978.
43. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Criminal Behaviour A Psychosocial Approach. Englewood
Cliffs, 1986, pp. 150.
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incident in Cardiff between Cardiff and Manchester United supporters, Paul Harrison
interviewed one supporter who used football as a staging arena for violence.
" 'I go to a match for one reason only: the aggro. Its an obsession, I
can't give it up. I get so much pleasure when I am having aggro that I
nearly wet my pants - it's true. I go all over the country looking for it.
I couldn't sleep all last night, I got so worked up looking forward to this
match. ... Before the match we go around looking respectable (he has
a shirt and smart trousers on); then if someone looks like the enemy, we
ask him the time. If he answers in a foreign accent, we do him over,
and if he's got any money on him we roll him as well.' Having entered
the opposition the supporter said, 'then we saw one of our lads - he
wears irons on his leg-out on the dock getting his head kicked in. There
were only eight of us against twenty of them, but we were beating them
till the police came. This scarf I got here, the bloke I got it off was
bleeding from everywhere on his face when I'd finished. . . . You've
got to keep proving yourself that way.' " 44
This type of statement is typical of individuals who use football as a staging ground for
violence. In many instances football grounds have become a legitimate place for youth
to seek violence for violences sake, football is a secondary issue for these individuals.
The violence at Chelsea, Luton, and in Brussels indicates an increasing use of football
grounds as a staging platform for semi-organised violence. This type of violence is
much more evident in England than Scotland, although Scotland does have a problem
with 'the casuals'. 45'46
At this point in the value-added theory, Smelser uses the concept of "short-circuiting"
to explain the change in the crowd - from a passive to an active. 47 Before short-
circuiting can occur, the crowd must have passed through all the stages of the value-
44. Paul Harrison, "Soccers Tribal Wars", New Society. 5 September 1974, pp. 603.
45. See chapter one for a definition of casual supporters.
46. The BBC has conducted further research into organised violence and has shown interviews with
individuals claiming to go to chosen matches simply for the purpose of violence. BBC
5 August 1986.
47. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 103.
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added theory of collective behaviour. The concepts under the generalised belief,
responsibility, anxiety, generalised aggression, and omnipotence are exaggerated to a
specific belief in the crowd's ability to alter the existing situation. 48 The movement
from generalised beliefs to the exaggerated ability takes more than a simple concept of
short-circuiting. Fusing of wires in an electrical connection creates a short-circuit, and
applying this concept to the crowd is questionable. Smelser defines the concept as:
"Short-circuiting involves the jump from extremely high levels of
generality to specific, concrete situations". 49
Although the definition is useful to the analysis of football crowds, the terminology is
not. The term short-circuiting needs to be replaced with a more accurate definition, the
focusing process. Since most football crowds reach a level of crowd behaviour near
the short-circuiting level a further development is necessary to bridge the gap between
the passive and active crowd. The reason the two opposing support groups do not
clash at every match is because the attention and focus of the fans is on football, not on
each other. Before during and after the match the support group's main focus is on the
game and other issues like getting to and from the match. Only when the focus
switches from the match to each other will collective action take place.
The focusing process, does as Smelser indicates bridge the gap between the passive or,
in this case, ritualistic crowd to the active crowd. The focusing process can clearly be
observed in the crowd at specific times. The focus of attention moves from point to
point throughout the match, depending on the activities on the field. Before the match
the supporters will focus on each other, but the crowd has not passed through the
48. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 102.
49. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 82.
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requisite steps for collective action and the overriding influence is the anticipation of the
game so little violence will occur. During the game, play on the pitch keeps the focus
of the supporters off one another. While inside the ground physical barriers prohibit
easy movement of supporters and help prevent focusing taking place.50 Focusing
takes place when the attention of the supporters switches from the game to one another.
This can be seen when the supporters divert their vision from the pitch, or other object,
to the opposition support. This is usually accomplished through head and eye
movement. As the focusing intensifies on the opposition support, the ability to analyze
conflicting information is intentionally diminished as total blame and a desire to punish
those responsible intensifies. When focusing takes place in conjunction with a
precipitating incident, violent collective action will follow.
The discussion in Chapter Five indicates the importance of the precipitating incident in
collective behaviour. If the crowd is not focused on the opposition support then a
precipitating act may go unnoticed. When the focusing process has occurred the
precipitating incident will start large scale collective violence despite the physical
barriers that are placed in the way. Once the violence starts, violent supporters and
casuals will immediately go to the point of conflict and those who are opposed or afraid
of the violence will move away and simply observe the carnage.
Once the focus of the support groups is on one another, leaders of the support groups
have responded to a precipitating incident, the situation usually deteriorates as the
opposing sides prepare for battle. Where the confrontation takes place will determine
the scale and organisation of the violence. 51 Physical barriers which limit contact area
50. See the, Guide To Safety At Sports Grounds. London, 1976, for a description of all the
requirements for crush barriers and other safety features which help keep supporters separated.
51. See Chapter Four for the discussion about the football setting and it's effect on crowd violence.
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may restrict the numbers actually fighting and force other participants to throw objects
at one another. This is the case if there are fences between the support groups, until
they are torn down or circumvented, only a few individuals will actually fight while the
rest of the participants are restricted to other forms of violence. End invasions follow
similar patterns due to the presence of crush barriers with the fighting being restricted to
the relative few leading the invasion and those trying to stop it. Most supporters simply
leave the terraces. If the violence takes place on the pitch a totally different organisation
will develop. The clamjamfry, along with anyone else who wishes to participate will
charge down the pitch towards the opposition support. When contact is made fights
will break out between the violence seeking participants who are usually in the forefront
of the charge down the pitch. Other participants will throw missiles at one another
from various distances and avoid the fist fights due to caution or there is no room to get
through to the opposition support. The actual contact does not last very long as fist
fights are of generally short duration. One or both sides will retreat from the point of
contact leaving a 'no man's land', which is then maintained for the rest of the collective
episode. The no man's land provides a buffer between the two sides which allows
each side to take turns charging into it and launching fist and missile attacks on the
opposition before retreating. These lines of demarcation are maintained through out the
collective action and are influenced by the size of the pitch. The barriers which keep
the supporters off the pitch also keep the combatants on it; crowd leaders and police
intervention also affect demarcation lines. 52
One major factor influences all collective behaviour, especially football crowd violence,
identification. Although not isolated by Smelser as a component of the 'mobilization
52. See Appendix A for a full description of the Hampden Park Riot of 1980 which emphasise this
point.
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for action', identification of the opposition is necessary in any collective action.
Without an identifiable opposition no organised collective violence can take place.
Identification of opposition symbols can be in the form of inanimate objects such as
building, the opposition support group, or the police. Each of these symbols requires
an identifying mark which can include, signs, scarves and uniforms. These identifying
signs or symbols allow the opposition to focus its attention, engage the enemy, and
organise the violence. Without identification collective action can not have any
organisation and thus collapses into individual actions.
Support groups identify each other by their dress. The scarves, hats shirts, and
trousers in team colours instantly identify the individual's loyalty. If anyone can be
identified as the opposition support, they become a legitimate target for violence. If
there is no identification except for the isolation of the support groups on the terraces
then little violence can take place because the lines of demarcation will quickly become
blurred, preventing any long term organised violence. Even though the support groups
are segregated by tradition at all grounds this still allows for identification of the
opposition which facilitates ritualised behaviour patterns of singing and chanting. It is
only when collective action does occur that the identification factor becomes most
important. When pitch invasions occur the opposition must be identifiable throughout
the incident. Scarves worn by the supporters identify friend and foe, allowing each
side to stay together in collective moves. Without identification, the no man's land
would not develop, the supporters on each side would mix and the collective nature of
each side would break down.
The identification factor is extremely important for the supporters on their way to and
from the ground. When the crowd is not developed and supporters are on their own or
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in groups, identification is necessary for attacks on opposition supporters. If the
supporters are not wearing scarves, the risk of attack is reduced because of the
ambiguity created in not being able to differentiate between friend and foe. Many
supporters take advantage of this by hiding scarves under their clothing while outside
the ground thus reducing the chance of being attacked. If large numbers of home
supporters do not wear scarves outside the ground, visiting supporters may turn their
point of attack to shops and houses in the community. By damaging property in the
city the visiting supporters have "left their mark". Without an identifying symbol,
individuals are generally excluded from collective violence because they are not
recognised as a participant. Collective violence against an unidentified opposition has
no meaning since no claim can be made by the victors as to whom they fought.
The police and other forms of social control play an important role in the scope and
duration of collective violence. 53 The police react to all violence at matches. The
police strength and tactics will determine the response of the leaders in the support
groups. If the police are ill-equipped, the crowd may turn on the police or continue to
fight one another. When the police intervene, they may become the focal point of the
support groups. The focus of the support groups can change from one another to the
police, if they are seen as a legitimate target. This creates the triangular crowd, with
one or both support groups fighting the police.
In England, the police are legitimate targets for crowd action. Their intervention often
alters the focus of the participants from the opposing support group to the police. This
is influenced by crowd leaders who turn their hostilities on the police when they
intervene and prevent the support group from fighting the opposition support. In
53. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.. pp. 256.
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Scotland, the supporters do not change their focus from support group hostility to the
police. The influence of religious intolerance, mass crowd participation and police
reputation keeps the focus of the supporters on one another. One major reason for not
attacking the police in Glasgow may be the reputation they have for long memories and
heavy handed retaliation against those who assault them. 54
Violence before or during a match can usually be controlled because the crowd is
divided. Part of the crowd is focused on the violence while the majority is still focused
on the match. As previously noted, most violence takes place after the match or after an
important goal is scored late in the game. With the game over or near the end, the focus
of the support groups changes more easily from the match to violence. Celebrations by
one group of supporters over a victory, especially one achieved through a late goal in
an important match, can be matched by frustrations of the losing team's supporters.
"Hostility data collected at the (American) football games indicated that,
regardless of team preference and the outcome of the game, subjects
were significantly more hostile after observing the game than
before.
The verdict on the pitch can have a profound effect on the support groups. The
winning support group is happy, they have helped their team to victory while the
loosing supporters have failed in their effort. As previously noted, the identity with the
team, winning and losing, excitement seeking, and self-esteem, can all be affected by
the outcome of the match. Hostility, generalised aggression and crowd structure
influence the shift of support group focus through increased frustration after a loss by
54. A detailed discussion of the effect of the police on crowd disorder appears in the following
section of this chapter.
55. Jeffery Goldstein and Robert Arms, "Effects Of Observing Athletic Contests On Hostility",
Sociometrv. 34-1, 1971, pp. 88.
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the team.
. . emotional stress in spectators may well be as great or greater than
the physical effort put out by the athletes they watch ..." 56
Winning supporters or supporters of both teams after a draw are usually happy with the
result, unless the game was violent. For supporters of a losing team, frustration may
set in and lead to aggression. Frustration aggression 57 can be a major reason for
after-match spectator group clashes as supporters of the losing team try to vindicate
their team by defeating the opposition support in battle.
"Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of
responses, one of which is and instigation to some form of
violence".58
Frustration aggression theory is divided over the impact of viewing athletic contests on
individuals, but in given circumstances losing can create frustration related
violence.59' 60 The circumstances are directly related to the importance of the match,
Cup and important League matches often produce great anxiety and expectations of
victory. When defeat is the match verdict, frustration aggression can result if the
opportunity for violence is present. 61'62
56. M. Roberts, Fans! How We Go Crazy Over Sport. Washington D. C., 1976, pp. 15.
57. John Dollard et. al„ Frustration Aggression. London, 1944.
58. Neil Miller et. al., "The Frustration Aggression Hypothesis", in Leon Berkowitz ed., Roots
Of Aggression. New York, 1969, pp. 30.
59. Lloyd Slone, "The Function And Impact Of Sport For Fans: A Review Of Theory And
Contemporary Research", in Geffery Goldstein ed., Sport. Games And Plav: Social And
Psychological Viewpoints. Hillsdale, 1979.
60. Jeffery Goldstein and Robert Arms, Op. Cit.. pp. 88.
61. Leonard Berkowitz, "The Frustration Aggression Hypothesis Revisited", in Leonard Berkowitz
ed., Roots Of Aggression. New York, 1969, pp. 16.
62. The contentions of Leonard Berkowitz and the others cited are supported by personal
observations of football matches in Scotland. General aggression levels are increased as a result
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The most common response to frustration is verbal abuse, 63 which makes frustration
aggression impossible to distinguish from ritualised terrace behaviour. When
frustration is present in the crowd, it becomes an intermittent variable which can have a
direct influence on collective behaviour process. As Smelser indicated in his 1972
observations, psychological variables are important in the crowd and its ability to
become violent. ^ 65 If the expectation of victory, the anxiety created by the match,
and tension are high, a late goal or bad foul by the opposition will increase frustration
and help place the blame for the deprivation on the opposition support. Frustration
aggression created by a loss quickens the identification of the opposition support as
being responsible for the loss. It also channels generalised aggression, helps
exaggerate the omnipotence and desire to punish those responsible, and helps move the
focus on to the opposition support. All that is needed for collective violence is a
precipitating incident.
When violence occurs at the end of the match, the focus of those involved is totally on
the violence. For those not involved in violence the focus is on avoiding trouble,
watching the events, or leaving the area. Without the influence of the match to divert
the majority of supporters' focus, collective violence can become far more wide spread,
including more participants, be more destructive, have a stronger organization, and last
longer. The violent supporter often becomes extremely aggressive with little regard for
human life or personal property. Although few deaths result from collective violence at
of a loss, especially a loss against a specific rival or in matches of great importance.
63. Jay Coakley, Sport In Society: Issues And Controversies. St. Louis, 1987, pp. 77.
64. Neil Smelser, "Some Additional Thoughts On Collective Behaviour", in Merideth Pugh, ed.,
Collective Behaviour: A Source Book. New York 1980.
65. Neil Smelser, "Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in
James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence. Chicago 1972.
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matches many serious injuries occur, either through direct fighting or by being hit by
thrown bricks and bottles. Peter Marsh described collective violence as ritualistic, the
same as the non-violent crowd actions. 66' 67 Collective violence associated with
football has an organisation, but this should not be regarded as ritualistic behaviour.
Most participants in collective violence in Scotland intend to cause as much pain
suffering and physical damage as possible to opposition supporters. The lack of actual
injuries and deaths in violent incidents is the result of the lack of weapons 68 and
police intervention. Police action to control collective violence often disrupts the
organisation and the contact combatants have with one another. This usually restricts
the amount of physical damage done because individuals try to avoid arrest by running
away from the police.
Violence Outside The Ground
Before The Match
Crowd violence takes place outside grounds before and after matches as well inside the
ground.69 Often violence before and after matches receives more press coverage than
violence in the ground due to extensive property damage, despite the fact that fewer
people participate. The amount of violence outside grounds is dependent on the size of
the travelling support. Clubs with large travelling support like Rangers, Celtic and to a
lesser extent Hearts, have greater potential for collective violence at all times, but
66. Peter Marsh, Aggro. The Illusion Of Violence. London, 1978.
67. Peter Marsh et. al., The Rules Of Disorder. London, 1978.
68. In England weapons are more common at matches. On 9 March 1985 London Transport Police
searched supporters on their way to see Southampton play at Chelsea. Numerous Stanley
knives were dropped by supporters before being searched by the police.
69. During the course of the research no violence was observed before a match.
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especially outside grounds they visit. Like an invading army, large travelling support
enter a host city and are usually escorted to the match by police escorts in an effort to
prevent trouble. Since the focus of the supporters is on the game, the potential for
violence before the match is limited in Scotland. Once the game is over the focus of the
supporters is no longer on the match and the possibility of violence is increased. 70
Reputations for violence, religious intolerance, inter-city rivalry, blocked access to
violence in the ground, and nationalism all influence the possibility of violence outside
the ground. 71
The travelling accommodation, specifically special trains and coaches, can have the
same effect on the supporters as standing on the terraces. The crowd, although in this
case in a smaller segmented situation, can build through the value-added framework to
collective action. The build-up to the match begins when the supporters gather with
common identification, tradition, reputation, and hatred of the opposition. This often
takes place within the confines of transportation to the match, either home or away.
The building block system of the value-added framework can be accelerated by the
confines of transportation due to the increased facility for communication, rumour
transmission, and expectations about the match. Rumours bring out past grievances
over previous matches, religious differences, inter-city rivalry, the police, and the
opposition supporters. These grievances can heighten desires for violence to pay off
old debts.
Heightened tensions and hostility are also accelerated by alcohol. Many supporters'
70. Despite wide spread beliefs that "football hooligans" do large amounts of property damage, only
minor incidents were observed over the course of the research.
71. These contentions are supported by interviews conducted with the Edinburgh Police,
16 to 19 December 1982.
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club coaches continue to stop at a pub on the way to and from the match and alcohol is
taken on trains by supporters. 72 Under the influence of alcohol, crowd cohesiveness,
general aggression and willingness to participate in collective activity is increased.
When supporters arrive in a city for the match, the walk from the train station or coach
park to the stadium can be long and bring opposing supporters together for the first
time. When the support groups meet, running battles may develop. The battles are
usually fast moving because the supporters want to get to the ground, so have few
participants, and result in only limited police intervention. During these running
battles, shop windows may be broken by visiting supporters. This is often done
because the shops represent the local team and the city of the opposition. When
windows are broken and other property damage done, it degrades the area, the local
team, its support, and enhances the reputation of those who do the damage. The
damage is not as Ian Taylor might infer, an act of working class youth against an upper
class business. 73 Most of the football grounds in Scotland are located in working
class areas and the shops reflect the social situation in which they exist. The damage is
done to degrade the town, the area around the stadium, and the opposition team.
"We smash windows just to make the road look like the ground, a pile
of 'shite', just like Hibs". 74
In many instances once trouble has started, supporters will damage property just for the
fun of it, and because they are protected from easy detection by the crowd.
"We just smash up Easter Road for the fun of it, and to show those
Catholic bastards Rangers are here". 75
72. These practices are prohibited by the Criminal Justice Scotland Act, 1980, but the practice
continues.
73. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness And Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen ed.. Images
Of Deviance. Harmondsworth, 1971.
74. Personal interview with a Rangers supporter on Easter Road, Edinburgh, 7 May 1983.
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It must be noted, like most aspects of football crowd violence, the situation in Scotland
is different from that in England. The differences are acute on transportation and
violence outside the ground. In England, the destruction caused by travelling
supporters has at times been frequent and often extensive. Manchester United
supporters were notorious for the damage they could do to towns on their way to and
from away matches. Once Manchester United supporters had established a reputation
for damage and destruction before, during and after matches, a contest developed
between the supporters and the police in each city to see which one would be successful
in their quest. Supporters' trains would be met by large numbers of police, escorted to
the ground, closely supervised in the ground, escorted back to the train station and sent
home. If the police are successful, only minor damage occurs, but on many occasions
supporters were able to do considerable amounts of damage to transportation and
property. The opportunity for collective violence and property damage is often aided
by home supporters who actively seek confrontations. Defeat of a known violent
support group transfers the reputation to the victorious supporters. Chelsea, Leeds
United, Derby County and Millwall all have reputations for violence which necessitate a
large police deployment and an increased possibility of home support confrontation.
In Scotland, the problem of the invading army style of travelling support has been
limited. Celtic, Rangers and Hearts have the largest travelling support. Other teams
can gather large travelling support for special games. For most Scottish clubs the
tradition of destroying property and transportation has never taken hold, although there
are always exceptions. The few isolated incidents of violence and property damage
outside grounds is almost exclusively restricted to Derby matches; Rangers versus
Celtic, Hibs versus Hearts, Dundee United versus Dundee and Morton versus St.
75. Personal interview with a Rangers supporter on Easter Road, Edinburgh, 7 May 1983.
244
Mirren. Violent incidents rarely occur on transportation to the match. Destroying
buses or trains can result in a long walk home, high probability of arrest, and the
distinct possibility of missing the game.
After The Match
After the match, trouble is far more likely to occur. When supporters' groups exit from
the excitement and control of the stadium, the freedom of city streets can provide the
perfect opportunity to vent anger and frustrations built up during the game. The crowd
structure breaks up to a limited extent on exit from the ground, except for units within
the crowd, casuals and the clamjamfry. Maintaining a structure combined with new
opportunities the support groups often find that the post match exit from the ground is
the best opportunity for violence to take place. The effect is enhanced due to the lack of
the ground structure, physical barriers and easy police control. As a result, the police
deploy extra officers to segregate the supporters groups after the match when they leave
the stadium and on their way into city centres. 76
76. Grounds like Easter Road and Celtic Park offer good natural segregation routes for supporters
leaving the ground. Ibrox and Tynecastle offer little or no natural segregation for the police to
use. The exits from Tynecastle allow the Hearts support to fill the road in front and behind the
visiting support resulting in many bricks, bottles and fists raining in on the opposition support.
As a result violence often takes place outside these grounds. Gorgie Road outside Tynecastle
Park has often been the scene of violence as Hearts surround the opposition support to drive
them out of town. Even with the modern facilities at Ibrox Park, the exits allow the opposing
support groups to mix in front of the stadium. Bus and Underground routes require the support
groups to cross paths, creating the opportunity for violence, which often happens when Rangers
play Celtic. Several pitched battles have developed outside Ibrox Stadium as a result of the
supporters crossing paths on their way out of the ground. Celtic Park has excellent natural
segregation for supporters leaving the ground. The police can keep the support groups separated
along city streets until they reach Glasgow city centre. This often results in fights taking place
around the city after the police presence has decreased. Despite the good naturally segregated
egress routes from Easter Road, Hibs support have been able to get in behind the opposition
support on Bothwell street and chase them onto Bothwell Street Bridge which is narrow. The
245
Much of the violence that takes place outside football grounds in Scotland is perpetrated
generally by young supporters who see violent activity as a necessary element in the
general football activities. Many young supporters appear to have the misconception
that some kind of violence or property damage is a normal part of going to a match.
When no violence takes place in the ground then the emphasis shifts to outside the
stadium. Much of the misconception supporting violence at matches is gained from the
media and stories of past activities surrounding matches. Young supporters may
engage in violence to gain status and fulfil expectations of violence not fulfilled in the
ground. The casuals can always add to the possibility of violence after a match by
attacking groups of supporters. As previously noted, casuals tend to be young which
is one factor in their choice of opposition who are also generally young. Young
supporters, using the opportunity of the streets after a match are more likely to become
involved in minor violence and property damage. When older supporters become
involved the violence and damage becomes greater.
The police are often at their greatest disadvantage when trying to control supporters on
their way out of the ground. The police have large areas to cover which allows
violence seeking individuals or groups to avoid quick detection and become involved in
violence and property damage. When the police are notified or detect the violence, the
offenders have the time and opportunity to escape arrest by running off into side roads,
through back gardens, fields or anywhere else the police will not likely follow. Often
resulting pile up of supporters trying to crowd the bridge gives Hibs supporters the opportunity
to throw stones, bottles and glass, often causing severe injuries. Hibs supporters and Hearts
supporters often meet each other in St James Centre, on Rose Street and George Street to fight
and do property damage because the police are often not around to keep them apart and stop
potential trouble.
246
the police response is to simply keep the violence and property damage to a minimum
by dispersing collective groups. 77
The trip home after the match is when most of the damage is done to trains and buses.
If there has been violence in the ground or after the match, it may be carried over onto
buses and trains. If the visiting team lost the match, supporters may vent their
frustrations by destroying seats and other part of the buses or trains. This type of
collective violence is part of the same collective crowd violence that takes place in the
ground and after the match. All the same elements of the value-added theory of
collective behaviour are necessary for destruction of transportation as is required for
fighting opposing supporters, it simply takes place in a small confined space and the
violence is aimed at an inanimate object. The focal point becomes the carriage, which
can easily be destroyed by collective violence.
This type of collective action is far more prevalent in England than Scotland. 78 Trains
and buses have a long history of being destroyed in England. Without any kind of
police presence on most trains supporters often engage in collective destructive action.
Once a precipitating event takes place an entire carriage load of supporters can destroy it
in a few minutes. Although not as prevalent now, competitions existed between
support groups to see who could do the most damage to British Rail trains. Carriages
had their seats torn out, windows broken, toilets destroyed and cars set alight.
77. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police 16-19 December 1982.
78. In the six years of watching an average of two matches a week during the season and travelling
on all kinds of transportation, trains, buses, football special trains, and supporters buses, not
one incident of vandalism was witnessed. Over the same period several incidents occurred in
England. The major type of vandalism against transportation in Scotland involved Hibs fans
throwing bricks at opposition supporters' busses as they left Easter Road.
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Social Control
Social control is the final element in Smelser's value-added theory of collective
behaviour. Social control has effects on all the elements of the value-added framework.
"The operation of social control, in certain respects this final determinant
arches over all the others. ... the study of social control is the study
of those counter-determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect or inhibit
the accumulation of the determinants just reviewed." 79
Social control takes two distinct forms in football crowds; informal and formal.
Informal social controls are all types of personal and societal restraints that prevent
individuals and crowds from acting in an anti social manner.
"Social control involves the institutionalizing of respect for law and for
orderly means of expressing grievances. It involves the alleviating of
conditions of strain which generate dissatisfactions. It involves the
softening of prejudice and discrimination which deepen social
cleavages. It involves the minimizing of divisiveness among ruling
groups in society". °°
Smelser did not differentiate between formal and informal social control in the crowd,
but in football crowds both operate independently of one another. Formal social
control is the responsibility of the state through the police and the club. Informal social
control operates within the crowd itself and reflects the attitudes of the people,
especially those who denounce all violence at football matches.
79. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 17.
80. Neil Smelser, Op, Cit.. pp. 17.
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Informal Social Control
Informal social control is part of every crowd. Each person entering the terraces brings
with him or her a certain set of social values and norms of behaviour which are
reflected in every person's behaviour and thus by the crowd as a whole. 81 Social
bonds 82 are why the vast majority of football supporters behave totally within the
bounds of normal social acceptability. Any crowd situation or series of triangular
crowd situations where collective action takes place incorporate the breakdown of social
bonds or social restraint in the individual through the crowd's influence.83 There is a
direct correlation between the increase in crowd influence, progression through the
value-added framework, and the decrease in the effect of internal social control on the
individual. 84 When collective violence takes place, those who do not participate
directly usually stand and watch the violence. Reasons for non-participation or
differential participation 85 include; personal behaviour standards, lack of identification
with the crowd action, fear of injury, the deterrent effect of the police, age, material
wealth, sex, values, and immediate associates are all major influences on individual
participation in collective violence. 86 Older supporters with a good job, female
companion, and friends over twenty one years of age usually keep individuals from
participating in collective violence. The social bonds that develop with a good job,
81. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Op. Cit.. pp. 198.
82. also see Travis Hirschi, Causes Of Delinquency. Berkeley, 1969.
83. P. G. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice, Individuation, Reason, And Order Versus De-
individuation Impulse And Chaos", in Leon Berkowitz ed., Nebraska Symposium On
Motivation. Lincoln, 1970.
84. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 93-94.
85. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.
86. These influences, in some cases can be observed directly, or are conclusions based on analysis of
information collected by:Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study
In Scotland. Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 35-57, for specific age group, gender, employment,
education, and social class statistics on Scottish football crowds.
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responsibility, age, and social interaction create acceptable norms of behaviour which
are reflected on the terraces. 87
The young supporter who has not yet developed acceptable forms of internal social
control and those older supporters who have had their social bond development
disrupted through subculture identification are much more likely to engage in ritualised
behaviour of the clamjamfry. Once involved in the clamjamfry, these supporters are
more susceptible to the influences of the crowd process, resulting in an increased
likelihood of participation in collective violence. The learning process 88 involved in
developing internal social bonds resulting in control can be greatly influenced by family
relationships, 89 education level, social and economic problems, 90 peer group
pressures, 91 (subculture affiliation) and personality factors. 92 The development of
the individual is often affected by one or more of these factors which cause poor
development or drift93 away from internal social control or bond. The intensity and
duration of anti-social behaviour is determined by associations with influences that
reinforce these activities. 94 Almost every individual participates in some kind of
deviant behaviour, 95 and it is the reaction to that behaviour in the form of positive or
negative reinforcement which influences the likelihood of further deviant acts. 96
Society may react to deviant behaviour in the form of labels and official sanction 97 -
87. Travis Hirschi, Op. Cit.. pp. 18-19.
88. see Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, 1977.
89. Travis Hirschi, Op, Cit.. pp. 3-10.
90. President's Commission On Law Enforcement And The Administration Of Justice, Task Force
Report: Juvenile Delinquency And Youth Crime. Washington D. C. 1967, pp. 222.
91. Albert Bandura, Op. Cit.
92. Albert K. Cohen, Deviance And Control. Englewood Cliffs, 1966, pp. 55.
93. David Matza, Delinquency And Drift. New York, 1964.
94. Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey, Criminology. 10th ed., Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 80-82.
95. David Matza, Becoming Deviant. Englewood Cliffs, 1969.
96. R. L. Akers, Deviant Behaviour. A Social Learning Approach. 3rd. ed., Belmont, 1985.
97. Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies In The Sociology Of Deviance. New York, 1963, pp. 33-4.
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negative reinforcement. For the juvenile, peer groups of subcultural associates may
react in a positive fashion, thus reinforcing the deviant behaviour, which will then be
re-enacted at appropriate times in the future. 98
The football terrace structure provides, through the division of labour, 99 a place for
individuals to interact with others who may lack the same internal control - the
clamjamfry. The clamjamfry allows individuals who choose to enter the opportunity to
engage in otherwise unacceptable behaviour, with full reinforcement for their activities
and little intervention by the police - negative reinforcement. This type of positive
reinforcement has allowed the clamjamfry to develop ritualised behaviour patterns with
litde outside interference.
As previously noted, ritualised behaviour leads to an increased possibility of collective
action. Although it could be argued that reinforcement of antisocial behaviour patterns
in the clamjamfry leads to the establishment of subcultural behaviour patterns, it has
been noted in Chapter Two that the overriding emphasis is non-violent. This is because
the focus of the clamjamfry is on the match and not on violence. For individuals who
seek out the clamjamfry as a place to act out antisocial behaviour, reinforcement does
not create a situation where violence will occur at every match which could happen in a
subcultural setting. Violence will only occur when the element of collective behaviour
have been met by the crowd. At this point; individuals who value antisocial behaviour
or who lack strong social bonds will be in the forefront of the collective action. The
antisocial behaviour that is part of collective violence may be reinforced through
success in the fight, by the peer group, and by the media which results in the recurring
98. R. L. Akers, Op. Cit.. pp. 45.
99. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op, Cit.
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patterns of collective violence. 100
As crowd violence increased in the 1960s physical barriers were erected in all grounds
to help prevent collective violence. The barriers are effective in isolating the support
groups, limiting the ability of supporters to focus on one another and by increasing the
ability of non-violent crowd members to influence the behaviour of potentially violent
supporters. Control within the crowd can be reflected in traditions of non-violence
which are created through internal control within the collective behaviour framework.
In the same way that collective violent activity is created collective non-violence takes
place. Those not wanting collective violence influence the value-added framework to
the point that those seeking violence are isolated and are not powerful enough to change
the non-violent crowd to a violent one. Reputations for good behaviour are hard to
build and easily destroyed. Those in the crowd who are easily influenced towards
violence can, with enough numerical support, overcome the non-violent sentiment in
the crowd. Non-violent reputations are also lost because the opposition support
attacks a non-violent support who then defend themselves. 101
Social control factors in the crowd are further evident in the differences between the
clamjamfry and groups of average supporters. Average supporters, who stand at
100. This point has been previously discussed in Chapter Five in relation to recurring moral panics.
101. The Kop in Annfield, Liverpool is the best example witnessed of a non-violent reputation at
work. One Saturday in 1982, an individual in the Kop threw a bottle that hit Joe Corrigan, then
the Manchester City goal keeper, on the head. A few moments later a large gap appeared in the
supporters with everyone singing "get the bastard out". One lone person was left in the gap
with many supporters pointing at him. The police had no trouble identifying, arresting and
removing the guilty person. Liverpool supporters may have a reputation for good behaviour at
Annfield in front of television cameras, but they are well known for attacking opposition
supporters outside the ground. When Liverpool play away from home, their supporters have
engaged in several incidents of collective violence including damage done in Wolverhampton in
April 1983 and the Heysel Stadium riot in May 1985.
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varying distances from the clamjamfry, have a strong social bond and their behaviour
patterns are well within the limits of social acceptability. The average supporter is
distinguishable by the lack of extravagant dress in team colors and lack of animated
behaviour, this does not preclude this group from singing and chanting in support of
the team. Generally older, the average supporter reflects traditional values, while the
clamjamfry is younger with weaker links to conforming behaviour. Without parental
control, 102 the clamjamfry have developed their own ritualised behaviour
patterns103,104 which reflect their general behaviour patterns in society. 105
Formal Social Control - The Police
The police perform many duties and services in the community, one of which is crowd
control at football matches. Almost universally disliked by the officers assigned, the
police are deployed at every match. 106 Each Premier Division and many lower division
matches are staffed by a predetermined number of constables which is established in
meetings between senior police officers and the home club who pay for the policing. In
Edinburgh, the average number of police deployed is one officer for every two hundred
and fifty supporters at Easter Road and Tynecastle. 107 Police enforcement of the law
and crowd segregation start well before the match. Approximately two hours before
the match all officers assigned to the game gather for a briefing before deploying on
known routes supporters use to get to the match. Officers are also assigned to watch
turnstiles and the terraces. As the ground fills officers move from the street to reinforce
those in the ground. During the match reserve officers stand in sight of the support
102. Travis Hirschi, Op. Cit.. pp. 3-10.
103. Peter Marsh, Op,Cit.
104. Peter Marsh et. al., Op. Cit.
105. also see Walter Miller, Op. Cit.
106. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.
107. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.
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groups before deploying to relieve constables on the terraces and around the pitch. As
the final whistle approaches officers will leave the ground and take up positions along
egress routes to ensure segregation as the supporters leave the match. These tactics are
successful in stopping violence at almost every match. 108
Although there is no specific statute that defines football hooliganism, the police are
responsible for enforcing a group of laws designed to control general anti-social and
violent behaviour. These laws include: Breach of the Peace, Criminal Justice Scotland
Act, Urinating in a public place, Assault, Assault on the police, Resisting Arrest,
Failure to obey a police order, Possession of an offensive weapon, Drunk and
incapable, Malicious mischief and Vandalism. 109 Such offences as Breach of the
Peace and Assault commonly take place on the terraces as part of the ritualised
behaviour of the clamjamfry, but are overlooked by the police. "We can't arrest every
one of them" 110 As a result, relatively few arrests are made at matches when
compared to arrests for Breach of the Peace and Assault in the wider society. Dl, 112
To assist the police, club stewards, have responsibility for the enforcement of club
rules at football matches. Every football club in Scotland uses official stewards to
assist the police. Stewards, at one time, were the main form of crowd control, 113 but
108. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982. and personal observation
at matches over the course of the study.
109. Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland. Edinburgh,
1984, pp. 107.
110. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.
111. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 102 and 132.
112. See John White, A Socio-Legal Approach To Football Hooliganism. Edinburgh Ph.D., 1985,
pp. 118-138, for a extended analysis of the law and enforcement policy of the police at football
matches
111. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1982.
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as crowd activity became more unruly the police became more involved. Today the
police and club stewards share responsibility for crowd control at matches. Stewards
are usually appointed through a relationship with the club. They are generally not
trained for crowd control, fire fighting,or anything else. 114 They are positioned
throughout the ground, man entry points, exits and help the police watch the crowd.
Stewards have no powers of arrest, but can enforce club rule through ejecting
individuals or calling in the police. They also call in the St. Andrews Ambulance men
if supporters need medical attention.
Stewards range in age from fairly young to very old men. They are given free
admission to the ground for their services. Often recruited from official supporters
clubs, stewards represent the club and their commitment to non-violent crowds.
Younger stewards are often placed in positions where they know individuals who have
been involved in violence. They are seen as being more acceptable by the crowd since
they can not make arrests, are more lenient, and often have been in the crowd itself. 115
This relationship can have a positive influence on the clamjamfry since antagonism
towards the police is reduced. On the negative side, stewards are intimidated by the
crowd because of their non-police function and personal relationships with individuals
in the crowd. Stewards' main function is to control potentially violent situations before
violence starts and to influence supporters on their way to and from the ground, but not
to take over the role of the police.
It is police action and its relationship to collective violence which determines the
opportunity for the beginning, scope and duration of football hooliganism. The
policing of football crowds has a direct effect on the "hostility curve", 116 which is the
114. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Op, Cit.. pp. 25.
115. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit., pp. 25.
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natural duration of collective violence, or defined as the build-up, climax and control of
one or a series of violent incidents. 117 In this case, the concentration is on the specific
incident, not on a series of collective crowd disturbances.
The police can have six effects on Scottish football crowds: 118 (1) their presence is
enough to prevent crowd disorder, which happens in the vast majority of games, (2)
police actions incite an aggressive but non-violent response from the clamjamfry, (3)
police actions incite violent reactions from the clamjamfry, 119 (4) lack of intervention
allows the crowd to progress to collective violence, (5) police response to collective
violence affects its development, organization, and duration,120 and (6) police action in
controlling crowd violence can alter the focus of the participants from each other to the
police.
Within these six categories of police crowd interaction variables exist which influence
the relationship. The most important influence on the terraces is the relationship
between the police and the wider community. If the police and the community or a
segment of the community have a particularly bad relationship, then open hostility may
result on the terraces. 121'122 A small amount of hostility always exists between the
police and the clamjamfry, but interviews with supporters indicate that they support
police activity as long as the police act in a proper manner. The Luton versus Millwall
crowd violence is a good example of police community tension. As soon as the police
116. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp.257.
117. See Chapter Five in reference to the recurring moral panic.
118. The following effects of the police on football crowds are the result of personal observation and
in two cases are supported by other research.
119. also see Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 163.
120. Neil Smelser, On. Cit.. pp. 384.
121. David Cowell, Trevor Jones and Jock Young eds. Policing The Riots. London, 1982.
122. William Belson, The Public And The Police. London, 1975.
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intervened, the crowd turned on them. In Scotland, the police and the wider
community have a fairly good relationship which is reflected by the lack of collective
violence aimed at the police at football matches.
Interviews with supporters in all sections of the crowd indicate a general acceptance of
the police and their activities. The clamjamfry showed the most hostility towards the
police, but still recognised the need for them. "If they were'nt here everybody be
fighten". "They make sure the game gets played". The major complaint of the
clamjamfry concerned the police removing individuals from the crowd. "They always
get the wrong person". Although police action is aimed at calming a potentially violent
situation, by removing someone from the crowd they often invoke increased hostility.
"The bastard police come in wrecken our fun, tell 'em t' leave us alone. We aint causn
nay real trouble". Despite the hostility, general respect exists within the clamjamfry for
the police. If constables are continually on duty in a support group, members often
know the officers by name and speak to them. This is evident in the Glasgow and
Edinburgh horse units which are on duty at most matches. Many supporters know the
names of the horses and riders. Even the dedicated clamjamfry supporters have been
seen talking politely to mounted constables and giving the horses an affectionate pat.123
Police actions, both inside and outside the ground are watched very carefully by the
clamjamfry. All action taken by the police is evaluated and reacted to accordingly. If
the police are doing their job within accepted limits, then the reaction will be within the
normal ritualised aggression present in the clamjamfry. If the police are seen to act in
an unjust manner, then the reaction will become progressively stronger. If the police
move into the clamjamfry to remove a leader, the clamjamfry will react verbally to
123. Quotes are from supporters at Ibrox and Celtic Park conducted over the length of this study.
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protect him. Verbal abuse is the normal reaction to police intervention. If the police
use excessive force, as perceived by the clamjamfry, the reaction can become violent.
In reacting to excessive force, the clamjamfry will usually move in two ways, free the
individual arrested, or they will attack the police. Both these actions are a reaction to a
police created precipitating incident. By using excessive force - as perceived by the
clamjamfry - the police turn the focus of the crowd from the match to themselves and
become the identifiable target of collective violence. 124
Just as police action can provide crowd violence, police inactivity can also indirectly
lead to crowd action.
"... vacillation on the part of the police authorities in deciding to utilize
force tends to encourage the spread of disorder." 125
If the police fail to recognise the activities within the crowd that lead to collective
violence, then lack of action to control the crowd may be interpreted as weakness by the
crowd and encourage them to take violent action. The police, therefore, must recognise
the elements of the value-added framework and move decisively when the clamjamfry
is in a heightened state, leaders are present, violent supporters are obvious, and a
precipitating incident is the only missing element, to control the situation. In doing so,
the police must act in numbers, using the least amount of force necessary, to alter the
focus of the supporters from one another to the match or themselves. In most cases,
simple police movement to reinforce their men and women in the area will avert the total
focus of the supporters from one another and break up the collective process.
124. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 267 supports the change in the focus of supporter from each other
to the police. Smelser's explanation shows how the crowd moves from attacking inanimate
objects to the police.
125. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 267.
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Once an episode of support group violence has started, the actions of the police will
directly affect the development, organisation and duration of the violence. Lack of
police manpower and organisation will allow the participants to organise themselves
with leaders and followers, spread the violence, and continue the violence over a
prolonged period.
"When authorities issue firm unyielding and unbiased decisions in short
order, the hostile outburst is dampened." 126
Quick decisive intervention by the police is necessary to restrict the violence through
disrupting its organisation and disbanding the participants. According to Smelser, the
police can use any amount of force necessary to control the violence including the use
of lethal force. The superior power and organisation of the police will always quell
disturbances. 127' 128 Since over-reaction by the police can cause a change in crowd
focus from support group violence to violence against the police, the best form of
police reaction is to use the minimum force necessary to control the situation. 129
"... control agents operate within the political system where the crowd
members have rights which must be respected and where the majority of
the individuals who make up the crowd respect the legitimacy of these
agents. The use of maximum rather than minimum force is regarded as
a last resort..." 130
In Scotland, using minimum force necessary has taken the form of officers on foot with
truncheons, mounted officers with batons, and officers with dogs. When the police
must control collective violence, four main objectives exist.
126. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 256.
127. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 265.
128. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 261.
129. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 160.
130. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 163.
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"(1) Prevent communication in general, so that beliefs cannot be
communicated. (2) Prevent interaction between leaders and followers,
so that mobilization is difficult. (3) refrain from taking a conditional
attitude towards violence by bluffing or vacillating in the use of the
ultimate weapon of force. (4) Refrain for entering in to the issues and
controversies that move the crowd; remain impartial, unyielding and
fixed on the principles of maintaining law and order."131
By simply disrupting the organisation and communication within the collective violence
framework, the collective begins to break down, which alters the focus of the
participants from the violence to avoidance apprehension. With the interruption of the
focusing process the violence quickly dissipates. By using minimum force, superior
organisation and discipline, the police should be able to break up collective violence
without having to shift the focus of the supporters to themselves. 132 Since the
Scottish police are not formally trained in crowd control, officers learn to deal with
football supporters through experience. 133 As one Glasgow Police Inspector said:
"The best way to control a crowd is through humour. .. They know us
and they know what we will do if they get out of line ... the best way
to ease a bad situation is through humour . . . The supporters are very
funny and like a good joke. ". 134
Although humour may not be part of any collective behaviour theory, it plays a major
role in the police handling of football crowds in Scotland. Humour, together with the
effective reputation of the Glasgow police, play an important role in defusing possible
violent situations. One Rangers supporter trying to enter Ibrox for a Rangers-Celtic
match immediately after the ban on alcohol at matches came into effect, was frisked by
an officer at the turnstiles. When the constable felt a half bottle of whisky in the
131. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.. pp. 160-162.
132. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.. pp. 163.
133. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.





This thesis has studied football crowd violence in Scotland using the value-added
theory of collective behaviour. Aspects of the football crowds in Scotland, and in
comparison to England, have been investigated as they relate to the problem of
collective violence in and around football grounds. Historical, social, and analytical
issues have all contributed to the adoption and modification of the value added theory of
collective behavior. As a result, these conclusions and implications can only look into
ways of reducing the problem as it has been studied in the previous chapters. Although
many recommendations have been made by government investigations and other
studies, these conclusions are restricted to the relationship between football crowds and
collective behaviour.
Historical References
In both historical and contemporary analysis, football has always had a relationship
with collective crowd violence. 1 Historically, the frequency of collective violence
has increased and subsequently decreased due to social stress in the community. The
modern problem, may be understood as an intense period of collective violence
reflecting social stresses in a complex society. Chapter Two indicates the long history
and evolution of both the game and its relationship to crowd activity. First requiring
1. See Chapters Two and Three.
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mass participation for the game to be played and evolving into a mass spectator sport,
football has a history that coincides with the development of modern industrial society.
The development of spectator sports and organised police control reduced the collective
input of mass participation in the game and shifted it to the terraces. This does not
mean that the collective nature of the public was reduced in the evolution from mass
participant to spectator sport. The ability of any crowd situation to shift from peaceful
assembly to collective violence is not a function of changing relationships between
football and mass participation. The ability of any assembly of people to become
violent is natural. Nonviolent crowds reflect social, psychological and physical
restraints which inhibit the crowd from progressing through the stages of the value-
added framework.2
Even though the media have identified football hooliganism as a major contemporary
social problem, it has always existed in various forms, and will continue to be a
problem in the future. Football crowd violence has changed forms, as the game itself
has changed. As a result, crowd violence, to some degree, will always be associated
with football. It is only the number and frequency of incidents that can be controlled.
Control can be applied through a reduction in social stress and by disrupting the crowd
process so that it can not progress to the stage of collective action.
Theoretical Assertions
Having analysed football crowds through the value-added theory of collective
behaviour, it becomes apparent the the theoretical concepts reviewed in Chapter Three
2. This conclusion is based on the writings of Robert E. Park, The Crowd And The Public.
Chicago, 1972., and applied to the value-added theory of collective behaviour.
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do not adequately account for the structure of football crowd violence. Each of the
approaches have not only failed to account for the structure of the violence but have
failed to explain why most matches are non-violent. Despite these drawbacks, all the
perspectives as outlined by Ian Taylor 3>4 make a significant contribution to the
analysis of football crowd violence because they correctly identify many of the the
underlying social stresses that contribute to football hooliganism.
Structural theories, relating subcultural concepts to football hooliganism, as presented
by John Clarke and his associates, 5 indicate how changing relationships between
age, economic conditions, social conditions, the reestablishment of traditional working
class values, and football result in crowd violence. These changes have taken place in a
natural evolution in which football and spectators have changed with or reflected
changes in the wider society. Although Clarke and Ian Taylor base much of their work
on preconceptions of class relationships and struggle, football has always been a multi-
class institution, with no one class totally dominating any aspect of the sport. Although
the terrace supporter may be traditionally working class, they do not dominate the
terraces to such an extent that violence can be seen as a class dominated subcultural
struggle against the middle and upper class. 6 Interviews indicate that no specific set
of working class values are dominant on the terraces or that their re-establishment is
demanded by the supporters. Violence that occurs is not aimed at the upper class
establishment, traditions, or individuals, it is aimed at opposing supporters. In this
3. See Chapter Three for Ian Taylors typology.
4. Ian Taylor, "On The Sports Violence Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in John
Hargreaves, ed., Sports Culture And Ideology. London, 1982, pp. 165.
5. John Clarke, "Football And Working Class Fans: Tradition And Change", in Rodger Ingram et.
al., Tootball Hooliganism': In The Wider Context. London, 1978.
6. See Fred Coulter et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland.
Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 114, which indicates that football crowds are multi-class.
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application class and subcultural concepts have assumed that violence is a reflection of
change and stress in the wider community which it is, but it is not a function of class
conflict which results in widespread social unrest aimed at political and social change.
Ian Taylor's early work, 7' 8' 9 although similar to Clarke's, uses a conflict
approach instead of a subcultural one. "Internationalisation and professionalisation"
lead to a dismantling of a "participatory democracy" that existed between the
management and supporters. This resulted in the "rump" of working class supporters
being left on the terraces trying to re-establish traditional working class values and
influences over the game. The history of football suggests that football has never been
a functional participatory democracy. There has always been a division between
ownership, management, players and spectators. No one class dominates any one level
of football, although material wealth does influence at what level individual
participation takes place. Supporters seldom aim violence at the club and management,
but they chant and sing to communicate their dissatisfaction with the players or
manager. In this way the participatory democracy works, as it always has, but it is not
reflecting a class struggle to reestablish working class values. The criticism aimed at
John Clake's work, applies also to Ian Taylor's work. In both cases the social issues
raised are important to the overall evaluation of football hooliganism but neither provide
an adequate framework for the analysis of the violence itself.
Peter Marsh's work10' J1' 12 using a social anthropological approach, views
7. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness An Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen, ed., Images
Of Deviance. Harmondsworth, 1971.
8. Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology Of Football Hooliganism", in Eric
Dunning, ed., Readings In The Sociology Of Sport. London, 1971
9. Ian Taylor, "Hooliganism: Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society. 7 August 1969.
10. Peter Marsh, Elizabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder. London, 1978,
11. Peter Marsh, Aggro. The Illusion Of Violence. London, 1978,
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football crowd violence as a form of ritualised behaviour based on masculinity,
toughness and territoriality which is expressed on the terraces. Some of the insights
noted by Marsh were identified on the Scottish terraces, ritualised behaviour patterns
and subgroups within the crowd. Scottish support groups are more flexible in size and
participation, not restricted in career orientation or age delineation, and are more prone
to mass participation in collective violence when it starts than the crowds Marsh
observed. 13, 14 Despite the similarities found in Marsh's work and football crowds
in Scotland, violence when it does happen is not governed by rules which prohibit
excessive use of force. The lack of injuries in crowd violence is the result of the
structure of the collective episode which limits the scope, duration of personal contact,
and time frame of the fighting. As with the previously mentioned theories, Marsh does
not provide a framework for the analysis of the build up of the crowd to collective
violence. Although he does note the structure of the violence when it does occur, the
gap between the non-violent crowd and the violent one must be bridged.
Stanley Cohen, 15 used a form of labelling theory in an attempt to analyse football
crowd violence. Labelling approaches have general problems in that they account for
after the fact relationships between the offender, agents of social control and the wider
society. It does not look at what causes the activity that creates the label by defining
agencies. Labels may be important in relation to the media and society in their
interpretation of crowd violence, but it is not important to the participants in football
12. Peter Marsh, "Careers For Boys, Nutters, Hooligans And Hard Cases", New Society. 36,
1976, (710)
13. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit.. conclusions support the these contentions about the Scottish
football crowd.
14. Also see F. H. Moorhouse, "Professional Football And Working Class Culture: English
Theories And Scottish Evidence", Sociological Review. May 1984.
15. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers.
London, 1972.
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crowds. Just because someone wears a football scarf does not mean they are a
hooligan. The vast majority of supporters are not involved in violence, are not
arrested, so they do not assume the label of a hooligan. Despite the general label
applied by the press, football supporters are not ostracised from society because they
can not be identified without special dress. Just as in actual crowd violence,
identification is crucial to the ability of those opposed to individuals or groups to take
action. Without daily identification as a "football hooligan" society can not apply the
label and the individual will not assume the label. Most supporters simply see
themselves as individuals who support their club at matches, and not as potential
hooligans.
Collective Behaviour
The value-added theory of collective behaviour is flexible enough in its framework for
evaluation of crowd action to incorporate the positive points made by the above
mentioned theories. This can be done without contradicting Smelser's components
because the stages of structural stress and strain are designed to incorporate all kinds of
social problems that appear in the crowd that lead to collective violence. The one
common point of criticism of the previous theories is that they do not offer a framework
for the examination of the process which takes a football crowd from a passive group to
a riot. Each theory investigates various social issues that contribute to the problem, but
none has adequately addressed all these. This results from the restrictions, that arise
from the assumptions the authors use. The value-added theory requires that the social
problems present in the crowd are both a reflection of the wider society and are to be
analysed before moving on to linking them with the actual structure of crowd violence.
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Despite the general acceptance of the value-added theory of collective behaviour, certain
modifications to the theory became necessary as a result of the research carried out in
football crowds. Following the order in which the modifications occur, they are:
combining of structural conduciveness and structural strain, crowd settings, leadership,
re-emphasising the importance of the precipitating incident, including the effect of the
media and the recurring moral panic, outside influences on the mobilisation for action,
the triangular crowd, and the focusing process as a replacement for Smelser's "short
circuiting". These modifications to the the value-added framework do not make it
unacceptable for the study of football crowds. The modifications may only be relevant
in relation to football crowds, especially the changes involving leadership and the
triangular crowd. The modification involving the structural strain and conduciveness
was simply one which allowed for easier analysis of the social problems on the terraces
and avoided problems of repetitiveness. Changes involving re-emphasising the
precipitating incident may not be of great significance, but it does take on added
emphasis when related to the media and recurring moral panics. The changes which
most affect Smelser's framework are the psychological influences in the crowd and the
focusing process. These two points when combined with the triangular crowd make
football crowds unique within the process of collective action.
Structural Conduciveness and Strain
The setting of the football stadium which helps create the triangular crowd is the
overriding influence on football crowd violence. This structure creates the opportunity
for ritualised behaviour patterns between the two support groups which emphasises
leadership, communication through rumours, crowd omnipotence, suggestibility, and
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blame being placed on the opposition or the police for existing or new deprivations.
The triangular crowd will react much more quickly to precipitating incidents because
most of the participants are familiar with the setting and know what to do when
incidents take place.
Structural conduciveness and strain reflect wider social issues which are present in the
crowd. The crowd assigns blame, or responsibility for grievances on the opposition
and uses the opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with existing conditions.
Communication in the form of rumours among the crowd, provides a common
definition and form of expressing grievances through a collective response in the form
of singing and chanting. The major source of social stress on the Scottish terraces is
religion. Religious intolerance not only fuels most of the singing and chanting
associated with Hibs, Hearts, Celtic, and Rangers but is a major underlying cleavage in
the wider community. The communities through churches and civil authorities need to
take steps to reduce discrimination in education and employment. Football clubs need
to take steps to distance themselves from religious backgrounds. Even though all clubs
in Scotland claim to be religiously neutral, old traditions of religious identity are still
maintained. Celtic fly an Irish flag over Celtic Park and Rangers still do not have a
Catholic player in the first team. Both practices should be ended.
The working class tradition of football in Scotland is still alive, but supporters of the
modern game come from a wide cross section of the population, 16 yet the majority are
under twenty-one years of age. 17 It is the young supporters, without regard to class
background, who are responsible for most of the violence in and around football
16. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 38-39.
17. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit.. pp. 35-36.
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grounds. The identification of football as a place for violence has reduced the number
of older supporters on the terraces, intensified the number of subcultural influences on
the terraces, brought in more violence prone individuals, which has resulted in the
increased possibility of collective violence. Age, not class background is more
important in football crowd violence. Football provides excitement, the opportunity of
general aggression and to take part in identifying with a winning team for the younger
person. In doing so football, with its distinctive triangular crowd situation creates a
high risk area for crowd violence.
Generalised Hostile Belief
The crowd builds on social stresses through the rumours which create anxiety,
generalised aggression and places blame on those responsible and results in a general
hostile belief. This segment of the value-added framework is similar to the ritualised
behaviour patterns noted by Peter Marsh, 18 since they happen at every match.
Leadership develops early in the crowd build -up. The identification of the opposing
team, or symbol as Smelser calls it, takes place on the way to the ground and becomes
stronger once the first chants begin in the ground.
Leadership in the crowd is greatly influenced by the triangular situation. Smelser's
framework had leaders appearing in the 'mobilisation for action' category. In football
crowds leaders emerge as soon as a collective group exists on the terraces. Leaders
can be continuous from match to match and active throughout the game or individuals
who emerge to lead one chant before returning to a following role. Short term leaders
are very active in Scottish football crowds and are usually more interested in chants
18. Peter Marsh et. al., Op. Cit.
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than violence, like long term leaders often are.
The symbols which make up the identification factor in football crowd violence are
made up of team colours and police uniforms. Supporters wear team colors in the form
of scarves and other apparel which identifies them inside and outside the ground.
Identity symbols are necessary for any large scale structured collective violence
between crowd factions to take place. The obvious conclusion from this is to prohibit
individuals from wearing team colours inside football crowds. Although difficult if not
impossible to enforce it would reduce the possibility of long term fighting between
support groups. Without identifying markings crowd action would be reduced to
individual fighting or the support groups would combine to fight the police, who are
identified by their uniforms.
A second way to reduce crowd violence would be to prohibit visiting supporters in the
home ground. Without opposition supporters to create conflict with the home support
little or no collective violence would take place in the football setting. The triangular
crowd would not exist, the home support would have the police as their only
opposition. Although the high cost to clubs in prohibiting visiting supporter entry to
the ground might be seen as a reason for not introducing such a measure, the possible
increase in attendance by supporters who are worried about crowd violence could offset
the losses incurred by not allowing visiting supporters in the ground. The experiment
going on at Kenilworth Road in Luton, where no visiting supporters are allowed in,
should serve as a guide to the reduction of crowd violence and the economic cost to the
club.
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Mobilisation Under The Generalised Belief
Once blame for a situation has been placed on those perceived to be responsible, a
desire to punish those responsible must develop. In order to punish those responsible,
the omnipotence or crowd power, must exist. Omnipotence creates the exaggerated
ability to alter or remove those responsible for the deprivation.
This stage in the development of collective action is one where physical barriers and
crowd segregation play an active role in reducing crowd violence. Government
mandated safety regulations and crowd segregation rules 19,20 isolate support groups
on the terraces. The result is that one clamjamfry may develop the power and
exaggerated ability to attack those in opposition, but can not do so because the barriers
inhibit mobility. When the supporters have to climb over barriers, cross the pitch, or
do some other physical task to make contact with the opposition, crowd unity breaks
down and the power to fight the enemy is destroyed. The restriction on mobility may
not stop collective action at all matches but it does help prevent the crowd from reaching
a stage where a precipitating incident will spark off violence no matter what the
restrictive physical barriers are.
Precipitating Factors
Although Smelser played down the importance of the precipitating incident, it can not
be overlooked in the football crowd. The precipitating incident or series of incidents,
acts as a signal for the followers in the crowd to become involved in violence. The
19. Safety At Sports Grounds Act. 1975, London, 1975.
20. Guide To Safety At Sports Football Grounds. London, 1976.
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incident sharpens the focus, deprivation suffered, omnipotence, power and the ability
of the supporters to act. In so doing, control within the crowd is lost and violent
collective action follows. Since football crowds seem to be more apt to react to a series
of precipitating incidents than to a single event, the police must be aware of this process
and act to disrupt it. By doing so, the police can control most potential large scale
incidents at an early stage by altering the focusing process and by reducing the feeling
of power that is developing in the crowd.
In addition to the direct physical incidents which spark off collective violence, indirect
actions have a major influence on the stress within the crowd. Social issues can
increase the tension on the terraces, but it is often the media that sharpen the definitions
of social stress and keep the issue of collective action in the minds of the supporters.
Although not mentioned by Smelser, the media play an important role in bringing
violence in matches to national attention. The media through reporting newsworthy
incidents bring the idea of crowd violence into the minds of those on the terraces. This
process, discussed in Chapter Five, alters what Smelser called the "hostility curve". 21
The hostility curve exists in relation to each incident of violence and is influenced by the
size of the crowd and police actions. The football crowd influences the hostility curve
in two specific ways. First, the duration and intensity of an incident may be prolonged
as participants try to out do other recent events. Second, the media create moral panics
about "football hooliganism" which then acts as a precipitating factor, or has a
triggering effect, for further outbreaks of violence. The hostility curve then takes on a
two dimensional effect; the traditional scope of the riot, and the carry on effect as one
group of supporters tries to outdo previous crowd actions. This creates the recurring
moral panic in which a series of violent incidents occur. This relationship is extremely
21. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour. London, 1962, pp. 257.
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important to the control of football crowd violence. Media coverage in the form of
sensational headlines and repeated stories of incidents needs to be played down in order
to prohibit coverage from becoming a precipitating incident for future violence. In the
same way, good behaviour needs to be rewarded by the media, as a precipitating factor
in future non-violence at matches. 22' 23
Mobilisation For Action
Influences on the mobilisation for action step in the value added framework are
important to any collectivity. In this case the casuals, subcultural groups, and
psychological factors all influence individuals or groups of individuals to seek violence
in the crowd setting. This speeds up the value-added process and increases the
probability of collective violence. Outside influences are present in all collective
behaviour situations. In the case of football crowds, the ongoing collective nature of
the terrace environment attracts those who seek violence. Violence prone individuals,
subcultures, and psychological factors such as frustration aggression, all contribute to
the collective mood of any crowd. Although difficult if not impossible to measure,
their effect can not be overlooked.
The focusing process, as a replacement for Smelser's concept of short circuiting, relies
not on an abstract change in the crowd from passive to active, but on an identifiable
change in the crowd based on observable individual and crowd actions. During the
game most of the supporters can be observed following the play on the pitch through
head movements. When head movements stop following the match and move to the
22. See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, 1977, whose concepts support
this point.
23. See R. L. Akers, Deviant Behaviour: A Social Learning Approach. 3rd. ed., Belmont 1985,
whose concepts support this point.
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opposition support for any prolonged period, focusing has occurred. Focussing
narrows the perception of the individual by reducing the awareness of conflicting
stimuli, (conflicting stimuli are never completely removed from the individual's
perception) and increases the concentration on one specific object. This process
includes the concepts Smelser mentions of crowd omnipotence, power and the ability to
alter states of perceived deprivations. Once focussing has occurred, a precipitating
incident will spark large scale collective action, if a crowd leader makes the first move
in response. The police must be aware of the focusing process. Once focusing occurs
the police should be able to distract the support groups from focusing on one another,
even if this means getting the support groups to focus on them.
The triangular crowd, is made up of the two support groups and the police. The third
component, the police, are left in a unique position in relation to crowds. Usually they
stand in direct opposition to crowd objectives, but in this situation they occupy a centre
ground and try to keep the support groups apart. As a result they are seldom the focus
of support group violence, and their sole purpose is usually to maintain control over the
support groups. In doing so the police must keep the support groups from focusing on
one another, even if this means having supporters focus their attentions on them.
The police in Scotland are generally very effective in controlling football crowds. Their
tactics and reputation keep them from becoming targets for attack. When responding to
collective violence the police must be careful not to be perceived to use excessive force
or be so lenient that the supporters will assume that they can continue in their activities.
This requires a firm but fair hand, since excessive force can lead to the support groups
turning on the police, and not enough force can lead to continued collective violence.
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One of the major side-effects of controlling violence in the ground is its moving
outside. Physical barriers, closed circuit television and the police have eliminated most
opportunities for easy contact between the support groups. As a result more violence
may occur after matches, outside grounds when control is more limited. Violence
prone supporters and the clamjamfry having passed through the stages of the value-
added theory may simply have to wait until they are outside the ground in city streets to
participate in collective violence. The time it takes for the crowd to move out of the
stadium disrupts its collective nature, thus reducing the numbers likely to participate in
violence, but does not restrict the probability of its happening. Since control of
violence outside the stadium is more difficult and property damage usually occurs, it
may be better to allow collective violence to happen inside the ground, if it happens at
all. Control of violence inside the ground is much easier because of the confines of the
stadium which the police can use to their advantage.
The triangular crowd which influences leadership, precipitating factors, and the
focusing process are all modifications to the value-added theory of collective behaviour.
These modifications indicate why every form of collective crowd action must be studied
individually within the social and physical setting where they occur. The modifications
cited here may not be applicable elsewhere, but they are important to football crowds
and go some way into understanding the nature of football hooliganism.
The very nature of football, where fans are attracted to watch a sporting contest in large
partisan numbers, standing in close proximity on terraces creates the ideal situation for
collective violence to occur. The supporters are encouraged to identify with the team
and shout their support for the players, it is only natural that the support groups come
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into conflict with each other. The structure of the game throughout its history has
created conflict between large numbers of people. This adds to the possibility of
collective behaviour amongst those involved in the crowd. As a result collective
violence has existed in some form throughout the history of football, only the nature of
the violence has changed as the game itself has changed. The modern problem is
simply an extension of a phenomenon which is natural, collective behaviour. The




CASE STUDIES OF OBSERVED VIOLENCE
AT FOOTBALL MATCHES
Introduction
During the course of this study, three hundred matches were observed, but violence
was only witnessed at ten matches. This chapter presents case studies of several of the
matches where violence was observed. In most cases the violence was generally
minor and dealt with by the police very quickly. The one major exception to this
pattern was witnessed at Hampden Park at the Scottish Cup Final of 1980. This one
event triggered off a media blitz of publicity about the 'riot' and led indirectly to the
Criminal Justice Scotland Act 1980 containing legislation banning the bringing of
alcohol, bottles or cans into any designated sports grounds in Scotland. The legislation
also prohibited intoxicated individuals from being admitted to football grounds. 1
The Hampden Park riot was the single largest incident of crowd violence witnessed or
that occurred in Scotland during the course of this study and therefore, maybe
somewhat unrepresentative of every match and of the forms of violence that do take
place, but it does represent the potential for large scale participation in collective
violence which could happen at any match. 2
1. See the Criminal Justice Scotland Act, 1980
2. I arrived at Hampden Park a little before the advertised opening of one o'clock. With a ticket I
was sent by the Scottish Football Association, I entered the Celtic end. I stood away from the
clamjamfry in the average Celtic supporters. My position provided a good view of the Celtic
and Rangers ends plus the pitch. I remained in the same position throughout the match and for
the fighting afterwards. After the pitch was cleared I moved out of Hampden Park which led
directly into no man's land of the street fight, so I moved back inside the stadium and climbed up
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Glasgow Rangers versus Glasgow Celtic:
Scottish Cup Final,
Hampden Park, Glasgow: Saturday 10 May 1980
"WAR - IN THE CENTRE CIRCLE"
"A Pitched battle was fought at Hampden Park yesterday - minutes after
the end of the Scottish Cup Final.
Thousands of rival Old Firm fans poured on the field and clashed at the
centre circle.
Dozens were injured as they fought with bottles, sticks, flags and
stones.
Bottles and cans rained from the terracing on fighting supporters.
Police attempting to break up the fighting, sustained several casualties.
Four Officers were taken to hospital, one seriously injured.
The trouble started as the final whistle blew with Celtic 1-0 winners
after half hour of extra time.
Celtic players ran to the east terracing - the 'Celtic' end - to greet their
supporters.
Hundreds of fans poured over the protective fences to join the team on
the park.
But, after the cup had been presented, Celtic fans ran to the Rangers
end, where they sang and gesticulated at their rivals.
One fan kicked a ball into the net where Celtic had scored the winning
goal. That was the signal for a counter-charge by Rangers fans.
They poured onto the park. Celtic fans retreated to the centre line,
where a pitched battle was fought.
Police were outnumbered at least 10-1, as they tried in vain to separate
the rival supporters.
Finally, six mounted police charge onto the field.
on the back bank of the earthen terraces and stood beside several young Celtic supporters who
were throwing chunks of concrete and earth at Rangers supporters in the street. After the police
broke up the street fight, I walked through several side streets to look for further trouble but
found none.
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As they did so, one of the horses swerved to avoid a group of fans, and
a policeman was trampled underfoot. He was carried unconscious from
the field.
The mounted police drew their batons and charged through the middle
of the mob, splitting it in two.
210 ARRESTS
They were joined by six more mounties, including three police
women...
Having split the fans, they charged the Celtic supporters, driving them
back over the wall into their own terracing. Then they did the same to
the Rangers supporters at the other end.
With relative calm inside the ground, a fleet of ambulances carried the
injured to the Victoria Infirmary.
Sporadic fighting went on in the streets around the ground, as opposing
fans met.
Last night police said 210 people had been arrested - about 160 in or
around Hampden and the other 50 elsewhere in the City.
A police spokesman, Chief Inspector Ian McKie said over 300 police
had been on duty in and around the ground.
'They did as good a job as possible in the circumstances. I have never
seen anything like it. It was the quietest final on record up till the final
whistle'..."3
Upon arriving at Hampden Park via British Rail from Central Station with dozens of
scarf-clad supporters, all the gates were found closed and locked. The pipe band could
be heard on the pitch as the advertised opening of one o'clock came and passed without
the turnstiles admitting any of the growing number of spectators queueing at then-
respective gates. Hundreds of Rangers and Celtic fans waited with growing hostility
towards one another and the late gate opening. By 1.25 p.m. the police finally
appeared and took up positions at each major section of turnstiles. Finally, after a
thirty-five minute delay, the turnstiles opened and the onslaught of spectators began to
3. The Sunday Post. 11 May 1980, p. 1.
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pour into the old dilapidated terracing of Hampden Park.
As soon as the first partisan spectators began to fill the terraces, the green and white of
Celtic and the blue and white of Rangers were clearly segregated to opposite ends of the
old stadium. Thousands of partisan scarf-clad spectators flocked into the terraces and
began to sing and chant support for their teams. The bagpipe band and later an
American high school marching band had very little effect in controlling the chants or
songs; the participants only sang louder to drown out the music. This was especially
true of the Rangers end who enjoyed the value of the covered terrace.
The chants and songs grew in intensity as the crowd grew to the limit of 80,000. Both
ends chanted, sang, waved banners and drank various kinds of alcohol continuously,
building to a pre-kick-off climax. The terraces became a sea of tightly packed
supporters. As the numbers grew, the threatening chants increased, Rangers
supporters, using the full value of their enclosed end, sang "God Save The Queen", a
direct reference to the Catholic-Protestant problem in Northern Ireland. The Celtic end
immediately replied with a chorus of "You Will Never Walk Alone", and the Irish
anthem, a direct reference to Irish Republican Army tactics against British troops in
Northern Ireland. No matter how loud the American marching band played, they were
barely able to compete with the constant noise of the ends.
As the sunny day continued to warm the spirits of the hopeful fans, alcohol was being
consumed in great amounts by supporters in both ends. Many spectators entered the
terracing having consumed great amounts of wine, whisky and or beer. Great numbers
of bottles and cans full of the favourite intoxicating beverage of the day were being
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passed around, to the delight of all. The consumption of great amounts of drink lent
another important aspect to the atmosphere at each end.
With the slow approach of the three o'clock kick-off the crowd began to grow tired of
the American High School marching band. With numerous shouts of profanity at the
band, the time dragged on. Finally the players appeared, still in suits, to test the pitch.
The teams drew respective cheering, boos and whistling as they appeared. The teams'
appearance added to the intensity of the chants and singing at both ends. Each end
taunted and responded to each insult or self-homage emanating from the opposite end.
Finally the time was near. The stands and terraces were full, the chants loud, and a
small brass band marched down the track to a position in front of the players' entrance
to the pitch. With a great cheer from each end, the players appeared and walked out
onto the pitch, turned and faced the large stand. As soon as the players were in
position, the Celtic end began to whistle, boo, and do everything possible to drown out
the small brass band playing "God Save The Queen". As the band began to play, the
Rangers supporters took up the words in direct opposition to the Celtic end. The small
band was hopelessly drowned out in a sea of opposing noise.
The bands left the pitch and the players began to warm up. The referee moved to the
centre of the pitch and summoned the respective team captains. The coin was tossed
and each team defended the goal in front of their supporters. With great cheering,
chants and songs, the game began, the supporters urging their teams on to victory. As
the intensity of play increased, the noise level decreased. Only in slow periods did the
supporters increase the noise level and chants. The ball was played back and forth,
back and forth, but after forty-five minutes neither team had scored. As the sides left
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the field for half-time, the ends again carried on vociferous chants and songs in support
of their teams.
The American marching band reappeared on the pitch. Some watched the show, but
most drank what was left of the alcohol and chanted and sang songs of self-eminence,
personal superiority, and degradation and hatred of the opposition. As the long half-
time dragged on, more and more shouts of vulgarity could be heard as the spectators
grew impatient for the teams to return to the arena.
The alcohol was having a profound effect on many of the spectators. Many of the fans
had consumed far too much of their favourite booze and were stumbling around and
occasionally falling down, which caused several injuries. These injuries were keeping
the first-aid teams on the pitch behind the goals busy, treating minor cuts and scrapes.
The major result of the alcohol was a great need for the majority of the participants to
urinate. With poor public convenience facilities and the drunken spectators' desire not
to miss anything on the pitch, the aisles became an open urinal. Many beer cans were
filled and emptied, but as the aim began to deteriorate and the need to go increased, the
aisles were surrounded by urinating spectators. The lower aisles became rivers of
alcohol-laced urine flowing down to the barrier surrounding the pitch.
The players finally reappeared to a tremendous welcome from each end and the
American marching band finally left the field. The teams lined up for the second half
kick-off with each end shouting support for their team. The teams moved up and down
the pitch creating numerous goal-scoring opportunities, but each time the defences
turned the attackers away. The partisan chanting decreased as the intensity of the game
again escalated. Both ends were tense with fear and hope as the fortunes of their
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respective teams constantly changed. Only during slow points in the contest did the
supporters revert to chants and singing. No matter who started the first hostile chant, it
was immediately answered by the opposite end. As the ball was kicked up and down
the pitch, great groans would emit from the end of supporters as a shot was taken by
their team, but went wide of the goal, then a round of applause for the player who took
the shot. Goalkeepers were also applauded for saves by their respective fans. As
usual, the referee took the brunt of the abuse. No matter how the call went, the referee
was wrong in someone's eyes and the supporters let the referee know about it with
whistling and booing. After a second forty-five minutes of hard play, neither team had
scored a goal. So with a great roar of approval from the combined spectators for the
previous ninety minutes in preparation for thirty minutes of extra time.
The five minutes of rest for the players provided a break in the anxiety for each end,
which resulted in chants and songs from everyone involved. The chants gained in
intensity with the realization that a goal by either team in extra time would probably win
the game. Each end shouted support to the players who remained on the pitch during
the short break.
The first-aid crews at each end of the pitch were busy treating the drunken supporters
who were injured in the terracing. Many fell due to the amount of drink, others were
felled by punches, some stumbled while negotiating the stairs and a couple were hit by
flying bottles. The unfortunate victim would be passed down to the barrier
surrounding the field. Two stretcher bearing members of the first-aid crew would meet
the victim at one of the gates through the barrier on to the pitch. A police constable
would open the gate and the victim would walk if possible or be placed on a stretcher
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by other helpful spectators and be passed through the gate and taken to the pitch for
treatment. Most of the treatment was minor, requiring only a little disinfectant and a
bandage. Some of the victims were taken to waiting ambulances and transported to a
local hospital. Many of the victims after being brought out onto the terraces on a
stretcher would vomit as a result of being treated if necessary, and then stagger to their
feet and return to the terraces, a hero, especially if they took the opportunity to wave a
partisan scarf whilst on the pitch.
The police had maintained a noticeable, but not overbearing presence in each end.
Between ten and fifteen officers were always in evidence on the track between the pitch
and the terraces. There was also a contingent of officers on the terraces in the ends
themselves. They mingled with the spectators and did little except keep the aisles clear
and intervene if any minor skirmishes started. The officers around the pitch watched
the crowd continuously. When injured spectators came to the gates in the retaining wall
separating the terraces from the pitch, the officers would open the gate and assist the
injured person. Many of the police officers in the terracing also helped injured fans
down to the barrier to obtain first-aid. The police seemed to have only half their force
deployed at one time as each officer was relieved once during each half by officers
waiting in the wings.
The teams were once again assembled for the kick-off. The supporters roared
encouragement to the sides and extra time began. Everyone was tense with the pleasure
to score and not be scored against themselves. The spectators cheered and groaned
with every well-played ball. Again the intensity and the importance of the play held
down the chants and singing. For the one hundred and fifth consecutive minute no one
could produce the much needed goal and the players changed ends for the last time.
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The spectators kept up the noise level even though the warm day, alcohol and
continuous shouting was taking its toll. Finally, after one hundred and seven minutes
of play a shot by Celtic captain Danny McGrain deflected off George McLuskey past a
diving Peter McLoy, the Rangers goalkeeper. Rangers fans were stunned into silence.
Celtic supporters went wild. Everyone yelled, jumped up and down and created a huge
dust cloud from the old earthen terraces. The wild celebration resulted in six people
being taken out of the terraces on stretchers, injured in the wild melee. As the game
continued on the pitch the Celtic supporters settled down to wait out the last thirteen
minutes for victory. Real concern developed as Rangers continuously attacked, but
each time the needed goal was denied. The ends shouted, chanted and sang, Celtic
supporters expecting a victory, and Rangers fans still proud of their team. Then the
whistle blew ending the sporting contest, and signalling the beginning of a very
different contest on the pitch.
The Celtic players all ran to congratulate one another and then ran down to the Celtic
end to wave and receive the accolades from their loyal supporters. As the Celtic players
stood on the pitch waving to the crowd, many fans moved to and climbed up on the
barrier separating the pitch from the terracing. The limited number of police tried to
keep the spectators off the barrier. As the police moved along the barrier, everyone
would jump down and just climb back up as the police moved along the barrier.
Several officers appeared from the reserve force and moved into the crowd leaving the
small force to protect the pitch. All during this time there was a wild celebration going
on in the Celtic end. No-one was leaving. Everyone was jumping up and down,
congratulating one another and creating another tremendous dust cloud. Again as in the
celebration following the goal, several people were knocked or fell down and required
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first-aid. These people were again passed down to the barrier to obtain help. As the
Celtic players began to move off towards the main stand to receive the Scottish Cup
many young supporters climbed on and jumped over the barrier surrounding the pitch.
The group of spectators on the pitch increased despite police actions to keep them in the
terracing, there were not enough police to stop every person from scaling the barrier.
As the Celtic players moved into the main stand to receive the Scottish Cup the Celtic
supporters who were on the pitch rushed over to get a better view of the Cup
presentation. This caused more Celtic fans to jump over the barrier and follow their
comrades across the pitch to view the Cup presentation. With a great cheer from the
Celtic fans, the Scottish Cup was presented to Danny McGrain, the Celtic team captain.
He waved it triumphantly over his head to show everyone he had won the Scottish Cup
before passing it to each member of the victorious Celtic team.
During this celebration for the Celtic team and spectators, the Rangers supporters began
to leave. Some stayed on to watch the cup presentation and the second place award
presentation to the Rangers players. As the Celtic players ran to the Celtic supporters
end and then went to the Cup presentation many young Rangers supporters also began
to climb over the barrier on to the pitch. These young spectators milled around behind
the goal at the Rangers end watching the Celtic and Rangers players preparing to
receive their respective awards. Just after the Scottish Cup was presented to the Celtic
players the first few Celtic supporters ran towards the Rangers' supporters who were
on the pitch directly behind their goal and a football was kicked into the net by a Celtic
supporter.
This caused many Rangers' fans to flee back towards their own end. After the Scottish
Cup had been presented and waved around, it was time for the second place award to
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be given to the Rangers players. This prompted a massive charge by the Rangers
supporters towards the area in front of the presentation box, occupied by Celtic
supporters. The Celtic supporters retreated as the on-rushing Rangers' supporters
neared. Several bottles were thrown by Rangers supporters as they neared the
retreating Celtic fans. Many Celtic fans fled back into the terracing aided by police who
opened the gates in the barrier to allow the fans easy access to the terracing. Despite the
number of Celtic fans who left the pitch, many fans turned to watch the Rangers
supporters who were watching the second place award being presented to the Rangers
players. After the award was presented to the Rangers players, the Rangers fans turned
and charged at the Celtic fans.
The war was on. Those not interested in the fight quickly scrambled back into the
relative safety of the terracing. Those who wanted a shot at the other side quickly
climbed the barrier and joined their respective side. As the Rangers supporters
charged, the Celtic supporters fell back until the Rangers charge stopped fairly near the
Celtic goal. A few brave individuals from each side actually made contact with the
opposition and a few punches and kicks were exchanged before the brave individual
retreated to the relative safety of his own side. As the thrust and bravery of the Rangers
charge ebbed they slowly retreated towards their own end. This gave the Celtic
supporters a great opportunity and they charged at the Rangers fans. The Rangers
supporters fell back towards their own end. During this charge, a no man's land was
immediately set upon by several members of the opposition. Anyone who tried to stop
an on-coming charge by waiting in no man's land was also attacked by several of the
opposition. As a result, most of the fights were very one-sided affairs with brave or
dumb individuals being set upon by several members of the other side. The no man's
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land was maintained throughout the charges and counter charges of each side.
The police were totally helpless to stop the one thousand or so participants on each
side. Many police constables generally confined their activities to pushing lone
individuals back into the terraces, helping injured participants, and breaking up fights.
Only occasionally did an officer try to make an arrest or tackle one of the participants.
Even with reinforcements, the police could not stop the sides from charging at one
another.
When the Celtic charge neared the Ranger's end the spectators in the terraces began to
throw bottles at the Celtic supporters. This caused the Celtic fans to retreat and the
Rangers supporters then charged down the pitch towards the Celtic fans armed with
bottles, cans and anything else that could be thrown. The few Celtic fans who turned
to face the Rangers charge were quickly set upon by the charging Rangers fans and
punched, kicked and generally maimed for their efforts. As the Rangers charge neared
the Celtic end and the Celtic supporters had nowhere to run, a bombardment of bottles,
cans and rocks was launched by the Rangers fans. Several Celtic fans were hit by
flying objects, but most landed harmlessly on the pitch. When the thrown objects
landed, they were quickly picked up by the Celtic fans. As the Rangers fans ran out of
objects to throw, they quickly retreated. This led to a counter charge by the Celtic
supporters now armed with all the bottles thrown at them by the Rangers fans. The
Celtic fans charged down the pitch to unleash another bombardment of bottles at the
retreating Rangers fans. Again few were hit and the bottles were picked up as
ammunition for another charge.
Like gladiators in the ancient colosseum the opposing sides charged at one another,
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bottles flying, fists punching and feet kicking. Charge and counter charge, back and
forth, no side was winning or losing, just participating and collecting a growing
number of casualties. The police tried to help the injured of both sides but there were
not enough police to cope with the growing number felled by the violence. The first-
aid teams were hopelessly swamped by the injured who required treatment. Stretcher
after stretcher was taken out to waiting ambulances for the ride to the hospital. Despite
the losses the fight continued, back and forth, charge after charge. Many wounded
victims lay on the pitch waiting for help and trying to avoid the stampeding feet of the
next charge. Most victims of the fight were left alone by the opposition when they met
on the pitch.
Finally after what seemed like an eternity, which was only half an hour, the police
appeared with four club-wielding horse-mounted constables. Four abreast the
constables on Clydesdale horses charged at the Celtic supporters. With batons drawn
the constables thundered down the pitch towards the Celtic fans. The Celtic fans
quickly ran as fast as they could go towards their end. The police opened all the gates
into the terracing and many fans quickly jumped into the terracing for safety. Several
combatants who did not get out of the way were knocked over by the galloping horses.
The Rangers fans seeing their new allies push the Celtic supporters back into their own
end massed for one more attack. As the horses circled in the Celtic end, Rangers
supporters crept up towards the Celtic end but the police were no one's allies and four
abreast the horses at full gallop charged down the pitch into the Rangers supporters.
Rangers fans scattered everywhere just trying to avoid the on-charging Clydesdale
horses and baton-wielding constables. Again the police opened the gates in the barrier
to allow the participants to get into the terraces. Many did not have time to queue to go
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through the narrow gates so they vaulted and scrambled over the barrier as best they
could. Most got out of the way of the horses, some got knocked down, some went
back into the terraces, but many were still left on the pitch.
If Rangers supporters could try a sneak attack behind the charging horses so could the
Celtic supporters, so off they went. As they neared the middle of the pitch, four more
mounted horses joined the four already dispatching the participants. Eight abreast, the
mounted horses charged the Celtic supporters who instantly ran for cover. Almost
every Celtic participant moved back off the pitch and into the terracing with the second
charge by the mounted police. Another four mounted constables joined their
colleagues.
Not to be out-done, a few Rangers fans moved towards the Celtic end and once again
the police charged down the pitch. Twelve abreast with batons drawn they went. The
Rangers fans all climbed back into the terracing. The mounted police moved to the
middle of the pitch and the police on foot moved to protect the barriers from further
spectators trying to climb over and back on to the pitch. The Rangers supporters did
not appreciate the police stopping their fight with the Celtic supporters and they began
to bombard the police on the pitch with every bottle and can they could find. The
bombardment continued until there were no more bottles to throw. The Celtic end
started to do the same thing but fights broke out in the terracing between the Celtic fans
who wanted to throw bottles and those who did not. The Celtic support threw only a
small fraction of the number of bottles and cans compared to the number thrown as
from the Rangers end.
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With the ammunition gone and the police in charge of the pitch there was only one place
to turn the streets. As the participants were forced off the pitch they moved out into
the streets running along side Hampden Park. The two sides had lined up across the
street between the houses and the brick wall surrounding Hampden Park. Fewer in
number but just as mean the participants charged back and forth at one another
throwing anything handy at the other side. Again a no man's land developed between
the two sides. Only brave or stupid participants ventured into no man's land. This
usually resulted in the person being hit, kicked and generally maimed by the opposing
side. Several Celtic supporters, all quite young, were standing inside the Hampden
Park wall on the earthen back side of the terraces throwing dirt clods, bottles and
chunks of concrete at the massed Rangers supporters. Several Ranger's fans were hit
by these flying objects.
Finally the police called in the twelve mounted constables who once again charged at a
full gallop into the participants. Everyone in the street ran for safety. The horses ran
over anyone who tried to stand against them. With one fell swoop the last major
fighting was ended. Skirmishes took place in many side streets between Hampden
Park and the Mount Florida train station. The mounted constables riding in groups
were able to keep most of the belligerents separated and only minor fights broke out.
The Celtic and Rangers supporters were separated on the trains back into Glasgow
Central station..
The police, although unprepared for the massive spectator participation on the pitch
after the end of the match, showed good restraint in not taking advantage of the
situation and unnecessarily using excessive force. The mounted constables did not use
their drawn batons in any of their charges into the participants. In only a few instances
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did a constable try to tackle any of the belligerents. The police on foot generally tried to
get people off the pitch and back into the terracing or lent aid to injured participants.
A survey of the damage outside Hampden Park, found the streets littered with debris
from the rock and bottle throwing. One house had a second floor window broken
which caused much disgust from the people occupying the house. The other major
damage was done to a police vehicle. A small vehicle equipped to carry dogs had been
parked right in the middle of the area the Rangers supporters had decided to defend
outside Hampden Park. The police car was totally demolished. Every piece of glass
was broken by large rocks being thrown through them. The horns mounted on top of
the cars were twisted and bent. The side, top and bonnet were all dented by rocks or
kicks. A police constable with a police dog had been standing near the vehicle as it was
being destroyed, but did not release the dogs.
A short uneventful walk to the Mount Florida train station found twelve mounted
horses in full control of the streets outside the station. Inside the station everyone was
being separated by scarf colour by the police for the ride back to Central station. While
standing with Rangers supporters, they were quite friendly and in good spirits despite
the match loss. While on the train, the Rangers supporters continually sang songs
recalling past glory. Several references were made to a previous altercation with the
Barcelona police in Spain. They sang "bring on the dogs, bring on the fucking dogs",
and other songs about triumphs in the past. By the time the train arrived at Central
Station, everyone was ready to head for home so there was no evidence ofmore trouble
between Rangers and Celtic fans. In fact, several groups of mixed supporters were
standing around the station talking about the day's activities.
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The Hampden Park riot was a classic example of collective behaviour. Every element
of the value-added theory of collective behaviour was present in the crowd. The
structure was perfect, Hampden Park accommodated 80,000 supporters, divided
almost perfectly in half. The stadium had only a low retaining fence around the pitch.
The supporters were highly emotional due to religious divisions, anxiety over the
match, and recent political events in Northern Ireland. The crowd settled into
traditional roles of singing and chanting which was fuelled by high levels of alcohol
consumption. When the game ended in victory for one end and defeat for the other, the
situation was perfect for violence. Each side began to mobilize under a general belief
(support) to follow their teams up to witness the presentations. When a Celtic
supporter kicked a loose football into the Rangers net the precipitating factor had taken
place. The support groups quickly altered their make up so that those who wanted to
participate in the violence went onto the pitch while those who only wanted to see the
awards presented retreated to the safety of the terraces.
The violence itself was intense, of a duration indicated by police action, and not as
Marsh claimed ritualized or governed by rules restricting the amount of violence
inflicted on an opponent. When the focussing process occurred due to the precipitating
event under the mobilization for action, the supporters turned on each other - no other
instrument was available to alter the focus of the supporters from each other. The
violence was shaped by two features; the confines of the pitch, and the weapons
available for use. Since bottles were the main source of weaponry, a no man's land
appeared between the attacking support groups, so the sides had time to avoid the
onslaught of missiles as they were launched by the opposition. The no man's land also
provided a safety zone against personal contact, but this was often used as a staging
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ground for very violent interpersonal fights, which usually left one or more individuals
injured.
The police did little to intervene and stop the violence until the mounted officers
appeared on the pitch. Only one foolish Rangers supporter was seen to stand up to the
horses, and he was run over. The police with batons drawn (the batons were
approximately three feet long) never actually used them to strike any of the participants.
Within ten minutes of the mounted officers appearance on the pitch, the 'riot' was over.
The organisation of the mounted police and their use of tactics totally out-maneuvered
the supporters' groups who had to retreat to the terraces for fear of arrest or being
trampled under the large horses. Police action, both on the pitch and on the streets
quickly defused the situation by altering the focus of the support from each other to the
police, but only when the police had a superior force to that of the combatants.
Although an exceedingly large number of individuals participated in the violence, most
supporters remained on the terraces or left the stadium. Many supporters became angry
at those participating in the violence and tried to stop more from joining or resisted
attempts by people on the terraces to throw bottles at the police. Social control on the
terraces did not totally break down, it only broke down for the younger supporter and
those suffering from high levels of intoxication. The vast majority of the crowd
remained outside the collective violence itself, but some of the non-participants still
supported the violence.
The newspaper report of the riot was in many ways fairly accurate. The detail was
lacking and the terms of description elegant, but the true picture never totally emerged.
The collective action was not a 'war' and the battle was fought all over Hampden Park,
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not in the centre circle. The bottles that were thrown from the terraces were generally
thrown at the police after the riot was over, not at the participants. Unless the
participants were very close to the terraces the distance was too great for someone to hit
a participant with an empty bottle. The reporter's description lacked any real detail of
the incident on the pitch before the horses appeared, which went on almost twenty
minutes. None of the real reasons for the violence were mentioned, but the major
precipitating incident was picked out of the series of developments which led directly to
the violence. Although the newspaper account gave a brief account of the incident, it
was more interested in the shock, newspaper selling feature of the violence. Although
reprinted here, the original story was done with two inch block headlines to attract
attention to the lead story of the day.
Hearts versus Hibs:
East Of Scotland Shield Final,
Tynecastle Park, Edinburgh: August, 1980
After a very eventful match in which Hibs scored two late goals to draw the match.
Hibs won the Shield on penalty kicks. After the final penalty kick, violence broke out
on Gorgie Road as Hearts and Hibs supporters exited the stadium.
Hearts supporters' exits from Tynecastle allow them to surround visiting supporters on
Gorgie Road. Realising they were going to lose the penalty kicks many supporters
headed for the exits. Hearts supporters often plan to use this tactic and when the
clamjamfry leaders shouted "let's get the bastards", the clamjamfry split into two
groups and ran for the exits. Once in position on Gorgie Road, all the Hearts
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supporters had to do was wait for the Hibs supporters to appear, and the fight was on.
All available rocks, bottles, cans and anything else handy was thrown by Hearts
supporters at Hibs fans from both sides. Many Hibs supporters retreated back into
Tynecastle, while many others rushed to join the fight. Hibs supporters who stayed on
Gorgie Road started throwing back all the missiles that had previously been thrown at
them. After the initial stone throwing, Hibs supporters charged up Gorgie Road and
took possession of a small derelict patch of ground on the side of the road. This
presented plenty of ammunition in the form of rocks and also a high point from which
to throw objects and defend against attack. The Hearts supporters quickly launched a
prolonged attack on the Hibs support occupying the derelict ground. Hundreds of
rocks and other and other missiles flew in both directions. Many people were hit and
suffered injury. Most of those hit were local residents and non-participants trying to
leave the area.
As the support groups milled around with more and more people exiting the ground
onto Gorgie Road, many fist fights broke out as the support groups jockeyd for
position on the street. After several minutes of missile throwing and fist fights, the
police moved in to break up the combatants. The police, on foot, were able to stop
most of the missile throwing and fist-fighting at first. The Hearts supporters assembled
behind the Hibs support and charged up Gorgie Road. The Hibs support ran up the
road toward Haymarket Station. The Police were caught in an unorganised situation.
Unable to stop the charge by Hearts supporters, fighting continued as the supporters
clashed all the way up Gorgie Road to Haymarket. 4 Once the support groups
reached the Haymarket the large-scale violence ceased as the supporters dispersed into
4. This incident was not uncommon between the two clubs in the past. During the course of
this study the opportunity for such incidents were few because Hearts and Hibs played in
different league divisions over a four year period.
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the dozens of roads in the area.
Having stood in the 'corner' at Tynecastle, with the Hearts support, observations were
made of the support groups during the match and on Gorgie Road during the violence
after the game. The supporters groups were participating in their normal 'ritualised'
singing and chanting throughout the match. When Hibs scored two late goals and went
on to win the match, frustration set into the Hearts fans. The frustration was vented
through organised collective violence. Hearts support, through ritualised behaviour,
had built up to the point where they had a 'generalised hostile belief, and by following
crowd leaders out of the ground 'mobilised under the generalised belief'. The
'precipitating events' included, Hibs winning the match, Hearts support following their
leaders out of the ground, and the first missile thrown. The supporters had by this
point, focused on the opposition and the 'mobilisation for action' had taken place.
Once the first missile was thrown the fighting continued until the police intervened and
crowd movement allowed the support groups to disperse. The setting in Gorgie Road
limited the scope and the participants' ability to become active in the violence. As in all
football crowd situations the triangular crowd placed three separate groups against one
another.
The violence, in this case, was a direct result of frustration caused by the expectation of
victory which was quickly changed by a late Hibs surge. The frustration became an
indirect precipitating event. It sharpened the deprivation created by city and club
rivalry, and religious intolerance. It helped Hearts support create the omnipotence
necessary to focus on Hibs fans. The focussing, in this case, was Hearts supporters
diverting their attention from the penalty kicks on the pitch to moving out of the ground
and into position for the attack. The focusing for Hibs supporters did not take place
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until they left the ground and were attacked by the first missile being thrown at them.
Once both sets of supporters were firmly focused on one another the violence became
prolonged, organised, and able to out-manoeuvre an undermanned police force.
Dundee United versus Dundee
Scottish Premier League, Tannadice Park
12 September 1981
A crowd of 17,000 saw a 5-2 victory for Dundee United. A derby atmosphere,
combined with a good match kept the crowd excited. The support groups kept
taunting each other throughout the match, maintaining a high level of ritualised crowd
activity. Two arrests were witnessed during the second half. When the match ended
and the spectators were leaving the ground, groups of Dundee fans began to throw
stones at Dundee United supporters. This incident took place behind directly behind
the side terrace which had been recently renovated. The main exits from the side terrace
are within easy stone throwing distance of each other and stones were used to cover the
exit pathways. The stones made excellent missiles to throw at opposing supporters.
The police quickly moved in and stopped the stone throwing. No other incidents were
witnessed.
This incident is typical of minor violence at matches. Frustration at having lost, limited
focusing by a small group of Dundee fan on Dundee United supporters created a short
burst of violence. Those who participated may have been violent supporters using the
opportunity to try and start large-scale violence. Due to the physical barriers separating
the exiting supporters direct contact was not possible. Stones were thrown as the only
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form of contact available. The quick intervention by the police limited the scope of the
violence to a few dozen stones being thrown. Quick police intervention broke the
focusing process as those involved became more aware of the police and the avoidance
of arrest than throwing stones.
Rangers versus Celtic
Scottish Premier League, Ibrox Stadium
1 January 1982
After a "routine" Old Firm match at Ibrox, with no violence witnessed inside the
stadium, major collective violence erupted outside the stadium. With the supporters
well segregated in a modern stadium, seating almost eighty percent of the crowd, the
fans were satisfied to engage in the normal singing and chanting of a Rangers versus
Celtic match. After the final whistle, the crowd began to leave the stadium peacefully.
Upon reaching Edminton Drive, the main road next to Ibrox stadium, Rangers fans had
blocked the egress route of the Celtic supporters. Several fist fights broke out and
many supporters from both sides rushed to join the fray. The exiting crowd was
swayed by conflicting forces as many tried to leave the area while others tried to get
into the violence. Many combatants, bystanders and innocent supporters were injured,
some severely, due to punches, kicks and missiles being indiscriminately thrown. The
conflict developed distinct lines of demarcation, with a contact line stretching across the
street between the support groups. The no-mans land kept most of the combatants
apart, but several fist fights developed as the support groups charged at one another.
After a five minute initial contact period between the support groups, horse mounted
police moved in to stop the fighting. Many large groups of supporters, when seeing
the charging police horses, immediately ran off down side streets in an effort to avoid
300
arrest.
Since the violence stated almost one hundred yards away from the point of observation,
the specific crowd structural steps were difficult to identify. No precipitating incident
was observed, but the crowd quickly developed lines of demarcation with those
wishing to participate rushing in and those not wanting to participate trying to leave the
area. Not being close enough identify the focusing process when it happened, it was
present in the confrontation. Only when the police arrived to complete the triangular
crowd did the focus of the combatants alter from one another to the avoidance of arrest.
This broke up the collective violence, simply because the focus of the participants was
no longer on violence. By the time observations were made at the point of the violence
only bloody bodies were visible and the police were well in control of the situation. No
further violence was observed.
Much of the violence was the result of heavy police presence inside Ibrox due to the
Cup Final riot the previous season. Heavy police presence combined with the all seated
stadium which restricts physical movement restricted opportunity for supporter
confrontation. Once outside the ground the police were stretched to cover all possible
points of confrontation between the supporters. Strict segregation and heavy police
presence inside the ground had a dislocation effect. The supporters waited until the
restrictions of the stadium and the police were reduced and the opportunities for contact
increased. If violence is going to occur, physical and police restrictions will not stop
supporters from fighting each other. The collective nature of the football crowd means
the support groups will seek alternative points for contact, usually immediately outside
the ground.
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Hibs versus Dundee United
Scottish Cup Replay, Easter Road
March 1983
The match itself was a boring encounter which was drawn at the end by a late
equalising goal by Dundee United. The crowd was small due to the game being played
on a Wednesday evening. No trouble occurred during the match.
After the match Hibs supporters got behind the Dundee United supporters walking
down Bothwell Street. The police had made no attempt to segregate the support groups
after the match. By chasing the Dundee United fans down Bothwell Street to the
narrow Bothwell Street Bridge the Hibs supporters created a large group waiting to get
onto the narrow foot bridge. The structure of the Hibs crowd was not witnessed
because fellow researcher John White and I were in the Dundee United support waiting
to cross the bridge when the first rocks began to rain in on the crowd. Several people
were hurt by the first rocks thrown.
When the first rocks landed the Dundee United support quickly recognised what was
happening and the crowd developed the same organisation present on the terraces. The
clamjamfry and violent supporters assembled close to the Hibs supporters while the
average supporters moved quickly to the Bothwell Street Bridge in an effort to escape.
Since the attack was sudden, the focusing process was very quick. The precipitating
incident for the Dundee United supporters being the first stones to hit the crowd. As
the crowd divided into segments to resist or escape the attack a crush of individuals
trying to escape ensued at the bridge because it can only accommodate a few people at a
time. The clamjamfry responded to the stone throwing Hibs support by picking up
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stones in the road and throwing them back.
One stone that was thrown by the Hibs supporters broke a second floor window in a
block of flats along the road. The occupants of the flat responded to having their
window broken by taking the broken glass and throwing it into the Dundee United
supporters waiting to cross the bridge. Several people were badly cut by the flying
glass, especially those whose attention was on gaining access to the bridge and not
watching the proceedings.
The triangular crowd did not develop in this confrontation. The police did not arrive
while the confrontation was in progress. The violence was confined by the physical
limitations of the streets leading onto the Bothwell Street Bridge and the missiles the
supporters had to throw. A no man's land developed between the Hibs and Dundee
United supporters in the street. No charges were made by either group so no fist-fights
developed. Hibs supporters would run forward only far enough to throw rocks or
other objects before retreating.
The violence only ended when the Dundee United supporters were safely across the
bridge. When the Hibs supporters tried to cross the bridge, United supporters threw
stones at them stopping any further charge forward. Most of the Dundee United
supporters went on down to Easter Road where there was a police presence which was
enough to stop any further attacks from Hibs fans.
Although the build-up to the violence was not witnessed, the lack of effective police
crowd segregation after the match provided the opportunity for Hibs supporters to
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begin collective action. The frustration of losing a late goal when the game should have
been won may have been the precipitating factor which focused the Hibs fans on
violence. Leaders in the crowd become very important in this situation because they
must take the participants out of the ground, formulate a plan of action, and get the
supporters to follow. The focus of the participants on the leader and violence makes
this easier to accomplish than if the leaders or individual were acting independently.
Since the Dundee United supporters were not mobilised for crowd violence and the
focus was on leaving the area most people continued to try to cross the bridge. Only
the clamjamfry and violence prone supporters tried to assemble and confront the Hibs
assault. Since only a small percentage of the United support turned and focused on the
Hibs fans and tried to fight back, the violence was of short duration and limited in
scope to stone throwing. The focus of the majority of United supporters continued to
be crossing the bridge and escaping the violence.
Although several groups of Hibs and United supporters were seen running up Easter
Road after the violence, it was not until the following morning that it was learned the
one of the supporters had thrown a brick through Professor McClintock's front
window. This illustrates the limitations associated with participant observation.
Violence can easily take place outside the view of the observer and not be recorded.
Hearts versus Aberdeen
Scottish League, Tynecastle Park
April 1984
After another match in which Hearts lost when expectations of victory were high,
Hearts supporters attacked Aberdeen supporters outside Tynecastle Park on Gorgie
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Road. The match was typical in that the support groups engaged in ritualised singing
and chanting throughout. Many references were made to the casuals in the songs and
chants. Aberdeen scored a late goal for the victory and Hearts fans, in known tradition,
ran for the exits in order to run Aberdeen out of town. Hearts supporters occupied
Gorgie Road and waited for the Aberdeen fans to come out of the ground after the
match. As they had done to Hibs fans in the past, Hearts supporters, or as they call
themselves, "Gorgie Boys" attacked the Aberdeen fans with rocks, bottles and anything
else that could be thrown. As the Aberdeen fans came under attack they quickly
organised to fight. Those wishing to fight in the street quickly moved forward while
others moved back into the stadium for protection.
The Aberdeen supporters organised with the clamjamfry and violent supporters moving
to the forefront of the confrontation. The ability of the Aberdeen fans to organise
quickly may have reflected the presence of the casuals or been the result of the focusing
process in response to the assault. As the rocks and other missiles flew in, they were
picked up and thrown back. A no man's land developed between the support groups
on the road. The pavement became a safe zone for Aberdeen and Hearts supporters
trying to avoid the violence and walk up Gorgie Road toward the centre of Edinburgh.
Hearts supporters used the tattered ruins of the Gorgie Farm as ammunition to throw at
Aberdeen fans. Bricks, bottles and old boards flew in the direction of the Aberdeen
fans. After being on the receiving end of the attack for ten to fifteen minutes, Aberdeen
fans launched a counter attack which disrupted the demarcation lines and allowed most
non-participants to escape the area. The counter attack brought the two support groups
together and resulted in many fist fights. Since many of the participants were armed
with missiles, they were used as weapons in the fights and resulted in many serious
injuries. When the charge by Aberdeen supporters disrupted the demarcation lines of
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the no mans land, running battles developed on Gorgie Road as various groups tried to
find positions to defend. Missile throwing and fist fights went on all over Gorgie Road
as the groups ran around looking for victims to attack. One group of Aberdeen
supporters ran back into Tynecastle through the open exit gates and pushed down the
flimsy fence surrounding the pitch. They ran back out into the road when the police
and club stewards intervened. When the group returned to Gorgie Road they found
themselves back in the middle of another stone throwing confrontation.
The police finally moved in with horses to separate the support groups. The
supporters, despite several attempts to avoid police control, were herded down Gorgie
Road towards Haymarket. The police intervention was slow in arriving which meant
the violence was prolonged between the support groups. When the police did move in
they were very effective in stopping the violence, although several windows were
broken when the supporters were forced down the road. In this case the triangular
crowd only existed for a few minutes. The slow police response to the violence, their
effective intervention, and the supporters' refusal to fight them meant that the violence
remained two dimensional through most of the incident.
The violence was again fueled by frustration from Hearts supporters at the loss when
the expectation of victory was high. The game was marked by intense ritualised
behaviour created by the possibility of the casuals being in the ground. This created the
mobilisation under the generalised belief. The frustration, the major precipitating factor,
was vented as anger and aggression. In addition to the frustration aggression, the
presence or supposed presence of the casuals meant Hearts supporters were ready and
willing for a fight. The first rock thrown signalled the start of prolonged intense
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violence. By surrounding the Aberdeen supporters and not allowing easy escape by the
average supporters many people became involved in the confrontation. The casuals
may not have been a major force in the crowd, but two groups of youths without
scarves were witnessed running along Gorgie Road as the police moved in. The
violence was limited by the confines of Gorgie Road. The violence lasted for a
prolonged period due to slow intervention by the police. Once the police had moved in
between the support groups and moved them far enough apart to prevent rock throwing
the violence ended.
This entire incident was witnessed from the centre of no man's land on Gorgie Road.
Hundreds of stones and missiles flew overhead as the support groups jockeyd for
positions of advantage. The group who ran into Tynecastle looking for victims were
witnessed from the rear of the running group, before returning to no man's land on
Gorgie Road. Several scarf clad supporters from both sides threatened violence, but
none of them made any overt advances. Many missiles had to be avoided, which
disrupted concentration on the violence between the support groups. The position in
the middle of no man's land was maintained until the police move into it to separate the
combatants, at which point I gave way to the police horses. Once the police had the
Aberdeen supporters ushered down Gorgie Road, I followed with the Hearts support
who were held back by more police in a successful effort to keep a substantial distance
between the two groups.
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APPENDIX B
MAPS OF FOOTBALL GROUNDS VISITED
The following Scottish football grounds were visited at least once during the course of
the is study. The actual layout of the grounds are found in the following pages. The
grounds visited in Scotland include: Pittodrie Stadium, Aberdeen; Celtic Park,
Glasgow; Dens Park, Dundee; Tannadice Park, Dundee (United); Easter Road,
Edinburgh (Hibernian); Fir Park, Motherwell; Ibrox Stadium, Glasgow; Love Street,
Paisley (St. Mirren); Tynecastle Park, Edinburgh (Heart of Midlothian); Douglas
Park, Hamilton; Muirton Park, Perth (St. Johstone); Kilbowie Park, Clydebank;
Cappielow Park, Greenock (Morton); Rugby Park, Kilmarnock; Broomfield Park,
Airdrie; Shawfield Stadium, Glasgow (Clyde); Firhill Park, Glasgow (Partick
Thistle); Hampden Park, Glasgow (Queen's Park and Scotland); Shiefield Park,
Berwick; East End Park, Dunfermline; and Meadowbank Stadium, Edinburgh. 1
In addition to the grounds visited in Scotland, the following grounds were visited in
England. Annfield, Liverpool; Roker Park, Sunderland; Portman Road, Ipswich;
Loftus Road, London (Queens Park Rangers); Highbury, London (Arsenal); White
Hart Lane, London (Tottenham Hotspur); Stamford Bridge, London (Chelsea);
Vicarage Road, Watford; and the Manor Ground, Oxford.




























































The following questionnaire was designed and tested on the football terraces during the
1980 football season. Due to sampling problems, study design problems, and advice
from Dr. A. N. Oppenheim, the questionnaire was abandon in favour of participant
observation as a method of gathering data about football crowds. 1
SURVEY OF FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS
Instructions: Complete each question by placing a tick in the proper
column, or circle the answer to the question or by filling
in your answer in the space provided. Yes No
1. How many or (name of team) home matches do you attend each month?
2. How many or (name of team) away matches do you attend each month?
3. Do you attend matches not involving (name of team)?
4. Are you involved in a (name of team) supporters club?
5. How many pints or whiskeys do you drink on an average day?
6. How many pints or whiskeys die you drink before the match?
7. Did you bring any alcohol in with you today?
8. If the answers yes, how much alcohol did you bring in?
1. The questionnaire originally was on one sheet of paper for easier use. It appears here in a longer
form for ease of reading.
316
9. Have you ever participated in a fight insides a football ground?
10. If the answer is yes, how many times?
11. Have you ever participated in a fight outside a football ground?
12. If the answer is yes, how many times?
13. Have you ever participated in a pitch invasion?
14. If the answer is yes, how many times?
15. Have you ever thrown objects at opposing supporters?
16. If the answer is yes, how many times?
17. Have you ever thrown objects at opposing players?
18. If the answer is yes, how many times?
19. Have you ever damaged property outside a football ground? .
20. If the answer is yes, how many times?
21. Would you participate in a fight against (opposing team of the day) supporters?
22. Concerning the police at football matches, do you, strongly like, generally like, have no
opinion, generally dislike, or strongly dislike them?
23. Why do you (answer from #22) the police?
24. Concerning the police in (cities name) do you, strongly like, generally like, have no opinion,
generally dislike, or strongly dislike them?
25. Why do you (answer from #24) the police?
26. Have you ever been arrested for your conduct at a football match?
28. Do you idendfy with any of these youth groups: Mods, Punks, Rockers, Skinheads,
or some other group?
29. How old are you?
30. What is your religion?
31. How many times a month do you attend church?
32. What level of education have you obtained?
33. Do you attend school or university?
34. If the answer is yes, what is the name of the school?
35. What is the name of your job?
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36. What is your take home pay each week?
37. Are you married?
38. What type of accommodation do you live in?
39. What is the name of your fathers job?
Date Cup or League match Day or evening match
Time of interview Home team Away team
End Final score Supporter train or coach
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